IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS
No. 98,301
JOSHUA HAMLIN KINGSLEY,
Appellant,
v.
KANSAS DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,
Appellee.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1. Subject matter jurisdiction is vested by statute and establishes the court's authority to hear and decide a particular type of action. Parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction by consent, waiver, or estoppel, and parties cannot convey subject matter jurisdiction on a court by failing to object to the court's lack of jurisdiction. If the district court lacks jurisdiction to make a ruling, an appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter on appeal.
2. The question as to whether subject matter jurisdiction exists is a question of law over which this court's scope of review is unlimited.
3. A petition for judicial review of a driver's license suspension under K.S.A. 8-259 must strictly comply with the pleading requirements of K.S.A. 77-614(b), even though it is subject to de novo review. Because a petition for judicial review of an agency action is jurisdictional, the failure to comply with the pleading requirements set forth in K.S.A. 77-614(b) precludes a litigant's statutorily granted right of appeal.
4. The legislature's primary purposes for enacting the Kansas Act for Judicial Review and Civil Enforcement of Agency Actions (KJRA), K.S.A. 77-601 et seq., were to assist people in filing their appeals from administrative actions and to facilitate the judicial task by giving notice to opposing parties and the reviewing court by identifying issues to be addressed on appeal and the facts as to why the petition should be reviewed. Application of a strict compliance standard is in keeping with the overall intent of the Kansas Legislature in enacting the KJRA and results in apprising both the court and the agency of the positions raised. Compliance with the specific language of K.S.A. 77-614(b) meets the strict compliance requirement.
5. K.S.A. 77-614(b)(5) and (b)(6) set forth two distinct requirements for petitions seeking an appeal under the KJRA.
6. Under the plain language of K.S.A. 77-614(b)(5), a petition for judicial review must contain specific facts indicating that the plaintiff is "entitled to obtain judicial review" as described by K.S.A. 77-607(a) or K.S.A. 77-608. In the case of an appeal from a final agency action, the plain statutory language of the KJRA requires that a petitioner provide facts that demonstrate petitioner has standing, has exhausted administrative remedies, and is filing a timely petition for review.
7. K.S.A. 77-614(b)(5) provides that petitions for judicial review under the KJRA must set forth "facts to demonstrate that the petitioner is entitled to obtain judicial review." The statute does not require legal arguments or statutory citations, but facts. Thus, if there are sufficient facts in a petition for judicial review from which the agency and reviewing court can determine that the requirements for standing, exhaustion, and timing are met, petitioner is "entitled to obtain judicial review." In light of the KJRA's specific statutory requirements, the safer practice for a petitioner seeking an appeal from a final agency action is to specifically and separately state in the petition facts establishing standing, exhaustion, and timing. However, a petition for judicial review will not be dismissed if the petition as a whole establishes those required facts.
8. A petition for judicial review strictly complies with K.S.A. 77-614(b)(6) when the reasons for relief set forth in the petition give the court and the agency notice of the issues that will be raised. While it is a better practice for the language in the petition for judicial review to mirror the statutory basis for the specific relief requested, the failure to cite to specific statutory language will not result in a lack of jurisdiction to review the agency decision.
9. If a person does not exhaust all available and adequate administrative remedies before filing a petition for judicial review of an agency action, then the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider the contents of the petition.
10. The KJRA's exhaustion requirement applies to administrative procedures, not to individual issues to be reviewed.
11. The exhaustion requirement of K.S.A. 77-612 is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the entire petition for judicial review. The failure to raise an issue at the administrative hearing bars a district court only from reviewing that particular issue.
12. In an appeal from a decision by an administrative agency, a party may only argue the issues raised at the administrative hearing. A district court may only review those issues litigated at the administrative level.
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed October 5, 2007. Appeal from Ellis district court; THOMAS L. TOEPFER, judge. Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court is reversed. Judgment of the district court is reversed and the case is remanded to the district court. Opinion filed March 27, 2009.
Michael S. Holland II, of Holland and Holland, of Russell, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.
