City of Atwood v. Pianalto

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

No. 109,796

CITY OF ATWOOD,
Appellee,

v.

RICHARD DAVID PIANALTO,
Appellant.


SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

1.
An appellate court reviews the district court's decision on a motion to suppress
using a bifurcated standard. Without reweighing the evidence, the district court's findings
of fact are reviewed to determine whether they are supported by substantial competent
evidence. A de novo standard of review is then used to review the ultimate legal
conclusion regarding the suppression of evidence.

2.
A traffic stop is considered a seizure of the driver for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. To comply with the Fourth Amendment,
the officer conducting the stop must have a reasonable and articulable suspicion, based on
fact, that the person stopped has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime.

3.
The reasonableness of an officer's suspicion is based on the totality of the
circumstances viewed from the perspective of a trained law enforcement officer.
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Reasonable suspicion arises from the combination of an officer's understanding of the
facts and the relevant law.

Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed February 14,
2014. Appeal from Rawlins District Court; GLENN D. SCHIFFNER, judge. Opinion filed May 22, 2015.
Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court is affirmed. Judgment of the district court is
affirmed.

Daniel C. Walter, of Ryan, Walter & McClymont, Chtd., of Norton, argued the cause and was on
the briefs for appellant.

Charles A. Peckham, city attorney, argued the cause and was on the briefs for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

BILES, J.: Richard D. Pianalto appeals from his conviction for driving while under
the influence of alcohol, arguing the evidence of that offense was the product of an illegal
traffic stop. Pianalto claims the officer who initiated the stop was mistaken about the
applicable speed limit because a traffic sign normally posting the limit had been knocked
to the ground. Pianalto contends the speed limit increased as a matter of law on the
seemingly unposted roadway, so the officer had no basis to pull Pianalto over for
speeding. We affirm his conviction.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Early on the morning of January 1, 2012, an Atwood police officer observed
Pianalto's vehicle traveling westbound on North Lake Road within the city limits. Using
his radar gun, the officer checked Pianalto's speed as their vehicles passed each other.
This instrument showed Pianalto traveling 28 miles per hour. The officer, a lifelong city
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resident, believed there was a posted 20 miles per hour speed limit on North Lake Road,
so the officer activated his emergency equipment to initiate a traffic stop for a speeding
violation. The officer was unaware the speed limit sign at this location had been knocked
down.

During the stop, the officer developed suspicion that Pianalto was intoxicated. He
administered field sobriety tests and arrested Pianalto. An evidentiary breath test showed
Pianalto had a breath alcohol concentration of .148 grams of alcohol per 210 liters of
breath, which is well in excess of the .08 specified by statute. See K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 8-
1567. Pianalto was convicted in Atwood Municipal Court of DUI and speeding.

Pianalto appealed both convictions for a trial de novo in Rawlins County District
Court, where he challenged whether the officer had reasonable suspicion for the traffic
stop based on the fallen traffic sign. He argued that unless otherwise marked, the speed
limit automatically increased to 30 miles per hour at the place of the stop in accordance
with K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 8-1558, so Pianalto's 28 miles per hour speed did not provide the
reasonable suspicion to initiate a stop for speeding. The district court denied Pianalto's
motion to suppress in a written order. It stated in part:

"1. The facts are not at issue. Simply stated, the arresting officer initiated a traffic
stop of [Pianalto] for travelling 28 mph in what the officer mistakenly believed was a 20
mph zone based upon his use of a radar gun. The zone was and had for more years than
anyone knew been a 20 mph zone but because the 20 mph speed limit sign had been
knocked down the argument is that the speed limit reverted to 30 mph. The arresting
officer did not have knowledge that the sign had been knocked down therefore making
his mistake one of fact, not one of law. Had the officer known the sign had been knocked
down then the argument could be made that his mistake was one of law, i.e.[,] did the
speed limit revert to 30 mph.

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"2. Although an argument could be made, and in fact was, that the speed limit did
not increase to 30 mph based upon the speed limit sign having been knocked down it is
not necessary to address that issue as this matter can be decided on the mistake of fact
issue alone."

The district court then concluded a reasonable mistake of fact could not invalidate
a traffic stop when the officer had a "reasonably articulable" suspicion the motorist was
speeding and ruled that the evidence against Pianalto would not be suppressed. The court
did not explicitly conclude the officer had reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop despite
the mistake, but that is implicit.

