264 Kan. 293
(955 P2d 1136)
No. 80,223
STATE OF KANSAS ex rel. NICK A. TOMASIC, WYANDOTTE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY,Relator, v. THE UNIFIED GOVERNMENT OF WYANDOTTE COUNTY/KANSAS CITY, KANSAS, Respondent.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1. It is a fundamental rule that our state constitution limits rather than confers powers. Where the constitutionality of a statute is involved, the question presented is, therefore, not whether the act is authorized by the constitution, but whether it is prohibited thereby.
2. The constitutionality of a statute is presumed, all doubts must be resolved in favor of its validity, and before the statute may be stricken down, it must clearly appear the statute violates the constitution.
3. In determining constitutionality, it is the court's duty to uphold a statute under attack rather than defeat it, and if there is any reasonable way to construe the statute as constitutionally valid, that should be done.
4. Consolidating the governments of a city and a county is a legislative power.
5. The legislature may enact general provisions and delegate to an administrative body the power to fill in the details if the legislature establishes reasonable and definite standards to govern the administrative body's exercise of authority.
6. Where flexibility in fashioning administrative regulations to carry out statutory purpose is desirable in light of complexities in the area sought to be regulated, the legislature may enact statutes in a broad outline and authorize the administrative agency to fill in the details. Standards may be implied from the statutory purpose.
7. Kansas follows the modern trend that requires less detailed standards and guidance to administrative agencies in order to facilitate the administration of laws in areas of complex social and economic problems.
8. Older statutes are subordinate to new enactments, as the newer statutes are the later expression of the legislative intent and so will control if there is a possible conflict between the two.
9. General and special statutes should be read together and harmonized whenever possible, but to the extent a conflict between them exists, the special statute will prevail unless it appears the legislature intended to make the general statute controlling.
10. Once the legislature has delegated by a law a function to the executive branch, it may only revoke that authority by proper enactment of another law in accordance with the provisions of art. 2, § 14 of our state constitution.
11. Where parts of a statute or a section of a statute can be readily separated, then the part which is constitutional may stand while the unconstitutional part is rejected.
12. The legislature may give voters permission to form themselves into a certain form of local government, and when, by the proper election, they avail themselves of this permission, they are not exercising legislative power, but merely accepting a privilege conferred by a proper exercise of such power.
13. K.S.A. 1997 Supp. 19-101a(a)(2) only applies to counties consolidating with one another and does not apply to a county consolidating with a city.
14. Art. 2, § 16 of the Kansas Constitution should not be construed narrowly or technically to invalidate proper and needful legislation. Generally, where the subject of the legislation is germane to other provisions in the legislation, the legislation is not objectionable as containing more than one subject. Art. 2, § 16 is violated only where an act of legislation embraces two or more dissimilar and discordant subjects that cannot reasonably be considered as having any legitimate connection with or relationship to each other.
15. The Kansas Constitution contains no inhibition upon the power of the legislature to provide, as it may deem best, the method for the appointment of officers whose election or appointment is not otherwise provided for. On the other hand, the constitution expressly declares that all officers whose election or appointment is not otherwise provided for shall be chosen or appointed as may be prescribed by law. Kan. Const. art. 15, § 1. The constitution has placed in the legislature the power to regulate the mode of appointing officers not otherwise provided for.
16. Whether this court may sever an unconstitutional provision from a statute and leave the remainder in force and effect depends on the intent of the legislature. If from examination of a statute it can be said that the act would have been passed without the objectionable portion and if the statute would operate effectively to carry out the intent of the legislature with such portion stricken, the remainder of the law will stand as valid. Whether the legislature had provided for a severability clause is of no importance. This court will assume severability if the unconstitutional part can be severed without doing violence to legislative intent.
Original action in quo warranto. Opinion filed March 6, 1998. Quo warranto denied.
Nick A. Tomasic, district attorney, and Thomas M. Martin and Michael P. Howe, of Lewis, Rice & Fingersh, L.C., of Kansas City, Missouri, argued the cause and were on the brief for relator.
Harold T. Walker, chief counsel, of Unified Government of Wyandotte County/Kansas City, argued the cause, and N. Cason Boudreau, deputy city attorney, and Michael M. Schultz and Daniel B. Denk, of McAnany, Van Cleave & Phillips, P.A., of Kansas City, and Kathryn Pruessner Peters and Norman E. Gaar, of McDowell, Rice, Smith & Gaar, of Overland Park, were with him on the brief for respondent.