John D. Shultz, of Legal Services Bureau, Kansas Department of Revenue, argued the cause, and James G. Keller, of the same office, was with him on the brief for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
DAVIS, J.: Joshua Kingsley appeals from the dismissal of his petition for judicial review of the Kansas Department of Revenue's (KDR) suspension of his driver's license. The district court dismissed Kingsley's petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the petition did not strictly comply with the pleading requirements of K.S.A. 77-614(b)(5) and (b)(6) of the Kansas Act for Judicial Review and Civil Enforcement of Agency Actions (KJRA). The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion. Kingsley v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, No. 98,301, unpublished opinion filed October 5, 2007.
We granted Kingsley's petition for review to clarify the pleading requirements for petitions for judicial review under the KJRA after our recent decision in Bruch v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 282 Kan. 764, 148 P.3d 538 (2006), where we held that strict compliance with those pleading requirements was necessary in order to confer appellate jurisdiction. We now reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court, reverse the decision of the district court dismissing the case, and remand for further proceedings. This is a companion case with Rebel v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, No. 98,930 (this day decided), which involves similar issues.
Facts
On June 2, 2005, Kingsley was operating a vehicle in Hays, Kansas, and was stopped by Officer J. Bonczynski of the Hays Police Department for failing to keep his vehicle in a single lane, weaving within his lane, and erratic acceleration and braking. When the officer approached Kingsley, he detected the odor of alcohol and noted that Kingsley's eyes were bloodshot. Kingsley failed the field sobriety test, exhibiting poor balance. Kingsley also indicated to the officer that he had previously consumed alcohol or drugs.
Kingsley consented to an evidentiary breath test. Officer Bonczynski certified that he administered the test after providing Kingsley with oral and written notice and in the presence of another officer. Officer Bonczynski also certified that the testing equipment and procedures were approved by the Kansas Department of Health and Environment and that he was authorized to operate the testing equipment. The evidentiary breath test demonstrated that Kingsley had a blood alcohol level of .142.
Based on these observations, Officer Bonczynski certified that he had reasonable grounds to believe that Kingsley had been operating a vehicle under the influence of drugs or alcohol in violation of K.S.A. 8-1001 et seq. and issued a notice of suspension of Kingsley's driver's license.
On June 10, 2005, Kingsley requested an administrative hearing with the KDR to review this suspension order. A hearing was conducted on March 8, 2006, after which the KDR issued an administrative order affirming the suspension of Kingsley's driver's license. Shortly thereafter, Kingsley filed a petition for judicial review under K.S.A. 8-259 in Ellis County District Court. Kingsley's petition for judicial review contained the following two critical paragraphs:
"6. That plaintiff seeks review of all issues raised by plaintiff in the hearing before the administrative hearing officer, in Hays, Kansas.
"7. The order suspending plaintiff's driving privileges should be vacated by this Court because plaintiff was subjected to an illegal and improper preliminary breath test was subjected that [sic] plaintiff's due process rights were violated because he was not allowed to subpoena relevant witnesses to his administrative hearing; the officer conducted an illegal search of plaintiff's vehicle; that plaintiff also seeks review of all issues raised before the administrative hearing officer at the March 8, 2006, hearing."
The district court dismissed because the petition failed to comply with K.S.A. 77-614(b)(5) and (b)(6) of the KJRA.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of the action in an unpublished opinion. Kingsley, slip op. at 4-5. The Court of Appeals concluded that paragraphs 6 and 7 of Kingsley's petition for judicial review were "no more specific than the petition for review in Bruch," where this court held that the petition did not strictly comply with the KJRA's pleading requirements. Slip op. at 4. The court emphasized that the petition provided "no indication the proper administration of the PBT was raised below" and that "there is no specific reason pled to indicate why the PBT was 'illegal and improper.'" Slip op. at 4-5.
Kingsley petitioned this court for review, arguing that the district court and the Court of Appeals erred by misapplying Bruch and that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction under K.S.A. 77-614(b)(5) and (b)(6) to hear the appeal. In its response to Kingsley's petition for review, the KDR argued no jurisdiction existed because (1) Kingsley failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by not raising evidence to support his allegations at the administrative hearing and (2) the petition for judicial review failed to strictly comply with pleading requirements of K.S.A. 77-614(b)(5) and (b)(6). We granted review.
