In re Lober

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

No. 104,496

In the Matter of TERENCE A. LOBER,
Respondent.


ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN DISCIPLINE

Original proceeding in discipline. Opinion filed October 15, 2010. Disbarment.

Stanton A. Hazlett, Disciplinary Administrator, argued the cause and was on the
formal complaint for the petitioner.

No appearance by respondent.

Per Curiam: This is an original proceeding in discipline filed by the office of the
Disciplinary Administrator against the respondent, Terence A. Lober, of Leavenworth,
Kansas, an attorney admitted to the practice of law in Kansas in 1979.

On September 15, 2009, the office of the Disciplinary Administrator filed a formal
complaint against the respondent alleging violations of the Kansas Rules of Professional
Conduct (KRPC). The respondent failed to file an answer to the formal complaint. A
hearing was held on the complaint before a panel of the Kansas Board for Discipline of
Attorneys on November 19, 2009. The respondent failed to appear at this hearing. The
hearing panel determined that respondent violated KRPC 1.1 (2009 Kan. Ct. R. Annot.
410) (competence); 1.3 (2009 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 426) (diligence); 1.4(a) (2009 Kan. Ct.
R. Annot. 443) (communication); 1.5 (2009 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 460) (fees); 1.15(b) (2009
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Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 507) (safekeeping property); 8.4(d) (2009 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 602)
(engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice); 8.1(b) (2009 Kan. Ct.
R. Annot. 594) and Kansas Supreme Court Rule 207(b) (2009 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 303)
(failure to cooperate in disciplinary investigation); and Kansas Supreme Court Rule
211(b) (2009 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 321) (failure to file answer in disciplinary proceeding).
Upon conclusion of the hearing, the panel made the following findings of fact and
conclusions of law, together with its recommendation to this court:

"FINDINGS OF FACT
. . . .
"Complaints filed by [J.T.] and [J.S.]

"2. [J.T.] was convicted by his plea of aggravated battery in Nemaha
County, Kansas. On April 26, 2006, [J.T.] was sentenced to sixty-six months in prison.
The Court granted [J.T.'s] request for probation.

"3. Later, [J.T.] violated the terms and conditions of his probation and was
sent to prison. After [J.T.] was sent to prison, his family was upset and wanted to see if
there was a way to get him out of prison.

"4. In March, 2007, [C.M.], [J.T.'s] mother, contacted Thomas M. Dawson
about representing [J.T.]. Mr. Dawson agreed to research the matter for $5,000.
Subsequently, Mr. Dawson and the Respondent met with [C.M.]. At that time, Mr.
Dawson informed [C.M.] that in order for him to proceed, he would require an additional
$40,000 in attorney fees.

"5. [C.M.] declined to retain Mr. Dawson for an additional $40,000.
However, [J.T.] wanted to meet with Mr. Dawson and the Respondent. Mr. Dawson and
the Respondent went to the prison and met with [J.T.]. Following that meeting, [J.T.]
talked with his grandmother, [J.S.], about borrowing some money to retain the
Respondent to file a motion to set aside [J.T.'s] guilty plea.

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"6. [J.S.] agreed to assist [J.T.] and paid Mr. Lober $10,000, to file a motion
to set aside [J.T.'s] guilty plea in October 2007. The Respondent agreed to proceed
quickly and would get a motion to set aside the guilty plea on file.

"7. On October 1, 2007, [J.S.] sent the Respondent an electronic mail
message inquiring about the status of the case. The following day, the Respondent
replied. The Respondent indicated that he had been in Colorado handling a federal
appellate case. The Respondent assured [J.S.] that he would be able to get [J.T.] into
court in late October or early November, 2007.

"8. On October 12, 2007, the Respondent indicated that he would have the
motion ready within the following two weeks. The Respondent also indicated that he had
an appointment to meet with [J.T.] on Saturday, October 13, 2007. The Respondent,
however, did not file a motion in behalf of [J.T.] nor did he see [J.T.] in prison.

"9. On November 9, 2007, the Respondent again assured [J.S.] that he was
working on the motion for [J.T.]. The Respondent indicated that he would file the motion
within the next seven to ten days. The Respondent did not file a motion in behalf of [J.T.]
as promised.