Christopher K. McKenzie, of Topeka, and Donald L. Moler, Jr., of Topeka, were on the brief for amicus curiae League of Kansas Municipalities.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ABBOTT, J.: This is an original action in quo warranto. The action was filed by Wyandotte County District Attorney Nick Tomasic seeking a ruling on the constitutionality of the Consolidation Act, K.S.A. 1997 Supp. 12-340 et seq., which authorized a procedure whereby the voters of Wyandotte County (County) could adopt a consolidated government for County and Kansas City, Kansas (City).
The parties filed a stipulation of facts. By way of background, we include a portion of the stipulation of facts.
"The County is comprised of 155.7 square miles and has a 1996 estimated population of 153,427. The County is the smallest county in Kansas. The County has the fourth largest population in the State of Kansas among Kansas counties.
"The County includes four (4) incorporated municipalities and a small unincorporated area of 2.7 square miles, the Loring area, which is south of Bonner Springs. The four incorporated municipalities are the City, Edwardsville, Bonner Springs and Lake Quivira.
"The City is a city of the first class. It is comprised of 127.85 [square] miles, and has a 1996 estimated population of 142,654. The City is the second largest city in Kansas in terms of population and the largest city in Kansas in land area.
"Approximately 82.1% of the County is within the geographic boundaries of the City.
"The City is the county seat of the County. The County Courthouse and most of the county officials are located in the City.
"Bonner Springs is a second class city. Its boundaries extend over Wyandotte and Johnson Counties. Its 1996 estimated population is 6,541, with 6,538 persons residing in Wyandotte County. Bonner Spring's area covers 15.8 square miles, with 15.5 square miles in Wyandotte County.
"Edwardsville is a third class city. Its 1996 estimated population is 4,097. It covers 9.2 square miles.
"Lake Quivira is a third class city. Its boundaries extend over Wyandotte and Johnson Counties. Its 1996 estimated population is 1,013, of which approximately 40 live in Wyandotte County. It covers 1.3 square miles, with .3 square miles in Wyandotte County.
"The unincorporated Loring area of the County covers 2.7 square miles. Its 1996 estimated population is 95.
. . . .
"In 1991, the City annexed 17 square miles of unincorporated land in the County, commonly known as the Piper area. See In Re Petition of the City of Kansas City for Annexation of Land, 253 Kan. 402, 856 P.2d 144 (1993).
. . . .
"As a result of the 1991 annexation, there were mergers of organizations and consolidation of functions. The County Sheriff's deputy patrol, the County road and bridge repair program and the County zoning function were eliminated. The Joint City-County Board of Health was eliminated and all responsibilities and facilities were transferred to the County. The City transferred all jail responsibilities to the County, by interlocal agreement. Solid waste planning vested totally in the City by interlocal agreement for county-wide purposes. The City acquired all remaining water districts in the County. A County sewer district was eliminated.
. . . .
"Pursuant to the Consolidation Act, on or about May 15, 1996, Governor William Graves appointed five (5) private citizens to form the Consolidation Study Commission of Kansas City, Kansas and Wyandotte County (the 'Commission'). The Commission members who were appointed were Rev. Robert L. Baynham, Chairman, Gary D. Grable, Vice-Chairman, Dr. Thomas R. Burke, Member, Aileen C. Eidson, Member, and Richard A. Ruiz, Member. The members were not elected officials or employees of any of the governmental entities in the County.
"The Consolidation Act charged the Commission with the responsibility to study the consolidation of the City and the County governments, or the consolidation of certain offices, functions, services and operations thereof, and to prepare and adopt a plan addressing such consolidation of governments or offices, functions, services and operations, as deemed appropriate.
"From May through October, 1996, the Commission held public hearings and meetings for the purposes of providing and receiving information about the consolidation of governmental services. Thirty-five (35) public meetings were held at which the Commission solicited opinions and testimony from the staff and elected officials of the two governments regarding the operations and functions of City and County government, as well as from the general public and professionals in various occupations in the area.
"Following receipt of information, the Commission determined that it would be appropriate to prepare and adopt a plan addressing the consolidation of governments rather than the consolidation of functions.