Discussion
Two questions are presented for resolution in this case: (1) whether Kingsley's petition for judicial review strictly complied with the KJRA's pleading requirements, specifically K.S.A. 77-614(b)(5) and (b)(6), and (2) whether Kingsley exhausted his administrative remedies. Each of these questions implicates the court's subject matter jurisdiction to consider a petition for judicial review. See Bruch, 282 Kan. at 773-74, 786-87 (strict compliance with the pleading requirements of K.S.A. 77-614[b] is necessary before a court may exercise jurisdiction over a petition for judicial review); Jones v. State, 279 Kan. 364, 368, 109 P.3d 1166 (2005) (exhaustion of administrative remedies is a precondition to judicial review under the KJRA). Resolution of these issues thus requires us to examine once again the specific provisions of the KJRA and the application of our cases dealing with jurisdictional questions under that Act.
It does not appear from the record that the KDR raised the second issue for our consideration--the exhaustion question--at any time before it filed its response to Kingsley's petition for review to this court. Ordinarily, claims not presented in an appellate brief are deemed abandoned and will not be considered by this court on petition for review. See State v. Greever, 286 Kan. 124, 131, 183 P.3d 788 (2008); Cooke v. Gillespie, 285 Kan. 748, Syl. ¶ 2, 176 P.3d 144 (2008). Nevertheless, issues relating to the court's subject matter jurisdiction to hear a particular claim may be raised at any time, as such claims go to the power of the court to hear a case. See Vorhees v. Baltazar, 283 Kan. 389, 397, 153 P.3d 1227 (2007).
Subject matter jurisdiction is vested by statute and establishes the court's authority to hear and decide a particular type of action. Pieren-Abbott v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 279 Kan. 83, 92, 106 P.3d 492 (2005). Parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction by consent, waiver, or estoppel, and parties cannot convey subject matter jurisdiction on a court by failing to object to the court's lack of jurisdiction. Kansas Bd. of Regents v. Skinner, 267 Kan. 808, Syl. ¶ 5, 987 P.2d 1096 (1999). If the district court lacks jurisdiction to make a ruling, an appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter on appeal. State v. McCoin, 278 Kan. 465, 468, 101 P.3d 1204 (2004).
The question as to whether subject matter jurisdiction exists is a question of law over which this court's scope of review is unlimited. Back-Wenzel v. Williams, 279 Kan. 346, 347, 109 P.3d 1194 (2005). Because subject matter jurisdiction is ordinarily conferred by statute, it should be noted that the interpretation of a statute is also a question of law subject to unlimited review. Griffin v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 280 Kan. 447, 451, 124 P.3d 57 (2005).
Preliminary note on Martin v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue
During argument before this court, Kingsley's counsel acknowledged that the issues raised by Kingsley in his petition for judicial review might be rendered moot by our recent decision in Martin v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 285 Kan. 625, 176 P.3d 938 (2008). In Martin, we held that the exclusionary rule does not apply in appeals from administrative license suspensions even though petitioners may raise Fourth Amendment questions during administrative appeals and the Fourth Amendment applies in such contexts. 285 Kan. at 639, 646. Thus, under Martin, a petitioner may raise Fourth Amendment claims, but such claims have no practical effect (meaning such claims do not trigger the exclusion of resultant evidence) in the administrative context. See 285 Kan. at 646.
It is true that Kingsley asserts in his petition for judicial review that he "was subjected to an illegal and improper preliminary breath test" and that "the officer conducted an illegal search of [his] vehicle." Thus, it may be that if the district court had evaluated the case on its merits, the court might have determined that Kingsley could not have succeeded on these particular issues under Martin. The district court did not make such a determination in this case, however, but dismissed the case on the face of the petition for failure to strictly comply with the KJRA's pleading requirements.
Martin did not involve the interpretation of the KJRA's pleading requirements. It had to do with the merits of the issues raised, not the court's jurisdiction to hear those issues. We find that Martin has no bearing on the question currently before us--whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to consider Kingsley's petition for judicial review. With this preliminary consideration resolved, we turn to the specific issues over which we granted review.
(1) Did Kingsley's petition for judicial review strictly comply with the pleading requirements of K.S.A. 77-614(b)?
K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 8-1020 and K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 8-259 govern a district court's review of an administrative decision to suspend a licensee's driving privileges based on the licensee's failure or refusal of a breath test. See Pieren-Abbott, 279 Kan. at 89. These statutes state that driver's license suspensions are subject to review in the form of a de novo trial before the district court and that "[s]uch review shall be in accordance with" the KJRA. K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 8-259(a); K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 8-1020(p); see Bruch, 282 Kan. at 783.
