

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 119,632

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

STATE OF KANSAS,
Appellee,

v.

REYNALDO PEREZ-MARES a/k/a STEVEN TRUJILLO,
Appellant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Ford District Court; VAN Z. HAMPTON, judge. Opinion filed April 19, 2019.
Affirmed.

Peter J. Antosh, of Garcia & Antosh, LLP, of Dodge City, for appellant.

Steven J. Obermeier, assistant solicitor general, and *Derek Schmidt*, attorney general, for appellee.

Before ARNOLD-BURGER, P.J., PIERRON, J., and MCANANY, S.J.

PER CURIAM: Before trial, Reynaldo Perez-Mares moved to discharge the jury venire for systematic underrepresentation of Hispanics in jury venires in Ford County. The district court incorporated its findings in 17CR354, *State v. Miguel Angel Perez* (now appellate case No. 119,336), and denied the motion. Perez-Mares appeals.

FACTS

On May 3, 2017, the State charged Perez-Mares with driving under the influence (DUI), driving without a valid driver's license, and transporting an open container for an incident that occurred two weeks prior. In a bench trial before the magistrate judge, on

November 3, 2017, the district court found Perez-Mares guilty of DUI and transporting an open container and not guilty of driving without a valid driver's license. On December 15, 2017, the court sentenced him to 1 year of probation with an underlying sentence of 120 days in jail with all but 5 days suspended. The court also imposed fines of \$1,450. Perez-Mares timely filed a notice of appeal to the district court pursuant to K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-3609a.

Perez-Mares filed a timely request for a jury trial under K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-3609a(5). The day before the jury trial, Perez-Mares filed a preemptive four-part motion, requesting (1) to discharge the jury venire; (2) a hearing on venire selection; (3) a continuance without a speedy trial waiver; and (4) to seal the motions.

The district court did not hear Perez-Mares' motion, but rather incorporated its findings, order, and transcript from the February 1, 2018 motion hearing in 17CR354, *State v. Miguel Angel Perez* (appellate case No. 119,336), as the prosecutor, defense counsel, and issue were the same. The court denied Perez-Mares' motion.

The jury ultimately found Perez-Mares guilty of DUI, driving without a valid license, and transporting an open container following a trial on stipulated facts. After the verdict, Perez-Mares renewed his objection to the jury process. The district court sentenced Perez-Mares to 1 year of probation with an underlying sentence of 120 days, with all but 5 days suspended. Of the 5 days, Perez-Mares had to serve 48 consecutive hours in jail and the remaining days could be served as arranged by Perez-Mares either in jail on house arrest, or at work release. The court also ordered \$1,650 in fines.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

We begin by noting the district court fully incorporated the arguments of the parties and the court's ultimate holdings in another case decided this date involving the

same prosecutor, defense attorney, and we will do the same for purposes of appellate review. See *State v. Miguel Angel Perez* (appellate case No. 119,336).

On appeal, Perez-Mares argues that he met his burden of making a prima facie showing of a continuing trend of underrepresentation of Hispanics in jury venires in Ford County. He asserts his claims satisfied the three factor test set out in *Duren v. Missouri*, 439 U.S. 357, 364, 99 S. Ct. 664, 58 L. Ed. 2d 579 (1979) and the district court should have given him the opportunity to explore the root cause of the racial disparity. He asks us to reverse the district court's findings and remand the case for an evidentiary hearing on the matter.

Standard of Review

Perez-Mares argues that resolution of his argument involves a mixed question of fact and law. When reviewing a mixed question of fact and law, an appellate court applies a bifurcated review standard. This court generally reviews the district court's factual findings under the substantial competent evidence standard. Its conclusions of law based on those facts are subject to unlimited review. *State v. Miller*, 293 Kan. 535, 547, 264 P.3d 461 (2011).

