IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS
No. 83,226
GAIL KUHN, as Special Administrator of the Estate of
JENNIFER JEAN KUHN BISHOP, deceased; JERRY
BISHOP, Individually as Heir-at-Law of JENNIFER
JEAN KUHN BISHOP, deceased; and JERRY BISHOP,
as Parent, Natural Guardian and Next Friend of RYAN
THOMAS KUHN BISHOP, a Minor, Heir-at-Law of
JENNIFER JEAN KUHN BISHOP, deceased,
Appellants,
v.
SANDOZ PHARMACEUTICALS CORPORATION,
a Delaware Corporation; SANDOZ LTD., a Foreign
Corporation; and SANDOZ PHARMA LTD., a Foreign Corporation,
Appellees.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1. Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. K.S.A. 60-256(c). Summary judgment decisions are reviewed de novo. An appellate court resolves all facts and inferences which may reasonably be drawn from the evidence in favor of the party against whom the ruling is sought.
2. The admissibility of expert testimony is subject to K.S.A. 60-456(b). The Frye test, Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), however, acts as a qualification to the 60-456(b) statutory standard. Frye is applied in circumstances where a new or experimental scientific technique is employed by an expert witness.
3. Frye requires that before expert scientific opinion may be received into evidence, the basis of the opinion must be shown to be generally accepted as reliable within the expert's particular scientific field. If a new scientific technique's validity has not been generally accepted or is only regarded as an experimental technique, then expert testimony based upon the technique should not be admitted.
4. Although abuse of judicial discretion describes a highly deferential standard, it can refer to questions of law warranting independent appellate review. Questions of law are presented when an appellate court seeks to review the factors and considerations forming a district court's discretionary decision. In this case, we have a first impression issue on the admission of medical causation proof that warrants our unlimited review. The appropriate label for the standard of review in this case is "de novo."
5. The term "pure opinion" is used to characterize an expert opinion developed from inductive reasoning based on the experts' own experience, observation, or research. The Frye test does not apply to pure opinion testimony. The Frye test does apply when an expert witness reaches a conclusion by deduction from applying a new or novel scientific principle, formula, or procedure developed by others.
6. The validity of pure opinion is tested by cross-examination of the witness. The validity of an opinion subject to Frye is tested by inquiring into general acceptance as reliable within the expert's particular scientific field.
7. Although compliance with Frye is necessary when a witness reaches a conclusion by applying a scientific theory or process based on the work or discovery of others, experts may testify concerning their own experimentation and observation and opinions based on their own work without first showing general acceptance.
8. The Frye test is concerned with the methodologies underlying expert testimony rather than the conclusions of that testimony.
9. Under K.S.A. 60-456(b) there is no requirement that before an expert witness may give an opinion the expert must demonstrate that many, most, or all other experts would agree with the opinion.
10. A Kansas jury has a constitutional mandate to decide between conflicting facts, including conflicting opinions of causation. A district judge under K.S.A. 60-456(b) controls the admissibility of expert opinion evidence that would unduly prejudice or mislead a jury or confuse the question for resolution. Cross-examination, the submission of contrary evidence, and the use of appropriate jury instructions form a preferred method of resolving factual disputes.
11. In a summary judgment case in which the district court used the Frye test to strike plaintiffs' experts' causation opinions advanced to explain a mother's death 3 days after the delivery of her baby, the record is examined and it is held: (1) The Frye test is not applicable to plaintiffs' experts' causation opinions, and (2) the district court erred in: (a) granting summary judgment to defendant pharmaceutical corporation and dismissing plaintiffs' claims with prejudice, as genuine issues of material fact remain, (b) requiring proof of both general and specific causation, and (c) excluding plaintiffs' experts' studies, literature, and other evidence on which the experts relied without making findings identifying the excluded items and expressing the reasons for exclusion.
Appeal from Sedgwick district court, D. KEITH ANDERSON, judge. Opinion filed December 15, 2000. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Channel P. Townsley, of Hutton & Hutton, of Wichita, argued the cause, and Andrew W. Hutton, of the same firm, was with him on the briefs for appellants.