The KJRA's pleading requirements are contained in K.S.A. 77-614(b), which states that all petitions for judicial review under the KJRA "shall set forth":
"(1) The name and mailing address of the petitioner;
"(2) the name and mailing address of the agency whose action is at issue;
"(3) identification of the agency action at issue, together with a duplicate copy, summary or brief description of the agency action;
"(4) identification of persons who were parties in any adjudicative proceedings that led to the agency action;
"(5) facts to demonstrate that the petitioner is entitled to obtain judicial review;
"(6) the petitioner's reasons for believing that relief should be granted; and
"(7) a request for relief, specifying the type and extent of relief requested."
This court considered the interplay of K.S.A. 77-614(b) and K.S.A. 8-259 in Bruch, where we concluded that a "petition for review under K.S.A. 8-259 must strictly comply with the pleading requirements of K.S.A. 77-614(b), even though it is subject to de novo review." (Emphasis added.) 282 Kan. at 787. We further explained that because a "petition for judicial review of an agency action is jurisdictional[,] . . . the failure to comply with the pleading requirements set forth in K.S.A. 77-614(b) precludes a litigant's statutorily granted right of appeal." 282 Kan. 764, Syl. ¶ 2.
The present case calls upon us to consider in greater detail what information parties must include in petitions for judicial review under the KJRA in order to strictly comply with the pleading requirements of K.S.A. 77-614(b). This question is resolved in large measure under the guidance of our recent decision in Bruch and the plain language of the KJRA. We note that neither party suggests that our decision in Bruch should be overruled or is an inappropriate reading of the statute. Instead, each party advocates an interpretation of Bruch that favors that party's respective position before this court.
Our conclusion in Bruch that strict compliance with the KJRA's pleading requirements is necessary to confer subject matter jurisdiction over the petition for judicial review had three legal bases: our Kansas case law interpreting the KJRA as requiring strict compliance, the legislative history of the KJRA as well as the Model Act on which the KJRA was based, and decisions of other jurisdictions with similar statutory schemes. See Bruch, 282 Kan. at 777-84. We need not revisit the latter two bases, as our discussion in Bruch sufficiently outlines our rationale in relying on them. See 282 Kan. at 777-81. We pause briefly, however, to trace our case law leading to the Bruch decision to underscore the purpose of the KJRA in general and the specific pleading requirements of K.S.A. 77-614(b) in particular.
A little over a year before we decided Bruch, this court held in Pieren-Abbott v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 279 Kan. 83, 95, 106 P.3d 492 (2005), that a failure to strictly comply with the KJRA's notice requirements resulted in a lack of personal jurisdiction to consider a petition for judicial review. Pieren-Abbott relied in large part on the two Court of Appeals opinions: Claus v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 16 Kan. App. 2d 12, 825 P.2d 172 (1991), and Pittsburg State University v. Kansas Bd. of Regents, 30 Kan. App. 2d 37, 44-46, 36 P.3d 853 (2001), rev. denied 273 Kan. 1036 (2002).
Claus involved an appeal from a driver's license suspension where the licensee failed to serve the Secretary of Revenue with a copy of the petition for judicial review (as required by the KJRA). The Court of Appeals held that even though the agency had received actual notice of the petition, there was no provision for "substantial compliance" in the KJRA. Because the licensee failed to strictly comply with the KJRA's notice requirements, Claus concluded that the district court did not have personal jurisdiction over the KDR. 16 Kan. App. 2d at 13-14; see also Reifschneider v. Kansas State Lottery, 266 Kan. 338, 342, 969 P.2d 875 (1998) ("The Court of Appeals' decision in Claus regarding strict construction is sound.").
Pittsburg State, which we discussed at some length in both Pieren-Abbott and Bruch, held that a "petition for judicial review of an agency action is jurisdictional," and the "[f]ailure to comply with the pleading requirements set forth in K.S.A. 77-614(b) precludes a litigant's statutorily granted right of appeal." 30 Kan. App. 2d 37, Syl. ¶ 3. Citing an article by Professor David Ryan--a member of the committee that advised the Kansas Legislature during its adoption of the KJRA--the Pittsburg State court concluded that "specificity in pleading under the KJRA is necessary to give focus to the asserted agency error and to give the reviewing court a proper understanding of the type of relief sought." 30 Kan. App. 2d at 45.