The State, however, claims we must use the negative factual finding standard. Perez-Mares moved for discharge of the jury venire, under K.S.A. 22-3407, which imposes an affirmative duty on the movant to show improper selection in the jury venire. The district court's finding that Perez-Mares did not meet his burden was a negative factual finding. When reviewing a negative factual finding, the appellate court must consider whether the district court arbitrarily disregarded undisputed evidence or relied upon some extrinsic consideration such as bias, passion, or prejudice to reach its decision. *State v. Smith*, 303 Kan. 673, 679, 366 P.3d 226 (2016).

We need not decide which position is correct, because under both standards, the result is the same.

The Exclusion of Jurors on the Basis of Race or National Origin

Under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, in criminal prosecutions, "the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed." According to the K.S.A. 43-155, it is the public policy of the State of Kansas "that jury service is the solemn obligation of all qualified citizens." Jurors must "be a citizen of the state, resident of the county and possess the qualifications of an elector," and potential jurors cannot be excluded from service "on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic status." K.S.A. 43-156. The United States Supreme Court has determined a jury selection system violates the right to an impartial jury if the system does not draw its jury venirepersons from a fair cross section of the community. *Duren*, 439 U.S. at 364; *Taylor v. Louisiana*, 419 U.S. 522, 529-30, 95 S. Ct. 692, 42 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1975).

"In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a 'distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process." *Duren*, 439 U.S. at 364.

The parties agree that the first prong of the test has been met. Hispanics are a distinctive group in the community. Instead, the State contests Perez-Mares' claim to have satisfied the second and third prongs.

Whether Representation of Hispanics Is Fair and Reasonable In Relation to the Number of Hispanics in the Community

Perez-Mares correctly asserts that the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution required the jury venire be drawn from a source that is fairly representative of the community. To support his assertion that they were not, Perez-Mares submitted the 2000 and 2010 U.S. Censuses to show Hispanics constituted 37.7% and 51.2% of the Ford County residents, respectively. From the growth trend, he estimated the Hispanic population by 2018 would have been at least 55%. Perez-Mares then provided 12 jury venires from July 8, 2010, through May 25, 2017, cases defense counsel had been involved in, and provided them as a sampling of venires in that timeframe. He determined, based on Hispanic sounding names, Hispanics made up 50 out of 395 jurors or about 12.7% of the Ford County jury venires. He calculated the absolute disparity, as defined in *United States v. Shinault*, 147 F.3d 1266, 1271-72 (10th Cir. 1998) to be 38.5%. From that, he determined the comparative disparity, which measures the decreased likelihood Hispanics would be called for jury service, was 75.2%. He asserted that a 10% absolute disparity is generally a prima facie threshold in demonstrating a Sixth Amendment violation.

The district court considered the data, noting that Hispanics were the largest group in the area who are likely noncitizens. Jury duty requires citizenship, while the census considers only residency. The court noted that even if resident noncitizens received jury questionnaires, they would not be summoned as part of the venire. The court found that though Perez-Mares' calculations showed an underrepresentation, it would be difficult to prove the actual numbers, which would show a disparity based on juror qualifications. Thus, the court held that the underrepresentation was neither unfair nor unreasonable.

The question is not simply whether disparity exists, but also whether the disparity is unfair or unreasonable. In *Duren*, the defendant presented weekly jury venires for nearly a year to show the underrepresentation of women in the venires was consistent.

439 U.S. at 362. Perez-Mares presents only 12 venires from a 7-year period with no explanation of how many venires had been created in that time or how his evidence shows consistency of the underrepresentation. He doubts that those 12 venires were anomalies but provides nothing to support that assertion.

The Kansas Legislature also requires that jurors be citizens of the state, residents of the county, and qualified as an elector. And although the 2010 U.S. Census provided ethnicity and residence, it did not provide citizenship of the residents. Perez-Mares does not suggest what percentage of the population could qualify as venirepersons. The district court pointed out that the jury venire was a result of jury questionnaires returned and Perez-Mares failed to present any evidence regarding a difference between questionnaires sent out and those returned or those returned with hardship requests granted.