"10. On November 13, 2007, the Respondent promised to go and see [J.T.] in
prison on the following Thursday. The Respondent did not go to see [J.T.] as promised.

"11. The Respondent explained, on November 21, 2007, that he had been ill
with the flu and that he would attend to [J.T.'s] motion as soon as possible.

"12. Despite that [J.S.] sent the Respondent three electronic mail messages in
early December, 2007, [J.S.] did not hear from the Respondent until December 27, 2007.
In that note, the Respondent stated that he would see [J.T.] in prison on December 28,
2007. The Respondent did not keep the appointment with [J.T.] on December 28, 2007.

"13. After the electronic mail message [was] sent by the Respondent on
December 27, 2007, neither [J.T.], [C.M.], nor [J.S.] ever heard from the Respondent
again. The Respondent never filed a motion to set aside [J.T.'s] guilty plea.
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"14. On January 22, 2008, on February 15, 2008, and on February 26, 2008,
Martin W. Mishler, an attorney related to [J.T.], wrote to the Respondent requesting an
accounting of the $10,000 and a refund of the balance of the advanced fee. Additionally,
Mr. Mishler requested that the Respondent provide an explanation of his failure to file a
motion to set aside the guilty plea. The Respondent never responded to Mr. Mishler's
letters.

"15. [J.T.] and [J.S.] filed complaints against the Respondent. Thereafter, the
Disciplinary Administrator docketed the complaints against the Respondent.

"16. On February 22, 2008, the Disciplinary Administrator notified the
Respondent that the complaints had been docketed. The Disciplinary Administrator
directed the Respondent to provide a written response to the complaints.

"17. Stephen W. Cavanaugh was appointed to investigate [J.T.'s] and [J.S.'s]
complaints. On March 24, 2008, and April 15, 2008, Mr. Cavanaugh wrote to the
Respondent directing the Respondent to provide a written response to the complaints.
The Respondent failed to provide a written response to the complaints.

"Complaint filed by [F.D.]

"18. In March, 2008, [F.D.] retained the Respondent to represent him in a
criminal case. [F.D.] paid the Respondent $500 for the representation.

"19. At the outset, [F.D.] provided the Respondent with photographs and
witness statements. [F.D.] did not retain a copy of these items.

"20. [F.D.]'s first appearance was scheduled for March 24, 2008. The
Respondent informed [F.D.] that his personal appearance was not necessary and that the
Respondent would appear in his behalf.

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"21. After the first appearance, [F.D.] spoke by telephone with the
Respondent. The Respondent informed [F.D.] that he had spoken with the prosecutor and
that the prosecutor was going to dismiss the criminal case. [F.D.] relied on the
Respondent and believed that the case had been dismissed.

"22. In June, 2008, [F.D.] learned that the court had issued a warrant for his
arrest for failing to appear in court. [F.D.] repeatedly called the Respondent by telephone,
but was unable to reach him. Approximately three weeks later, the Respondent left a
voice mail message for [F.D.]. In the message, the Respondent stated that his father had
passed away and that he was out of state. [F.D.] never heard from the Respondent again.

"23. [F.D.] was required to pay $100 to have the arrest warrant recalled.

"24. The Respondent never returned the photographs and witness statements
to [F.D.]. Additionally, the Respondent never returned any unearned fees to [F.D.]. [F.D.]
retained a new attorney, Gary Nelson, to represent him in the criminal case. Mr. Nelson
was able to negotiate a reduction of the charges and obtained a diversion for [F.D.].

"25. In August, 2008, [F.D.] filed a complaint against the Respondent. The
Disciplinary Administrator docketed the complaint and, thereafter, Mr. Cavanaugh was
appointed to investigate the complaint.

"26. On August 27, 2008, the Disciplinary Administrator directed the
Respondent to provide a written response to the initial complaint filed by [F.D.] within 20
days.

"27. On September 8, 2008, and on November 12, 2008, Mr. Cavanaugh
wrote to the Respondent and directed the Respondent to provide a written response to
[F.D.]'s complaint. The Respondent did not provide a written response to the complaint.