In Bruch, we again reiterated that strict compliance with the KJRA's pleading requirements is necessary to confer subject matter jurisdiction over a petition for judicial review. We rejected the petitioner's argument that the provisions of K.S.A. 8-259 calling for a de novo review on appeal from an administrative decision suspending a driver's license relieved the licensee of the strict compliance requirements of the KJRA, concluding that we may not ignore the plain language of the informed consent law, which states that "'review shall be in accordance with the [KJRA].'" Bruch, 282 Kan. at 783; see K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 8-259; K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 8-1020(p).
Bruch found that the legislature's primary purposes for enacting the KJRA were "to assist people in filing their appeals from administrative actions" and "to 'facilitate the judicial task' . . . [by giving notice to] opposing parties and the reviewing court by identifying issues to be addressed on appeal and the facts as to why the petition should be reviewed." Bruch, 282 Kan. at 779. This court noted that "[a]pplication of a strict compliance standard is in keeping with the overall intent of the Kansas Legislature in enacting the KJRA and results in apprising both the court and the agency of the positions raised." 282 Kan. 764, Syl. ¶ 4. We therefore concluded that "[c]ompliance with the specific language of K.S.A. 77-614(b) meets the strict compliance requirement." 282 Kan. at 781.
One final observation is appropriate before addressing the jurisdictional questions raised in this appeal. In Bruch, the court held that the petition for judicial review did not strictly comply with the same statutory provisions at issue in this case--K.S.A. 77-614(b)(5) and (6)--and thus dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 282 Kan. at 786-87. The Bruch court did not distinguish between these two provisions for purposes of that analysis, however, but rather treated them as similar requirements. See 282 Kan. at 785 (stating that K.S.A. 77-614[b][5] and K.S.A. 77-614[b][6] are "related" requirements). The decision proceeded with its analysis without specifically tying the discussion to a particular subsection:
"Bruch failed to strictly comply with subsections (b)(5) and (b)(6) of K.S.A. 77-614, because he failed to state in the petition for review that he was raising the issues of administration of and consent to the PBT, as indicated by the transcript before the district court. Nothing in his petition for review identifies these issues relating to the PBT, which are the heart of Bruch's appeal. . . . Bruch's argument that these issues fell under the broad umbrella of the 'probable cause' to arrest issue is without merit. 'Probable cause to arrest,' even if taken as the reviewable issue of whether there were 'reasonable grounds' to believe the licensee was DUI, is far too expansive of an issue, as it could include any number of arguments. [Citation omitted.] Bruch's broad statement concerning probable cause does not provide the department or the district court with any focus on the agency error to be addressed at trial.
"We also find it significant that the implied consent statutory scheme includes a separate statute involving PBT's, and Bruch failed to identify the provisions of that statute as well as any issues relating to PBT's, except by his broad statement relating to reasonable suspicion and probable cause in his petition for review. As such, Bruch did not strictly comply with the pleading requirements of K.S.A. 77-614(b)(5) or (6)." 282 Kan. at 786.
Although Bruch concluded that the petition for judicial review filed in that case did not strictly comply with either K.S.A. 77-614(b)(5) or (b)(6), the discussion in that case focused on whether the issues raised in the petition were sufficiently described. In other words, while Bruch held that the petition was insufficiently particular as to both the facts demonstrating that the petitioner was entitled to judicial review under K.S.A. 77-614(b)(5) and as to the reasons for believing relief should be granted under K.S.A. 77-614(b)(6), the discussion is limited to the second of these provisions: whether Bruch's petition sufficiently set forth the issues to be raised--or the reasons why he should prevail.