Though Perez-Mares' evidence suggests a large disparity, he provided no concrete numbers proving the disparity or how such disparity would be unfair or unreasonable. A sampling of only 12 select venires over a 7-year period with nothing more is not sufficient. The district court properly determined that Perez-Mares did not satisfy the second prong of the *Duren* test because he failed to show the underrepresentation of Hispanics in the jury venires was unfair or unreasonable in relation to the number of Hispanics in the community.

Whether the Underrepresentation Was Due to Systematic Exclusion of Hispanics

Perez-Mares claims the high absolute disparity, which he admits stems only from venires from his defense counsel's cases over the previous seven years, suggests a systematic exclusion, but he needed more time to discover the cause of the disparity. He claims that the district court improperly concluded that an intent to exclude Hispanics from jury pools was a necessary element for him to establish this prong. To the contrary, he asserts that an inference is all that is necessary.

He cites *United States v. Test*, 550 F.2d 577 (10th Cir. 1976) in support of this argument. There, the court discussed the two types of United States Supreme Court cases in which arguments had succeeded on inference of systematic exclusion. The first type of cases are the "rule of exclusion" cases, in which the distinctive group had been totally excluded from jury service or had only "token representation" over a substantial period. 550 F.2d at 586. The second type of cases presented a "substantial underrepresentation" of a distinctive group, in which the various stages of the selection process provided "obvious opportunities for discrimination." 550 F.2d at 586.

Though he does not specify which type of *Test* case this would be, it appears Perez-Mares classifies this as a "rule of exclusion" case that with further investigation could become a "substantial underrepresentation" case. However, if he classifies this as a "rule of exclusion" case, Perez-Mares' evidence falls short of a sufficient showing as demonstrated in the second prong. His calculated absolute disparity does not necessarily show a systematic exclusion. If he classifies this as a "substantial underrepresentation" case, he fails as he has presented no evidence of opportunities for discrimination in the jury selection process.

Moreover, we believe Perez-Mares improperly concluded that the district court inferred an intent requirement as the court only determined a systematic exclusion requires an act by the government, not an exclusion intent. For example, in *Castaneda v. Partida*, 430 U.S. 482, 493-94, 97 S. Ct. 1272, 51 L. Ed. 2d 498 (1977), the Supreme Court used a test similar to that in *Duren* but found the systematic exclusion prong required a showing of a "*selection procedure* that is susceptible of abuse or is not racially neutral." (Emphasis added). And in *Berghuis v. Smith*, 559 U.S. 314, 332, 130 S. Ct. 1382, 176 L. Ed. 2d 249 (2010), Smith provided a list of possible factors contributing to the underrepresentation of African-Americans in jury venires to show systematic exclusion. The Court rejected his claim and found "[n]o 'clearly established' precedent of this Court support[ed] Smith's claim that he can make out a prima facie case merely by

pointing to a host of factors that, individually or in combination, *might* contribute to a group's underrepresentation." 559 U.S. at 332.

Kansas jury venires are "prepared from voter registration records of the county, lists of licensed drivers residing in the county or enumeration or census records for the county, in accordance with the intent and purposes of [the Petit and Grand Jurors Act of 1971]." K.S.A. 43-162. The Kansas Supreme Court has determined that the use of voter registrations and driver's license records to generate jury venires is constitutional as it only excludes those who cannot or choose not to partake in such activities. *State v. Ji*, 251 Kan. 3, 7, 832 P.2d 1176 (1992). That excludes no distinct group in the community and so creates no constitutional concern. 251 Kan. at 7.

Perez-Mares' claim of systematic exclusion as required by the third prong of the *Duren* test is based solely on the numbers, rather than the system. He claims the system must be the cause without suggesting how such a systematic exclusion would be possible. Perez-Mares' assertion falls short of the list provided in *Berghuis*, as he does not even offer up factors to consider. He only requests additional time to research the issue, which should have been completed prior to the motions hearing. He has failed to present a prima facie case for a Sixth Amendment violation, although the number of Hispanics serving on juries is quite suspicious.

Affirmed.