"In November of 1996, pursuant to the Act, the Commission adopted a preliminary plan for the consolidation of the City and County governments. The preliminary plan was delivered to Governor William Graves and mailed to Senate President Richard Bond, Speaker of the House Tim Shallenburger, and each of the House and Senate Local Government Committees. The preliminary plan was filed with the County Election Officer, the City Clerk and each public library within the County.
"Following adoption of the preliminary plan, the Commission held three (3) public hearings to solicit public opinion about the preliminary plan. Approximately 300 people attended the first hearing, approximately 150 to 175 people attended the second hearing and approximately 250 people attended the third hearing.
"The Commission modified certain provisions of the preliminary plan following receipt of comments at the hearings.
"A Consolidation Study Report (the 'Plan') dated January 13, 1997, was prepared and adopted by the Commission. The Plan was submitted to the Kansas Governor and Legislature on January 13, 1997, by personal delivery to Governor William Graves, Senate President Richard Bond and Speaker of the House Tim Shallenburger. . . . The Plan was filed with the County Election Officer, the City Clerk and each public library within the County.
"The Plan provides for a new consolidated form of government, to be known as the Unified Government of Wyandotte County/Kansas City, Kansas (the 'Unified Government'). The existing governments of the City and the County are replaced by a governing body composed of a Mayor/Chief Executive and a ten member Unified Board of Commissioners. Eight Commission members are nominated and elected in eight newly created districts. Two County-wide Commission members are nominated from two newly created districts comprised of the four northern-most and four southern-most districts; these Commission members are elected at large. The Mayor/Chief Executive has veto power which can be overridden by a two-thirds majority of the Unified Board of Commissioners.
"The Plan provides for the appointment of a County Administrator by the Mayor/Chief Executive with the consent of the Unified Board of Commissioners. The County Administrator is directly responsible for the daily functions of the Unified Government.
. . . .
"The Plan provides for the establishment of an Ethics Commission, the members to be appointed by the Administrative Judge of the District Court with consent of the sitting judges of the County and appointment of a Legislative Auditor also appointed by the District Court sitting judges.
. . . .
"The Kansas Legislature did not adopt a concurrent resolution on or before February 12, 1997, rejecting the Plan. Neither the Governor nor the Kansas Legislature acted in any manner on the Plan.
. . . .
"A document entitled 'Consolidation Recommendations' was prepared by the Commission and mailed to the citizens of the County prior to the April 1, 1997 election. The document stated that it was a copy of the final recommendations submitted to the Legislature and Governor on January 13, 1997, and that the only purpose of the distribution of the document was to inform recipients of the details of the Recommendations which would appear as Question 1 on the April 1, 1997 ballot. . . .
"Pursuant to the Consolidation Act, the Plan was submitted to the qualified electors of the County (which included City residents) at the April 1, 1997 election. Fifty-nine and six-tenths percent (59.6%) of the electors voting on the Plan voted in favor thereof. . . .
. . . .
"On August 4, 1997, the governing body of the City passed Charter Ordinance No. 114 repealing provisions of Charter Ordinances No. 84 and No. 90 inconsistent with the recommendations of the Commission and establishing procedures for passage of ordinances by the Unified Government. . . .
"Charter Ordinance No. 114 was published on August 17, 1997, and thus, was not effective until October 24, 1997, sixty-one (61) days after the final publication thereof pursuant to Article 12, § 5 of the Kansas Constitution.
. . . .
"The Consolidation Act provides that the Unified Government is a county with all the powers, functions and duties afforded to counties under the Constitution and laws of the State, and is also a city of the first class with all the powers, functions and duties afforded to cities of the first class under the Constitution and laws of the State. The Consolidation Act provides that upon the effective date of consolidation of the City and County governments, the territory of the Unified Government includes all of the territory of the County for purposes of exercising powers, duties and functions of a county, and all of the territory of the County, except the territory of Bonner Springs, Edwardsville, Lake Quivira and the unincorporated areas of the County for purposes of exercising the powers, duties and functions of the City.
. . . .
"The Unified Government has operated as a consolidated city/county since the effective date of consolidation.
. . . .