"Formal Proceedings

"28. On September 15, 2009, the Disciplinary Administrator filed a Formal
Complaint regarding [J.T.'s], [J.S.'s], and [F.D.]'s complaints. The Disciplinary
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Administrator sent a copy of the Formal Complaint and Notice of Hearing to the
Respondent at his last registration address, via certified United States mail. The package
containing the Formal Complaint and Notice of Hearing that was sent to the Respondent's
last registration address was returned and marked 'not deliverable as addressed, unable to
forward.'

"29. Additionally, the Disciplinary Administrator also sent a copy of the
Formal Complaint and Notice of Hearing to an additional address that the Respondent
had provided in an earlier disciplinary proceeding . . . via certified United States mail.
The package containing the Formal Complaint and Notice of Hearing that was sent to the
Respondent's address in . . . Colorado, was also returned. The package was marked
'returned to sender, unclaimed, unable to forward, return to sender.'

"30. The Respondent did not file an Answer to the Formal Complaint.

"CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

"1. Based upon the findings of fact, the Hearing Panel concludes as a matter
of law that the Respondent violated KRPC 1.1, KRPC 1.3, KRPC 1.4, KRPC 1.5, KRPC
1.15, KRPC 8.1, KRPC 8.4, Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 207, and Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 211, as detailed
below.

"2. The Respondent failed to appear at the hearing on the Formal Complaint.
It is appropriate to proceed to hearing when a Respondent fails to appear only if proper
service was obtained. Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 215 governs service of process in disciplinary
proceedings. That rule provides, in pertinent part as follows:

'(a) Service upon the respondent of the formal complaint in any
disciplinary proceeding shall be made by the Disciplinary Administrator,
either by personal service or by certified mail to the address shown on
the attorney's most recent registration, or at his or her last known office
address.
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. . . .
'(c) Service by mailing under subsection (a) or (b) shall be deemed complete
upon mailing whether or not the same is actually received.'

In this case, the Disciplinary Administrator complied with Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 215(a) by
sending a copy of the Formal Complaint and the Notice of Hearing, via certified United
States mail, postage prepaid, to the address shown on the Respondent's most recent
registration. Additionally, the Disciplinary Administrator forwarded a copy of the Notice
of Hearing and the Formal Complaint to an address previously provided by the
Respondent in . . . Colorado. The Hearing Panel concludes that the Respondent was
afforded the notice that the Kansas Supreme Court Rules require.

"3. Lawyers must provide competent representation to their clients. KRPC
1.1. 'Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.' The Respondent failed to
thoroughly prepare for the representation of [J.T.] and [F.D.]. Accordingly, the Hearing
Panel concludes that the Respondent violated KRPC 1.1.

"4. Attorneys must act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing their clients. See KRPC 1.3. The Respondent failed to diligently and
promptly represent his clients, [J.T.] and [F.D.], by failing to timely advance their
matters. Because the Respondent failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness
in representing his clients, the Hearing Panel concludes that the Respondent violated
KRPC 1.3.

"5. KRPC 1.4(a) provides that '[a] lawyer shall keep a client reasonably
informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for
information.' In this case, the Respondent violated KRPC 1.4(a) when he failed to keep
[J.T.] and [F.D.] informed regarding the representations. The Respondent failed to meet
with [J.T.] in prison. Also, the Respondent failed to inform [F.D.] that his personal
appearance in court was required. Accordingly, the Hearing Panel concludes that the
Respondent violated KRPC 1.4(a).

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"6. According to KRPC 1.5(a), '[a] lawyer's fee shall be reasonable.' The
Respondent [and Dawson] attempted to charge [J.T.] $40,000 to file a motion to set aside
a guilty plea. A fee of $40,000 is per se unreasonable. KRPC 8.4(a) prohibits attorneys
from violating or attempting to violate the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct. By
attempting to charge [J.T.] $40,000, the Respondent attempted to violate KRPC 1.5. As
such, the Hearing Panel concludes that by virtue of KRPC 8.4(a), the Respondent
violated KRPC 1.5.

"7. Lawyers must deal properly with the property of their clients.
Specifically, KRPC 1.15(b) provides:

'(b) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client
or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client
or third person. Except as stated in this Rule or otherwise permitted by
law or by agreement with the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to
the client or third person any funds or other property that the client or
third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third
person, shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property.'

