City of Hutchinson v. Spears

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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 114,233

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

CITY OF HUTCHINSON,
Appellee,

v.

TYSON SPEARS,
Appellant.


MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Reno District Court; TRISH ROSE, judge. Opinion filed March 2, 2018. Affirmed.

Michael S. Holland II, of Holland and Holland, of Russell, for appellant.

Michael C. Robinson, municipal court prosecutor, for appellee.

Before HILL, P.J., McANANY and ATCHESON, JJ.

PER CURIAM: Tyson James Spears appeals his conviction for driving under the
influence of alcohol. At issue is whether his breath test results were admissible under the
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule after State v. Nece, 306 Kan. 679, 396 P.3d
709 (2017) (Nece II). We hold that they were.

On May 12, 2014, Hutchinson police officers intervened in a domestic dispute
involving Spears and a woman who wanted Spears to move his vehicle, which was
blocking her driveway. Spears complied and moved his car onto the street. The police
thought that Spears might be intoxicated and investigated further. This included checking
Spears' license, and that is when they discovered Spears' license had been suspended. Due
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to the police's belief that Spears was intoxicated and his license suspended, the police told
Spears not to drive his automobile.

Spears did not listen. The police were told that Spears drove his car away from the
location of the domestic dispute. They stopped Spears and began a DUI investigation.
After the police determined there was probable cause to believe that Spears was
intoxicated, they arrested him for driving under the influence of alcohol. He was provided
with the oral and written notices required by the Kansas implied-consent law and agreed
to submit to a breath test. Under the implied-consent law, an individual's consent to the
testing of his or her blood, breath, urine, or other bodily substances for alcohol content is
implied under certain circumstances if the individual operates or attempts to operate a
vehicle in Kansas. See K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 8-1001. In turn, K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 8-1025
made it a crime for an individual to withdraw that implied consent by refusing the test.

The breath test result was higher than the legal limit. Spears was charged with
driving under the influence of alcohol, driving on a suspended license, and illegal
transportation of an alcoholic beverage. In Hutchison Municipal Court, Spears pled no
contest to the charges and was found guilty. Spears appealed to the Reno County District
Court. Before the district court, he filed a motion to suppress the breath test result,
contending that his consent was coerced and involuntary and the breath test was an
unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Spears waived his right to a jury trial and agreed to a trial on stipulated
facts.

The district court denied the motion to suppress and found Spears guilty of driving
under the influence and driving on a suspended license. The district court sentenced
Spears to a jail term, a fine, and placed him on probation. He appealed to this court.

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While this appeal was pending, the Kansas Supreme Court struck down portions
of the Kansas implied-consent law. The court held that K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-1025 was
facially unconstitutional because by punishing an individual for withdrawing his or her
consent to search, it violated the fundamental right to be free from an unreasonable
search and was not narrowly tailored to serve the State's interests. State v. Ryce, 303 Kan.
899, Syl. ¶¶ 9, 12, 368 P.3d 342 (2016) (Ryce I), aff'd on reh'g 306 Kan. 682, 396 P.3d
711 (2017) (Ryce II). On the same day, our Supreme Court affirmed the suppression of a
defendant's breath-alcohol test result in a case similar to this one. The court determined
that the test resulted from involuntary consent because under the Kansas implied-consent
law, the defendant was informed that she might be charged with a separate crime for
refusing to submit to a breath-alcohol test and, in light of Ryce I, the State could not have
constitutionally imposed criminal penalties if the defendant refused the testing.
Therefore, the defendant's consent was obtained by means of an inaccurate and coercive
advisement. State v. Nece, 303 Kan. 888, 889, 897, 367 P.3d 1260 (2016) (Nece I), aff'd
on reh'g 306 Kan. 679, 396 P.3d 709 (2017) (Nece II).

Shortly thereafter, the United States Supreme Court went further, holding in a
similar case that drivers cannot be deemed to have consented to a blood-alcohol content
test on the threat of a charge of a criminal offense for refusal. But the Court held that
warrantless breath tests are permitted under another exception to the warrant
requirement—as a search incident to arrest. Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. ___,
136 S. Ct. 2160, 2185-86, 195 L. Ed. 2d 560 (2016).

After Birchfield, the Kansas Supreme Court reheard and reaffirmed Ryce I and
Nece I. The court modified its Ryce I decision "to reflect the validity of conducting a
breath test in a DUI case where an arrest is made under the warrant exception of a search
incident to lawful arrest," but the court reaffirmed its original holding that K.S.A. 2016
Supp. 8-1025 was unconstitutional based on its interpretation of the Kansas statute. Ryce
II, 306 Kan. at 693, 698-99. In Nece II, the court reaffirmed that Nece's consent to the
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warrantless breath test was involuntary. But the court did not further analyze whether the
search was lawful under the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant
requirement. 306 Kan. at 680-81.

We ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs addressing Nece I and Nece
II and whether any exceptions to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment
should be applied.

The State argues that the exclusionary rule should not be applied because the
officer acted in good-faith reliance on the Kansas statute when advising Spears that he
might be charged with a separate crime for refusing the breath test. Spears argues that the
State cannot raise the good-faith exception for the first time on appeal and that the good-
faith exception does not apply under the circumstances.

Ordinarily, unconstitutionally obtained evidence should be excluded from the
criminal trial of the victim of the illegal search. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55, 81
S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961). But our Supreme Court has recognized a good-faith
exception to the exclusionary rule when an officer acted in objectively reasonable
reliance on a statute that is later determined to be unconstitutional. In such cases,
suppression does not serve the purpose of the exclusionary rule, which is to deter police
misconduct. The good-faith exception is dependent on whether a statute can support an
officer's objective reasonable reliance on it—not on the officer's subjective beliefs. An
officer's reliance on a statute is not objectively reasonable if: "(a) in its enactment, the
legislature wholly abandoned its responsibility to pass constitutional laws; or (b) the
statutory provisions are such that a reasonable law enforcement officer should have
known the statute was unconstitutional." State v. Daniel, 291 Kan. 490, Syl. ¶ 8, 500, 242
P.3d 1186 (2010) (citing Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 355, 107 S. Ct. 1160, 94 L. Ed.
2d 364 [1987]).

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Following our reasoning in State v. Perkins, 55 Kan. App. 2d ___, Syl. ¶ 6 (No.
112,449, this day decided), we will consider the applicability of the good-faith exception
for the first time on appeal because it is a question of law based on stipulated facts and is
determinative of the case. State v. Schmidt, 53 Kan. App. 2d 225, 233, 385 P.3d 936
(2016), rev. denied 306 Kan. 1329 (2017).

Here, there is no indication that the officer should have known that K.S.A. 2013
Supp. 8-1025 was unconstitutional or that the implied consent advisory was coercive. At
the time of the arrest, the officer was required by law to advise Spears that failure to
submit to a breath test could constitute a separate crime. Suppression of the breath test
result would not serve the purpose of the exclusionary rule—to deter police misconduct.
Prior to Ryce I and Nece I, our courts had consistently upheld the validity of consent
obtained after giving the implied consent advisory. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 297 Kan.
210, 222-23, 301 P.3d 287 (2013). Our Supreme Court did not invalidate the implied
consent advisory until after the officer read it to Spears. Nor is there any indication that
the Legislature wholly abandoned its duty to enact constitutional laws in passing the
statutes. Other states had similar statutes and continued to uphold them until the
Birchfield decision. See Schmidt, 53 Kan. App. 2d at 235-37.

Spears argues that in order for the good-faith exception to apply, the State must
show the officer was in good faith relying on a statute for the admissibility of evidence or
as authority for the search. But, he argues, the statute that was ruled unconstitutional does
not provide for the admissibility of the evidence or authorize the officer to conduct the
breath test. Rather, admissibility was premised on consent.

The distinction Spears makes is unconvincing. Based on the stipulated facts, it was
the officer informing Spears that he may be charged with a separate crime of refusal that
rendered the consent involuntary. He does not argue the consent was otherwise
involuntary. But the officer was required by statute to give the advisory. In determining
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whether suppression is the appropriate remedy, the question is whether suppression
would serve the purpose of the exclusionary rule, which is to deter police misconduct.
The exclusionary rule is only applied when deterrence can be achieved. See Daniel, 291
Kan. at 496. Thus, applying the good-faith exception in this context "is simply a way of
saying that excluding evidence obtained as a result of the implied consent advisories
would not deter future violations of the Fourth Amendment." State v. McClellan, No.
115,164, 2017 WL 839720, at *14 (Kan. App. 2017) (unpublished opinion), petition for
rev. filed March 31, 2017.

The district court was correct to deny Spears' motion to suppress, even though it
was for the wrong reason. If a district court reaches the correct result, its decision may be
upheld even though it relied upon the wrong ground. State v. Overman, 301 Kan. 704,
712, 348 P.3d 516 (2015). The breath test result was admissible under the good-faith
exception to the exclusionary rule.

Spears' conviction is affirmed.