Joe G. Hollingsworth, of Spriggs & Hollingsworth, of Washington, D.C., argued the cause, and Katharine R. Latimer, of the same firm, Wyatt M. Wright, of Foulston & Siefkin L.L.P., of Wichita, and Grant J. Esposito, of Mayer, Brown & Platt, of New York, New York, were with him on the brief for appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SIX, J.: This case reviews the district court's use of the Frye test, Frye v. U.S., 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), to strike plaintiffs' expert causation opinions advanced to explain a mother's death 3 days after the delivery of her baby. Summary judgment was entered for defendant Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corporation (Sandoz). The plaintiffs, Gail Kuhn, the mother of Jennifer Kuhn Bishop, deceased, and as Special Administrator of her Estate; Jerry Bishop, the deceased's husband; and Ryan Thomas Kuhn Bishop, the deceased's minor son, appeal.
The plaintiffs' underlying product liability/negligence suit asserts wrongful death and survivor claims. The plaintiffs contend that the drug Parlodel, manufactured by Sandoz, caused or contributed to Jennifer's death. The district court reasoned that all of plaintiffs' experts' causation opinions and all studies, literature, and other evidence on which plaintiffs' experts relied was unreliable as a matter of law.
Our jurisdiction is under K.S.A. 20-3018(c), a transfer on our order from the Court of Appeals.
We review whether the district court committed error by: (1) granting summary judgment in favor of Sandoz based on the failure of medical causation proof and (2) reasoning that the opinions on causation expressed by plaintiffs' experts failed the Frye test.
Genuine issues of material fact remain. We reverse and remand. The Frye test is not applicable to the expert causation opinions at issue here.
FACTS
Jennifer Bishop gave birth to a baby boy at 7:47 a.m. on July 25, 1993, in the Hays, Kansas, hospital. Because Jennifer had decided not to breast-feed her baby, she received a 2.5 mg. tablet of Parlodel at 5:30 p.m. during dinner on that day to prevent postpartum lactation (the production of breast milk.) She vomited at 6:15 p.m., was overcome by nausea at 6:30 p.m., experienced chills and elevated blood pressure at 6:40 p.m., and vomited again at 7 p.m. By 7:30 p.m., Jennifer's temperature increased to 102.3 degrees Fahrenheit. She vomited again at 7:40 p.m. and continued to complain of a headache and chilling. At 9 p.m., she was drowsy and could not open her left hand on request. At 9:30 p.m., she screamed and became stiff and less responsive. Jennifer remained rigid over the next 30 minutes, relaxing only when she was given Benadryl at 10:13 p.m. At 10:45 p.m., she was transferred to the intensive care unit, suffered a respiratory arrest, and lapsed into a coma. She was pronounced dead at 3:30 p.m. on July 28, 1993.
The autopsy reported that the probable cause of the death was "related to postpartum eclampsia" or "possible bacteremia." Definitions are appropriate here to assist the reader: "postpartum" ("[a]fter childbirth"), "eclampsia" (the "[o]ccurrence of one or more convulsions, not attributable to other cerebral conditions such as epilepsy or cerebral hemorrhage, in a patient with preeclampsia"), and "bacteremia" (a condition characterized by "viable bacteria in the circulating blood"). Stedman's Medical Dictionary (26th ed. 1995), pp. 1413, 540, 181.
The autopsy description of Jennifer's central nervous system stated that sections of the cerebrum and cerebellum showed "hyperemia and some diffuse edema and possible petechial hemorrhage" and that sections of the brain stem "demonstrate[d]
softening and mild edema with hyperemia." The following definitions apply: "hyperemia" ("[t]he presence of an increased amount of blood in a part or organ"), "edema" ("[a]n accumulation of an excessive amount of watery fluid in cells, tissues, or serious cavities"), and "petechial" (a condition characterized by "[m]inute hemorrhagic spots, of pinpoint to pinhead size, in the skin"). Stedman's at 824, 544, 1337.
Jennifer's discharge summary listed the final diagnosis regarding her death as "Bacteria with Strep Group D," a condition that brought about "cerebral edema and probable herniation of the brain stem secondary to postpartum toxemia." ("Toxemia" refers to the "[c]linical manifestations observed during certain infectious diseases, assumed to be caused by toxins and other noxious substances elaborated by the infectious agent. . . . A lay term referring to the hypertensive disorders of pregnancy." Stedman's at 1826.) The plaintiffs sued Sandoz , the manufacturer of Parlodel, on July 16, 1996.