After the motion to suppress was denied, Pianalto stipulated he was operating his
vehicle with a breath alcohol content above the legal limit. The district court found him
guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol and imposed a sentence. The district court
made no findings and entered no judgment as to the speeding violation. Pianalto timely
appealed.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the DUI conviction. City of Atwood v. Pianalto,
No. 109,796, 2014 WL 642203, at *5 (Kan. App. 2014) (unpublished opinion). In doing
so, the panel assumed the speed limit reverted to 30 miles per hour under K.S.A. 2013
Supp. 8-1558 when the sign was knocked down. 2014 WL 642203, at *3. Next, the panel
agreed the officer's error about the speed limit was a reasonable mistake of fact, writing:

"Had [the officer] known that the speed limit sign was down but was unaware that this
fact caused the speed limit to revert to 30 miles per hour, this situation would have
constituted a mistake of law, rendering the traffic stop invalid. But here the record clearly
indicates that [the officer] reasonably believed there was still a speed limit sign in place
at the Highway 25 entrance to North Lake Road imposing a 20 miles per hour speed
limit. [The officer] was mistaken factually that the 20 miles per hour speed limit sign was
still in place." 2014 WL 642203, at *4.
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Finally, addressing an argument raised by Pianalto that another officer's earlier
knowledge of the downed sign should be imputed to the arresting officer, the panel held
the issue was not preserved because Pianalto failed to raise it in the district court.
Nonetheless, the panel continued, the arresting officer could be charged with the other
officer's knowledge only if he was acting on the other officer's directions. 2014 WL
642203, at *4-5.

Pianalto petitioned for review, which this court granted. Jurisdiction is proper. See
K.S.A. 60-2101(b) (review of Court of Appeals decisions).

ANALYSIS

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees "[t]he right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures . . . ." See also Kan. Const. Bill of Rights § 15. A
traffic stop is considered a seizure of the driver. State v. Thompson, 284 Kan. 763, 773,
166 P.3d 1015 (2007). To comply with the Fourth Amendment, the officer conducting the
stop "must '"have a reasonable and articulable suspicion, based on fact, that the person
stopped has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime." [Citation
omitted.]'" 284 Kan. at 773.

Reasonable suspicion is a lower standard than probable cause. "What is reasonable
depends on the totality of circumstances in the view of a trained law enforcement
officer." State v. Martinez, 296 Kan. 482, 487, 293 P.3d 718 (2013). In determining
whether reasonable suspicion exists, the court must:

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"'"[J]udge the officer's conduct in light of common sense and ordinary human experience.
[Citation omitted.] 'Our task . . . is . . .' . . . to determine whether the totality of the
circumstances justify the detention. [Citation omitted.] We make our determination with
deference to a trained law enforcement officer's ability to distinguish between innocent
and suspicious circumstances, [citation omitted], remembering that reasonable suspicion
represents a 'minimum level of objective justification' which is 'considerably less than
proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.'"' [Citations omitted.]" 296
Kan. at 487.

We must decide whether the panel erred when it affirmed the district court's denial
of Pianalto's motion to suppress. Our answer turns on a single issue: whether the
arresting officer's allegedly mistaken conclusion about the posted governing speed limit
was objectively reasonable. If so, when combined with the officer's uncontested
observation that Pianalto was driving 28 miles per hour, the officer would have had
reasonable suspicion to initiate a lawful traffic stop.

Standard of review

A trial court's decision on a motion to suppress is reviewed by an appellate court
using a bifurcated standard. The trial court's factual findings are reviewed for substantial
competent evidence. An appellate court does not reweigh the evidence, assess witness
credibility, or resolve conflicting evidence. The district court's ultimate legal conclusion
regarding the suppression of evidence is reviewed de novo. If the material facts
underlying the trial court's decision are not in dispute, whether to suppress evidence is a
question of law subject to de novo review. Martinez, 296 Kan. at 485.

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Discussion

The parties have hotly disputed whether we are dealing with a mistake of fact or
mistake of law. Pianalto argues the panel erred when it concluded the arresting officer
made a mistake of fact, stating "[t]he failure of the officer to know that [Pianalto] could
not be charged with violating a speed limit when he was not properly notified constitutes
a mistake of law and renders the initial stop invalid." The City argues the arresting officer
made a mistake of fact because he did not know the sign had been knocked down. This
distinction previously impacted the standard governing the remaining analysis.