"Pursuant to the Plan, the elected offices of County Clerk, County Treasurer, County Surveyor and Public Administrator became appointed positions. All functions performed by these officials will be retained in the newly appointed positions. The County Administrator has established positions of Unified Clerk and Unified Treasurer in order to consolidate the duties and responsibilities of the prior County and City Clerks and the prior County and City Treasurers. The position of County Surveyor has been designated as an administrative position within the Executive Branch to be appointed by the County Administrator. The Public Administrator position and functions will be transferred to the Judicial Branch with the district court judges determining how such functions will be carried out.
"The Plan provides that several offices have been retained for county-wide elections: Sheriff, District Attorney and the Register of Deeds. The District Attorney position is retained as it presently exists. Elections for both the Sheriff position and the Register of Deeds position will be non-partisan and held during the regularly scheduled April election period; prior to consolidation, partisan elections were held for these positions during the regularly scheduled November election period. The terms of office of these two offices will continue to be four (4) years; the terms of office of the present occupants were extended until the election period of April 2001 pursuant to the Plan.
"As of the date hereof, the Unified Government has merged some City and County departments, including the parks departments, clerks departments, legal departments and personnel departments, and merged functions of many other departments. [Approximately] 2,000 employees of the Unified Government have signed up under new health care plans under which they [became] covered as of January 1, 1998. The Unified Government has issued industrial revenue bonds. It has sent tax bills and is collecting taxes. It has carried out all aspects of consolidated city-county government, has taken official actions, has entered into contracts and has prosecuted persons for violations of municipal ordinance and state law. The Unified Government is proceeding with its capital improvements program and with economic development projects and tax increment financing projects that will require the use of the powers of eminent domain and the issuance of general obligation bonds."
"'This court has recognized on several occasions that in a proper case an original action in quo warranto is an appropriate procedure to question the constitutionality of a statute. [Citation omitted.]'" State ex rel. Stephan v. Finney, 251 Kan. 559, 567, 836 P.2d 1169 (1992) (quoting State ex rel. Stephan v. Kansas House of Representatives, 236 Kan. 45, 52, 687 P.2d 622 [1984]). State ex rel. Stephan v. Parrish, 257 Kan. 294, 297-98, 891 P.2d 445 (1995), which was also a quo warranto case, reiterated some of the general rules of constitutional construction:
"'It is fundamental that our state constitution limits rather than confers powers. Where the constitutionality of a statute is involved, the question presented is, therefore, not whether the act is authorized by the constitution, but whether it is prohibited thereby. [Hunt v. Eddy, 150 Kan. 1, 90 P.2d 747 (1939); see Leek v. Theis, 217 Kan. 784, 539 P.2d 304 (1975); Schumacher v. Rausch, 190 Kan. 239, 372 P.2d 1005 (1962); State, ex rel., v. Anderson, 180 Kan. 120, 125, 299 P.2d 1078 (1956).]
"'The constitutionality of a statute is presumed, all doubts must be resolved in favor of its validity, and before the statute may be stricken down, it must clearly appear the statute violates the constitution. [Leek v. Theis, 217 Kan. at 784, Syl. ¶ 2; see Rogers v. Shanahan, 221 Kan. 221, 223, 565 P.2d 1384 (1976); State, ex rel., v. Bennett, 219 Kan. 285, 289, 547 P.2d 786 (1976); Brown v. Wichita State University, 219 Kan. 2, 9-10, 547 P.2d 1015 (1976).]
"'In determining constitutionality, it is the court's duty to uphold a statute under attack rather than defeat it and if there is any reasonable way to construe the statute as constitutionally valid, that should be done. [State, ex rel., v. Fadely, 180 Kan. 652, Syl. ¶ 2, 308 P.2d 537 (1957); see Brown v. Wichita State University, 219 Kan. 2, Syl. ¶ 3; Leek v. Theis, 217 Kan. at 792; Shelton v. Phalen, 214 Kan. 54, Syl. ¶ 5, 519 P.2d 754 (1974).]
"'Statutes are not stricken down unless the infringement of the superior law is clear beyond substantial doubt. [Hunt v. Eddy, 150 Kan. 2, Syl. ¶ 7; see also In re Estate of Diebolt, 187 Kan. 2, 13, 353 P.2d 803 (1960); State, ex rel., v. Urban Renewal Agency of Kansas City, 179 Kan. 435, Syl. ¶ 1, 296 P.2d 656 (1956); State, ex rel., v. Board of Education, 173 Kan. 780, 790, 252 P.2d 859 (1953).]