In this case, on at least three occasions, Mr. Mishler requested that the Respondent
provide an accounting of the advanced fee of $10,000 and Mr. Mishler also requested that
the Respondent refund the unused portion of the $10,000. The Hearing Panel concludes
that the Respondent violated KRPC 1.15(b) when he failed to refund the unearned fees
paid by [J.S.].

"8. 'It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that
is prejudicial to the administration of justice.' KRPC 8.4(d). In this case, the Respondent
engaged in 'conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice' when he failed to
take any action in [J.T.'s] behalf and when he informed [F.D.] that the pending criminal
case was going to be dismissed. As a result of the Respondent's failure in this regard, no
motion was filed in behalf of [J.T.], and a bench warrant was issued for [F.D.'s] arrest. As
such, the Hearing Panel concludes that the Respondent violated KRPC 8.4(d).

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"9. Lawyers must cooperate in disciplinary investigations. KRPC 8.1(b) and
Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 207(b) provide the requirements in this regard. '[A] lawyer in connection
with a . . . disciplinary matter, shall not: . . . knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand
for information from [a] . . . disciplinary authority . . . .' KRPC 8.1(b).

'It shall be the duty of each member of the bar of this state to aid
the Supreme Court, the Disciplinary Board, and the Disciplinary
Administrator in investigations concerning complaints of misconduct,
and to communicate to the Disciplinary Administrator any information
he or she may have affecting such matters.' Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 207(b).

The Respondent knew that he was required to forward a written response to the initial
complaint—he had been instructed to do so in writing by the Disciplinary Administrator
and by the attorney investigator. Because the Respondent knowingly failed to provide a
written response to the initial complaints filed by [J.T.], [J.S.], and [F.D.], as requested by
the Disciplinary Administrator and the attorney investigator, the Hearing Panel concludes
that the Respondent violated KRPC 8.1(b) and Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 207(b).

"10. The Kansas Supreme Court Rules require attorneys to file Answers to
Formal Complaints. Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 211(b) provide the requirements:

'The Respondent shall serve an answer upon the Disciplinary
Administrator within twenty days after the service of the complaint
unless such time is extended by the Disciplinary Administrator or the
hearing panel.'

In this case, the Respondent violated Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 211(b) by failing to file a written
Answer to the Formal Complaint. Accordingly, the Hearing Panel concludes that the
Respondent violated Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 211(b).

"AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS

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"In making this recommendation for discipline, the Hearing Panel considered the
factors outlined by the American Bar Association in its Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions (hereinafter 'Standards'). Pursuant to Standard 3, the factors to be considered
are the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the potential or actual injury caused by
the lawyer's misconduct, and the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors.

"Duty Violated. The Respondent violated his duty to his clients to provide
competent and diligent representation and adequate communication. The Respondent
violated his duty to the public and the legal profession to maintain his personal integrity.
Finally, the Respondent violated his duty to the legal profession to cooperate in
disciplinary investigations.

"Mental State. The Respondent knowingly and intentionally violated his duties.

"Injury. As a result of the Respondent's misconduct, the Respondent caused
actual injury to [J.S.], potential injury to [J.T.], and actual injury to [F.D.].

"Aggravating or Mitigating Factors. Aggravating circumstances are any
considerations or factors that may justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be
imposed. In reaching its recommendation for discipline, the Hearing Panel, in this case,
found the following aggravating factors present:

"Prior Disciplinary Offenses. The Respondent has been disciplined on a number
of occasions:

'1. On May 23, 1994, in B5807, the Disciplinary
Administrator informally admonished the Respondent for having
violated KRPC 1.3 and KRPC 1.4.

'2. On February 26, 1996, the Disciplinary Administrator
informally admonished the Respondent for having violated KRPC 1.3,
KRPC 1.4, and KRPC 1.7.

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'3. On December 11, 1998, the Kansas Supreme Court
placed the Respondent on probation for two years for having violated
KRPC 1.1, KRPC 1.3, KRPC 1.4, KRPC 1.16, KRPC 3.1, KRPC 3.2,
KRPC 3.3, KRPC 4.1, KRPC 8.1, KRPC 8.4, and Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 207.
In those cases, the Respondent failed to diligently file a journal entry, the
Respondent failed to provide a client with a copy of a proposed Journal
Entry, the Respondent failed to return telephone calls, and the
Respondent failed to cooperate in disciplinary investigations. The
Respondent remained on probation until December 10, 2000. See In re
Lober, 266 Kan. 404, 969 P.2d 885 (1998).