Prior to the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Heien v. North
Carolina, 574 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 530, 190 L. Ed. 2d 475 (2014), a majority of federal
circuits to consider the issue held that, while reasonable suspicion could be founded upon
an officer's reasonable mistake of fact, it could not be based upon an officer's mistake of
law—no matter how reasonable. See, e.g., United States v. Nicholson, 721 F.3d 1236,
1242 (10th Cir. 2013); United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir.
2003); United States v. Miller, 146 F.3d 274, 279 (5th Cir. 1998). And our court had
adopted the majority position, holding "an officer's mistake of law alone can render a
traffic stop violative of the Fourth Amendment and § 15 of the Bill of Rights." Martin v.
Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 285 Kan. 625, 639, 176 P.3d 938 (2008).

But in Heien, the United States Supreme Court rejected the majority rule and
instead held that reasonable suspicion could also arise based on an officer's reasonable
mistake of law. 135 S. Ct. at 536. The facts involved a police officer stopping a vehicle
with only one brake light working, which led to a vehicle search and the discovery of
cocaine. In the ensuing fight over suppression of the drug evidence, the state trial and
appellate courts took conflicting views. In its holding, the Court majority reasoned:

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"'[T]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is "reasonableness."' Riley v.
California, 573 U.S. ___, ___, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482, 189 L. Ed. 2d 430 (2014) (some
internal quotation marks omitted). To be reasonable is not to be perfect, and so the Fourth
Amendment allows for some mistakes on the part of government officials, giving them
'fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community's protection.' Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949). We have recognized
that searches and seizures based on mistakes of fact can be reasonable. The warrantless
search of a home, for instance, is reasonable if undertaken with the consent of a resident,
and remains lawful when officers obtain the consent of someone who reasonably appears
to be but is not in fact a resident. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183-186, 110 S.
Ct. 2793, 111 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1990). By the same token, if officers with probable cause to
arrest a suspect mistakenly arrest an individual matching the suspect's description, neither
the seizure nor an accompanying search of the arrestee would be unlawful. See Hill v.
California, 401 U.S. 797, 802-805, 91 S. Ct. 1106, 28 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1971). The limit is
that 'the mistakes must be those of reasonable men.' Brinegar, supra, at 176, 69 S. Ct.
1302.

"But reasonable men make mistakes of law, too, and such mistakes are no less
compatible with the concept of reasonable suspicion. Reasonable suspicion arises from
the combination of an officer's understanding of the facts and his understanding of the
relevant law. The officer may be reasonably mistaken on either ground. Whether the facts
turn out to be not what was thought, or the law turns out to be not what was thought, the
result is the same: the facts are outside the scope of the law. There is no reason, under
the text of the Fourth Amendment or our precedents, why this same result should be
acceptable when reached by way of a reasonable mistake of fact, but not when reached by
way of a similarly reasonable mistake of law." Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 536.

Since Heien was handed down after the panel's decision in Pianalto's case we
ordered supplemental briefing to address Heien, which the parties filed prior to oral
arguments.

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We will proceed by considering the following: (1) whether to characterize the
officer's mistake as one of law or fact; and (2) whether that mistake was objectively
reasonable. In the end, we agree with the district court and the Court of Appeals that the
officer made a mistake of fact—although this is a close question. We further conclude
this mistake was objectively reasonable and affirm Pianalto's convictions for DUI and
speeding.

The officer made a mistake of fact.

After Heien, some might conclude it is unnecessary to characterize the officer's
mistake as being one of law or fact; but the subsequent analysis as to whether the mistake
was objectively reasonable can be affected by the mistake's characterization, so we
consider that question as a threshold matter. The principal cases relied upon by the parties
as to what type of mistake is involved are Martin, 285 Kan. at 637; State v. Miller, 49
Kan. App. 2d 491, 308 P.3d 24 (2013); and State v. Knight, 33 Kan. App. 2d 325, 104
P.3d 403 (2004).