"'Courts do not strike down legislative enactments on the mere ground they fail to conform with a strictly legalistic definition on technically correct interpretation of constitutional provisions. The test is rather whether the legislation conforms with the common understanding of the masses at the time they adopted such provisions and the presumption is in favor of the natural and popular meaning in which the words were understood by the adopters. [Hunt v. Eddy, 150 Kan. 2, Syl. ¶ 6; Leek v. Theis, 217 Kan. at 793; State, ex rel., v. Highwood Service, Inc., 205 Kan. 821, 825, 473 P.2d 97 (1970); Wall v. Harrison, 201 Kan. 600, 603, 443 P.2d 266 (1968); Higgins v. Cardinal Manufacturing Co., 188 Kan. 11, 360 P.2d 456 (1961).]
"'The propriety, wisdom, necessity and expedience of legislation are exclusively matters for legislative determination and courts will not invalidate laws, otherwise constitutional, because the members of the court do not consider the statute in the public interest of the state, since, necessarily, what the views of members of the court may be upon the subject is wholly immaterial and it is not the province nor the right of courts to determine the wisdom of legislation touching the public interest as that is a legislative function with which courts cannot interfere. [State, ex rel., v. Fadely, 180 Kan. at 659; see City of Wichita v. White, 205 Kan. 408, 469 P.2d 287 (1970); Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Axe, 197 Kan. 91, 415 P.2d 406 (1966); Tri-State Hotel Co. v. Londerholm, 195 Kan. at 760.]'" (Quoting State ex rel. Schneider v. Kennedy, 225 Kan. 13, 20-21, 587 P.2d 844 [1978].)
Following the Act's mandate, the Commission completed the Plan, which recommended total consolidation of the governments in Wyandotte County and Kansas City, Kansas. The Commission submitted the Plan to the Governor and the legislature in a timely fashion. The legislature did not reject the Plan by concurrent resolution, and the voters of Wyandotte County voted to adopt the Plan by a margin of 60 to 40 percent. In reliance upon the voters' adoption of the Plan, the governments of Wyandotte County and Kansas City, Kansas, were consolidated into one governing body--the Unified Government. The members of the governing body of the Unified Government were sworn in on October 1, 1997, and first met on October 2, 1997.
I. ART. 2, § 1 OF THE KANSAS CONSTITUTION
Art. 2, § 1 of the Kansas Constitution provides: "The legislative power of this state shall be vested in a house of representatives and a senate." Legislative power is the power to make, amend, or repeal laws. Executive power is the power to enforce the law, and judicial power is the power to interpret and apply the law to actual controversy. State ex rel. Stephan v. Finney, 251 Kan. at 577.
"'The power to create municipal corporations, including the power to designate their boundaries and to increase or to decrease their corporate limits, is purely legislative--it is not a part of either the executive or judicial branch of government.'" State, ex rel., v. City of Overland Park, 215 Kan. 700, 706, 527 P.2d 1340 (1974) (quoting Ruland v. City of Augusta, 120 Kan. 42, 50, 242 Pac. 456 [1926]); see also Lampe v. City of Leawood, 170 Kan. 251, 253, 225 P.2d 73 (1950) (the creation of a municipal corporation is a legislative function). Similarly, counties are created by the State and their powers, rights, and duties are derived from the legislature and may be changed as the legislature sees fit. Cow Creek Valley Flood Prevention Ass'n v. City of Hutchinson, 166 Kan. 78, 83, 200 P.2d 279 (1948). The consolidation of the governments of a city and a county is not identical to creating a new city or county or changing their boundaries. However, consolidation of city and county governments is similar enough to the legislative powers cited above that it is reasonable to conclude that consolidating the governments of a city and a county together is also a legislative power.
Courts permit the legislature to delegate certain powers to administrative agencies. However, the delegation of a power, such as consolidating the governments of a city and a county, to a private group, as opposed to an administrative agency, is improper. Sedlak v. Dick, 256 Kan. 779, 795, 887 P.2d 1119 (1995). Based on this distinction between a private group and a public administrative agency, the relator contends that the Commission is a private group, as opposed to a public agency or board. Thus, the relator asserts that the legislature has improperly delegated the legislative power of consolidating the city and the county governments to a private group--the Commission.