DISCUSSION
The FDA Report
Plaintiffs' claim was presented in the context of a decade-long disagreement between Sandoz and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) concerning the use of Parlodel for the prevention of physiologic lactation. (Parlodel's generic name is bromocriptine.) The FDA originally approved the use in 1980. By 1983, however, both Sandoz and the FDA began receiving reports relating the drug to hypertension or related effects. As a result of these reports, FDA staff members requested in both May 1983 and March 1985, that Sandoz place a warning of the adverse experiences in its labeling.
Initially, Sandoz would not agree to place the requested warning. In February 1987, however, Sandoz agreed to both make the requested labeling changes and to send a letter to doctors alerting them to the potential hazards of using Parlodel for the prevention of lactation.
The FDA continued to receive reports over the next few years of negative side effects associated with the use of Parlodel for the prevention of lactation. The FDA's Fertility and Maternal Health Drugs Advisory Committee considered a comprehensive study by Sandoz on the drug (the ERI study) that downplayed the relationship between Parlodel and the asserted harms. However, the FDA determined that the ERI study: (1) failed to allay concerns regarding the drug's association with seizures and (2) was too small in size to adequately characterize the risk of stroke.
The FDA committee recommended that drugs (including Parlodel) not be used for lactation suppression. The possibility that the products might cause serious adverse experiences in some patients outweighed the limited benefits associated with their use. The FDA agreed with its committee's recommendation and asked that all manufacturers remove the indication for lactation suppression from their drug products.
The FDA met with Sandoz on June 2, 1989, and informally requested a voluntary withdrawal of the lactation suppression indication from Parlodel's labeling. Sandoz declined. Sandoz met again with the FDA on September 7, 1989, to discuss "alternatives" to withdrawal of the indication. The FDA issued a letter on September 13, 1989, that reaffirmed its original withdrawal request.
On October 25, 1989, Sandoz declined the FDA request for withdrawal and announced its position that "Parlodel should not be used routinely but should remain available for specific circumstances under which the physician and the patient decide that the drug is indicated." On March 2, 1990, the FDA advised Sandoz that attempts to gain approval for revised package inserts and a draft patient brochure were "not approvable." The FDA had not changed its opinion "that there is no need for pharmacologic agents to prevent postpartum lactation."
On August 17, 1994, the FDA issued a talk paper stating that it had initiated procedures for withdrawing approval for the indication. A day later, Sandoz withdrew the Parlodel indication for the prevention of lactation in the United States.
The Plaintiffs' Contentions
The plaintiffs argue that the FDA case reports and Sandoz' history with the FDA tend to show that the 2.5 mg. dose of Parlodel ingested by Jennifer Bishop was a contributing factor as a "direct and proximate cause" of the serious bodily injuries culminating in her death. In support of their contention, plaintiffs refer to the opinions and deposition testimony of four medical experts, each of whom claimed that Parlodel caused or contributed to Jennifer's death. Plaintiffs' counsel stated in the district court and on appeal that the opinion of Dr. Leslie Iffey (one of the four) would not be relied on for causation. Our discussion focuses on the causation opinions of the other three experts.
Plaintiffs' Experts
The qualifications for plaintiffs' causation experts are summarized below.
Dr. Al Davies received his M.D. degree from the University of Utah in 1975. He is Board Certified in internal medicine and in the sub-specialities of endocrinology and metabolism and critical care medicine. Dr. Davies was associated with the Duke University Medical Center from 1975 to 1984. While at Duke, he served as an Associate in Medicine; Assistant Professor of Medicine, Division of Allergy, Critical Care, and Pulmonary Medicine; and Director of the Medical Intensive Care Unit. He currently is Associate Professor in Pulmonary and Critical Care Medicine, Department of Internal Medicine at the Baylor College of Medicine, Houston, Texas (Baylor). He became Assistant Professor of Medicine, Section on Hypertension and Clinical Pharmacology at Baylor. He has concurrent Attending Physician positions in the Critical Care Medicine Group and Pulmonary Medicine Service at The Methodist Hospital (Methodist), Ben Taub General Hospital all located in Houston. He was Attending Physician in the Hypertension and Clinical Pharmacology Service at Methodist and Baylor from 1984 to 1989. He also held the position of Director of the Clinical Pharmacology Invasive Laboratory at Methodist and Baylor until 1987.