Martin and Knight involved mistakes of law. In Martin, an officer pulled a vehicle
over when one of its three stop lamps malfunctioned. The traffic ordinance at issue
provided that a vehicle must have two or more stop lamps. We concluded the officer
made a mistake of law by "misunderst[anding] and misappl[ying] the ordinance. Two
functioning rear brake 'lamps' were sufficient under the law." 285 Kan. at 637. Martin
resolved a conflict among Court of Appeals panels and joined Kansas with those
jurisdictions in which reasonable suspicion could not be based on an officer's mistake of
law. See 285 Kan. at 638-39 (approving rationale in Chanthasouxat and Tenth Circuit
cases). In Knight, the officer misapplied an ordinance about the use of turn signals when
stopping a driver for failing to signal while turning onto a public street from a private
drive.
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But in Miller, a Court of Appeals panel held that an officer who believed his
fellow officers were blocking a roadway made a mistake of fact when he pulled over a
driver for disobeying their orders, not knowing they had been briefly called away from
their post. In deciding this was a mistake of fact, the panel reasoned the officer "wasn't
mistaken that it would have been illegal for [defendant] to go around those officers; he
was mistaken factually that those officers were still in place." 49 Kan. App. 2d at 496.

The panel in Pianalto's case determined the facts were more similar to Miller and
distinguishable from Martin and Knight, reasoning the officer had not misconstrued the
legal effect of the downed sign but was simply unaware that it was down. Pianalto, 2014
WL 642203, at *4. We agree. But we acknowledge this is a close question, and
admittedly the facts have a flavor of both a mistake of fact and one of law.

In State v. McCarthy, 133 Idaho 119, 982 P.2d 954 (Ct. App. 1999), the Idaho
Court of Appeals addressed a situation similar to Pianalto's case. In McCarthy, an officer
observed defendant pass through an intersection at approximately 45 miles per hour. The
officer mistakenly believed a 25 miles per hour speed limit sign was posted before the
intersection, but it was actually posted after the intersection. The parties disputed whether
the mistake was one of fact or law. The court reasoned:

"We think . . . that the mistake involved here was one of both fact and law. The officer
was mistaken about the fact of the speed limit sign's location and about the law regarding
the speed limit applicable on [the roadway]. These two mistakes are inextricably
connected, for the placement of the stop sign determined the applicable speed limit." 133
Idaho at 124.

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The court concluded it was unnecessary to determine whether it would permit reasonable
suspicion to arise from a reasonable mistake of law because no evidence had been
presented to demonstrate the officer's mistake was a reasonable one. 133 Idaho at 125.

Having concluded this was a mistake of fact, we turn to whether that mistake was
objectively reasonable. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 539. In mistake of fact cases, courts consider
the "reasonableness of an officer's actions using an 'objective standard' that takes the
'totality of the circumstances' and the 'information available' to the officer into account[,]"
disregarding the officer's "'actual motivations or subjective beliefs and intentions.'"
United States v. Winder, 557 F.3d 1129, 1134 (10th Cir. 2009). "That an officer's
suspicions may prove unfounded does not vitiate the lawfulness of a stop . . . ." 557 F.3d
at 1134. "[M]istakes of fact are rarely fatal to an officer's reasonable, articulable belief
that an individual was violating a traffic ordinance at the time of a stop . . . ." United
States v. Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d 392, 398 (3rd Cir. 2006).

Pianalto argues the mistake was not objectively reasonable because, for various
reasons, he believes the officer knew or should have known about the sign having been
knocked down: The officer would have driven past the downed sign prior to the stop;
another officer had reported the downed sign to a dispatch operator prior to the stop; and
that other officer was present at the traffic stop. And Pianalto further argues the other
officer's knowledge should be imputed to the arresting officer. But these claims are not
borne out by the record.

First, the arresting officer testified he was driving in a direction away from the
downed sign when he pulled Pianalto over and did not testify that he had passed or
noticed the downed sign at any point prior to the stop, and the district court did not find
that he had. Second, although Pianalto testified a second police officer (who knew the
sign had been knocked down) arrived at the stop after he had been pulled over, the record
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is clear that the officer who initiated the stop did so before the other officer arrived on the
scene. There was no evidence any person who knew the sign had been knocked down
shared that information with the arresting officer. Finally, Pianalto's assertion that he
raised his imputed-knowledge argument in the district court is belied by the record.
Nowhere in his oral arguments or brief to the district court did he make this claim. The
panel correctly found this imputed-knowledge argument was never made to the district
court. Pianalto, 2014 WL 642203, at *4-5.

In this case, the officer's reliance on the false, but normally true, fact that a speed
limit sign was in place was objectively reasonable. The district court found the speed
limit had been 20 miles per hour on North Lake Road for "more years than anyone
knew." And the evidence established that signs displaying the 20 miles per hour limit are
normally in place on both ends of the road. Nothing in the record indicates the officer had
any reason to doubt the continuing existence of the normal condition.

Affirmed.