'4. On June 21, 2000, in DA7352, the Disciplinary
Administrator informally admonished the Respondent for having
violated KRPC 1.16.

'5. Also on June 21, 2000, in DA7394, the Disciplinary
Administrator informally admonished the Respondent for having
violated KRPC 1.1, KRPC 1.3, KRPC 1.4, and KRPC 1.16.

'6. On October 31, 2003, the Kansas Supreme Court
suspended the Respondent from the practice of law for a period of one
year for having violated KRPC 1.4, KRPC 8.1(b), and Kan. Sup. Ct. R.
207(b). See In re Lober, 276 Kan. 633, 78 P.3d 442 (2003). [Footnote:
Following the 1-year suspension, on March 11, 2005, the Kansas
Supreme Court reinstated the Respondent's license to practice law in the
State of Kansas.]

'7. On April 3, 2009, the Kansas Supreme Court indefinitely
suspended the Respondent from the practice of law in the State of Kansas
for having violated KRPC 1.1, KRPC 1.2, KRPC 1.3, KRPC 1.4(a),
KRPC 3.2, KRPC 8.4(d) and KRPC 8.4(g). See In re Lober, 288 Kan.
498, 204 P.3d 610 (2009).'

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"Dishonest or Selfish Motive. The Respondent's misconduct included keeping
unearned fees. Failing to refund money owed to a client[ ] amounts to dishonest and
selfish conduct.

"Multiple Offenses. The Respondent violated KRPC 1.1, KRPC 1.3, KRPC 1.4,
KRPC 1.5, KRPC 1.15, KRPC 8.1, KRPC 8.4, Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 207, and Kan. Sup. Ct.
R. 211.

"Bad Faith Obstruction of the Disciplinary Proceeding by Intentionally Failing
to Comply with Rules or Orders of the Disciplinary Process. The Respondent failed to
participate in the investigation or prosecution of this matter. As such, the Hearing Panel
concludes that the Respondent engaged in a bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary
proceeding.

"Vulnerability of Victims. The Hearing Panel concludes that [J.S.], [J.T.], and
[F.D.] were vulnerable victims.

"Substantial Experience in the Practice of Law. The Kansas Supreme Court
admitted the Respondent to the practice of law on September 14, 1979. The Respondent
had been practicing law for nearly 20 years. Thus, the Hearing Panel concludes that the
Respondent had substantial experience in the practice of law.

"Indifference to Making Restitution. To date, the Respondent has not refunded
the unearned fees.

"Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may justify a
reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its recommendation for
discipline, the Hearing Panel, in this case, found no mitigating circumstances present.

"In addition to the above-cited factors, the Hearing Panel has thoroughly
examined and considered the following Standards:

'4.11 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly
converts client property and causes injury or potential injury to a client.
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'4.41 Disbarment is generally appropriate when:
. . . .
(b) a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a
client and causes serious or potentially serious injury to
a client; or

(c) a lawyer engages in a pattern of neglect with respect
to client matters and causes serious or potentially serious
injury to a client.

'4.51 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer's course of
conduct demonstrates that the lawyer does not understand the most
fundamental legal doctrines or procedures, and the lawyer's conduct
causes injury or potential injury to a client.

'8.1 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer:
. . . .
(b) has been suspended for the same or similar
misconduct, and intentionally or knowingly engages in
further acts of misconduct that cause injury or potential
injury to a client, the public, the legal system, or the
profession.'

"RECOMMENDATION

"The Disciplinary Administrator recommended that the Respondent be disbarred.

"Based upon the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the Standards listed
above, the Hearing Panel unanimously recommends that the Respondent be disbarred.

"Costs are assessed against the Respondent in an amount to be certified by the
Office of the Disciplinary Administrator."