Our treatment of these two statutory provisions in Bruch has led the district courts and Court of Appeals to treat K.S.A. 77-614(b)(5) and (b)(6) as virtually one pleading requirement. This approach, however, is inconsistent with the principle of statutory construction applied by this court that presumes that the legislature does not intend to enact useless or meaningless legislation. See Hawley v. Kansas Dept. of Agriculture, 281 Kan. 603, 631, 132 P.3d 870 (2006). When it enacted K.S.A. 77-614(b), the legislature set forth seven different pleading requirements that must be met before a district court has jurisdiction over a petition for judicial review. See K.S.A. 77-614(b). It does not make logical sense for two of these seven provisions to overlap, while the other subsections set forth individual requirements. While we indicated in Bruch that these requirements may be related, we now emphasize that the requirements are not identical. Instead, K.S.A. 77-614(b)(5) and (b)(6) set forth two distinct requirements for petitions seeking an appeal under the KJRA.
K.S.A. 77-614(b)(5)
K.S.A. 77-614(b)(5) states that a petition for judicial review under the KJRA "shall set forth . . . facts to demonstrate that the petitioner is entitled to obtain judicial review." The only other provisions of the KJRA that reference petitioners' entitlement to judicial review of agency actions are K.S.A. 77-607 (persons entitled to review of final agency actions) and K.S.A. 77-608 (persons entitled to interlocutory review of nonfinal agency actions). In particular, K.S.A. 77-607(a) provides:
"A person who qualifies under this act regarding (1) standing (K.S.A. 77-611), (2) exhaustion of administrative remedies (K.S.A. 77-612) and (3) time for filing the petition for judicial review (K.S.A. 77-613) and other applicable provisions of law regarding bond, compliance and other preconditions is entitled to judicial review of final agency action, whether or not the person has sought judicial review of any related nonfinal agency action." (Emphasis added.)
K.S.A. 77-608, which sets forth the conditions entitling petitioners to interlocutory judicial review of nonfinal agency actions, states that in addition to the requirements of K.S.A. 77-607(a), a petitioner must demonstrate that "postponement of judicial review would result in an inadequate remedy or irreparable harm disproportionate to the public benefit derived from postponement." K.S.A. 77-608(b).
There can be no question that the pleading requirement in K.S.A. 77-614(b)(5) is referring to these provisions. K.S.A. 77-614(b)(5) states that a petition for judicial review shall set forth facts demonstrating that the petitioner is "entitled to obtain judicial review." The plain language of K.S.A. 77-607(a) states that a person is "entitled to judicial review" of an agency action if that person has standing under the KJRA, has exhausted the available administrative remedies, and has filed the petition in a timely manner. K.S.A. 77-608 similarly sets forth the conditions necessary for a person to be "entitled" to interlocutory judicial review of a nonfinal agency action.
Because the interpretation of K.S.A. 77-614(b)(5) is clear when read in conjunction with the entire KJRA, there is no need to resort to principles of statutory construction to determine the meaning of "entitled to obtain judicial review." See Kansas Commission on Civil Rights v. Howard, 218 Kan. 248, Syl. ¶ 2, 544 P.2d 791 (1975) ("courts are not permitted to consider only a certain isolated part or parts of an act but are required to consider and construe together all parts thereof in pari materia"); In re K.M.H., 285 Kan. 53, 79-80, 169 P.3d 1025 (2007) (when the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, courts "need not resort to statutory construction"). Nevertheless, as the KDR correctly points out in its response to Kingsley's petition for review, the legislative history of the KJRA supports this interpretation of the statute.
In Bruch v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 252 Kan. 764, 148 P.3d 538 (2006), this court explained that the KJRA was modeled after Article 5 of the Model State Administrative Procedure Act of 1981 (Model Act), noting that the language of K.S.A. 77-614(b) is "almost identical" to the language of section 5-109(b) of the Model Act. See 282 Kan. at 778. Section 5-109(b)(5) states that petition for review must set forth "facts to demonstrate that the petitioner is entitled to obtain judicial review as described in § 05-102(a)(i), (ii), and (iii)." See Bruch, 282 Kan. at 778. The language of this requirement corresponds exactly to the language of K.S.A. 77-614(b)(5), except that the Model Act specifically refers to § 5-102(a)(i), (ii), and (iii).
Section 5-102(a) of the Model Act similarly corresponds to K.S.A. 77-607(a), stating:
"A person who qualifies under this Act regarding (i) standing (Section 5-106), (ii) exhaustion of administrative remedies (Section 5-107), and (iii) time for filing the petition for review (Section 5-108), and other applicable provisions of law regarding bond, compliance, and other pre-conditions is entitled to judicial review of final agency action, whether or not the person has sought judicial review