The respondent rejects this argument by claiming that the Commission is not a private group and has none of the qualities of a private entity. The respondent contends that the Commission was not an independently existing private association, partnership, or corporation. Instead, the respondent contends that the Commission was a public administrative agency, created by statute, which the legislature properly delegated power to. According to the respondent, the Commission was similar to every other public governmental task force or study commission charged with making a recommendation on governmental action.
We hold that the Commission is a public administrative agency, created by statute, which the legislature properly delegated power to. The Commission was created by the legislature, in the Act, to do as the legislature ordered. It was organized for the exclusive legislative purpose of preparing a Plan to consolidate the two governments, with its powers prescribed by statute. It did not exist prior to or independent of legislative authorization.
The Commission may not have had full accountability to the executive branch, the legislative branch, or to the voters, but it did have some. The Governor had the power, under the Act, to appoint the members of the Commission and the implied power to remove such members. The legislature could have passed a bill disbanding the Commission. The State provided funds to the Commission, and the Commission was under an implied duty not to misuse these funds. More importantly, the Wyandotte County voters had the opportunity to approve or disapprove of the Plan. Clearly, the Commission was accountable to more than just its own organization, and it had a connection with other branches of government. Thus, the Commission was a public entity and not a private one. As such, the Act did not unconstitutionally delegate legislative power--the power to consolidate a city and county government--to a private entity in violation of art. 2, § 1 of the Kansas Constitution. This issue fails.
II. DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER
Legislative power is the power to make a law, as opposed to the power to enforce a law. A legislature may try to delegate the legislative power to make a law. Such a delegation is improper, unless specific constitutional authority allows the legislature to delegate its legislative power to a different branch of government. If the constitution does not authorize a delegation of such legislative power, then the delegation is improper as a violation of the separation of powers doctrine and art. 2, § 1, which vests legislative power with the legislature only. However, a legislature may delegate an administrative power to a different branch of government. Administrative power is the power to administer or enforce a law, as opposed to the legislative power to make a law. The legislature does not need constitutional authority to delegate administrative power because it is not delegating a power reserved for its branch of government under art. 2, § 1.
It is often difficult to determine if the legislature has delegated the legislative power to make a law or the administrative power to administer a law. The difference between the two types of delegated powers depends upon the amount of specific standards included within the delegation. If the legislature has included specific standards in a delegation, then it has already enacted the law and it is simply delegating the administrative power to administer the law, based on the standards included in the delegation. On the other hand, if the legislature has not included specific standards within a delegation, then the legislature has delegated the legislative power to make the law. Such delegation is improper without constitutional authorization. Wesley Medical Center v. McCain, 226 Kan. 263, 270, 597 P.2d 1088 (1979); State, ex rel. v. State Board of Education, 215 Kan. 551, 554, 527 P.2d 952 (1974); State, ex rel., v. Fadely, 180 Kan. 652, Syl. ¶ 7, 308 P.2d 537 (1957); State, ex rel., v. Hines, 163 Kan. 300, 303, 182 P.2d 865 (1947).
A delegated power constitutes administrative power if the delegation contains sufficient policies and standards to guide the nonlegislative body in exercising the delegated power. State, ex rel., v. Bennett, 219 Kan. 285, 300, 547 P.2d 786 (1976); see State, ex rel., v. Fadely, 180 Kan. at 663-64. In other words, the legislature may enact general provisions and delegate to an administrative body the discretion to "'fill in the details'" if the legislature establishes "'reasonable and definite standards to govern the exercise of such authority.'" State v. Ponce, 258 Kan. 708, 712, 907 P.2d 876 (1995) (quoting Kaufman v. Kansas Dept. of SRS, 248 Kan. 951, 956, 811 P.2d 876 [1991]); see Vakas v. Kansas Bd. of Healing Arts, 248 Kan. 589, 594, 808 P.2d 1355 (1991).
The relator argues that the Act contained only two stated factors to guide the Commission in the exercise of its delegated power. These factors were found in K.S.A. 1997 Supp. 12-343 and require the Commission to consider, in making a consolidation recommendation:
"(1) . . . the efficiency and effectiveness of the administrative operations of the city and county [and]
"(2) . . . the costs and benefits of consolidating the city and county or certain city and county offices, functions, servic