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DISCUSSION

The Disciplinary Administrator recommends that this court adopt the
recommendation of the hearing panel that respondent be disbarred from the practice of
law in this state. We note that the respondent did not provide an answer to the complaint,
appear for hearing before this court, or offer an explanation for his absence, although a
copy of the hearing notification was mailed to him in accordance with our rules. The
notice was mailed, both by regular mail and by certified mail, on September 15, 2009, to
respondent's last address on file with the Clerk of the Appellate Courts; both were
returned, marked "not deliverable as addressed, unable to forward." Because respondent
had filed with the Clerk of the Appellate Courts a responsive pleading in a prior
disciplinary action listing an address in Colorado, the same notice in this case was mailed
September 15, 2009, to the Colorado address; it also was returned, marked "returned to
sender, unclaimed, unable to forward, return to sender." The respondent was properly
notified of this proceeding, and this court has jurisdiction to proceed.

In a disciplinary proceeding, this court considers the evidence, the findings of the
hearing panel, and arguments of the Disciplinary Administrator and determines whether
violations of KRPC exist and, if they do, what discipline should be imposed. Attorney
misconduct must be established by substantial, clear, convincing, and satisfactory
evidence. In re Landrith, 280 Kan. 619, 636, 124 P.3d 467 (2005); Supreme Court Rule
211(f) (2009 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 321). When a respondent does not file exceptions to the
hearing panel’s report, the report is deemed admitted under Supreme Court Rule 212(c)
and (d) (2009 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 337).

In this case, Lober filed no exceptions to the hearing panel’s report. We conclude
there is clear and convincing evidence that Lober violated KRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a), 1.5,
1.15(b), 8.1(b), 8.4(a) and (d) as well as Supreme Court Rules 207(b) and 211(b), and we
adopt the conclusions of the hearing panel.
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Disbarment is deemed appropriate according to the following ABA Standards
when: "a lawyer knowingly converts client property and causes injury or potential injury
to a client," Standard 4.11; "a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a client and
causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client; or . . . engages in a pattern of
neglect with respect to client matters and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a
client," Standard 4.41; or "a lawyer’s course of conduct demonstrates that the lawyer does
not understand the most fundamental legal doctrines or procedures, and the lawyer’s
conduct causes injury or potential injury to a client," Standard 4.51. The hearing panel
found that each of these Standards apply in this matter, and this court, in turn, must reach
the same conclusion.

Standard 8.1 provides:

"Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer:

'(a) Intentionally or knowingly violates the terms of a prior
disciplinary order and such violation causes injury or potential injury
to a client, the public, the legal system, or the profession; or

'(b) has been suspended for the same or similar misconduct, and
intentionally or knowingly engages in further acts of misconduct that
cause injury or potential injury to a client, the public, the legal
system, or the profession.'"

Standard 8.1 applies in this case because a 1-year suspension from the practice of
law was imposed in In re Lober, 276 Kan. 633, 78 P.3d 442 (2003). In In re Lober, 288
Kan. 498, 204 P.3d 610 (2009), this court indefinitely suspended Lober from the practice
of law, although the actions that led to the complaints currently before this court did not
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occur subsequent to that suspension. In addition to these cases, there were four
complaints previously considered by the Disciplinary Administrator; the earliest was filed
in 1994. Therefore, the hearing panel made the findings suggested by Standard 8.1. See
In re Comfort, 284 Kan. 183, 207, 159 P.3d 1011 (2007) (every potentially applicable
ABA Standard need not be discussed by hearing panel or court; ABA Standards serve
only as guidelines to assist courts in selecting appropriate and uniform discipline).

We conclude that the appropriate discipline is disbarment.

CONCLUSION AND DISCIPLINE

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the respondent, Terence A. Lober, be and he
is hereby disbarred from the practice of law in the state of Kansas effective immediately,
in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 203(a)(1) (2009 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 272) for his
violations of the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Appellate Courts strike the
name of Terence A. Lober from the roll of attorneys licensed to practice law in Kansas.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Terence A. Lober comply with Supreme Court
Rule 218 (2009 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 361).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this order be published in the official Kansas
Reports and that the costs of this action be assessed to respondent.

PATRICIA MACKE DICK, District Judge, assigned. 1

1REPORTER'S NOTE: District Judge Macke Dick was appointed to hear case No.
104,496 due to the vacancy on the court by Chief Justice Davis' retirement pursuant to
the authority vested in the Supreme Court by art. 3, § 6(f) of the Kansas Constitution.