In 1990, Dr. Davies became Director of the Critical Care Medicine Training Program at Baylor, as well as Director of the Medical Intensive Care Unit at Methodist. He retains both positions. In 1986, he began an Assistant Professorship in Physiology and Molecular Biophysics in the Department of Physiology and Molecular Biophysics at Baylor, a position he still holds. He is an invited reviewer of articles for a number of medical publications. In 1977, he gave a presentation on Parlodel and its use in microadenomas and associated pituitary illness.
Dr. George R. Saade received his M.D. from the American University of Beirut Medical School in 1985. He began his residency in Obstetrics and Gynecology at the American University of Beirut. Dr. Saade was at Union Memorial Hospital in Baltimore, for 4 years, as a Resident in Obstetrics and Gynecology. He was a Fellow in Maternal-Fetal Medicine from 1991 to 1994 at Baylor. In 1993, Dr. Saade accepted a position as Director of the Obstetrical Clinic at Ben Taub General Hospital in Houston. He began directing the Obstetrical Outpatient Services at Baylor in 1994. Also in 1994, he accepted an appointment as Assistant Professor of Obstetrics and Gynecology, Division of Maternal-Fetal Medicine at Baylor. In 1995, he began working as Assistant Professor of Pharmacology at Baylor. In 1993, he became eligible for Board Certification in Maternal-Fetal Medicine. Dr. Saade is a member of the Society for Obstetric Anesthesia and Perinatology. He is a member of the North American Society for the Study of Hypertension in Pregnancy. He is also a Junior Fellow for the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists.
Dr. Saade has received awards for research excellence from the Society of Perinatal Obstetricians. He retains editorial positions for "Reviews in Maternal-Fetal Medicine," a publication of the Division of Maternal-Fetal Medicine at Baylor, and for "Guidelines for the Antepartum Management of the Pregnant Patient with Medical Complications" published by the Division of Maternal-Fetal Medicine of Baylor. He is also a reviewer for the Obstetrics and Gynecology Journal and for the American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology. Dr. Davies, when deposed in this case, responded, "Yes, sir," when asked if he was aware that Dr. Saade is one of the people "in the country and, in fact, in the world who knew more about hypertensive disorders in pregnancy than a lot of other doctors and has published on it."
Dr. Jill Gould received her M.D. degree from the University of Kansas in 1981. She then served an internship and a residency in Pathology at the University of Colorado Health Services Center. She finished her post-graduate training in a fellowship in Forensic Pathology for the Denver County Coroner's Office in Denver, Colorado, and received Board Certification in Anatomical and Clinical Pathology in 1985 and Board Certification in Forensic Pathology in 1986.
Following her fellowship, between 1986 and 1993, Dr. Gould was employed as a Forensic Pathologist by the County Coroner's Office in three Colorado counties. She also was Medical Examiner and Coroner for Arapahoe County, Colorado. She was Assistant Clinical Professor of Pathology at the University of Colorado Health Sciences Center. In 1994, she was Clinical Assistant Professor in Pathology and Laboratory Medicine for the University of Kansas Medical Center. She later served as Coroner for Douglas, McPherson, and Harvey Counties in Kansas. At the time of her deposition she was employed as Deputy Coroner for Sedgwick County and also was a consultant pathologist in Colorado, Nebraska, Missouri, Wyoming, California, Texas, and Arizona.
The Causation Opinions
We next set out a summation of the causation opinions expressed by plaintiffs' three experts in their reports and depositions. Our ultimate inquiry is, how do the opinions play at the procedural stage of summary judgment?
Dr. Gould opined in her report that Jennifer had been in an "unrecognized, unstable, preeclamptic state characterized by elevated blood pressure, proteinuria, and hyperreflexia," a condition that had been "markedly exacerbated by the administration of Parlodel, setting off a chain of events consisting of vasospasm, exacerbation of hypertension, seizures, and resulting cerebral edema."
In Dr. Saade's opinion Parlodel "increased peripheral and intracranial pressures in a patient who already had preeclampsia and precipitated the cerebral edema and its consequences."
Dr. Davies emphasized that "there was sufficient time for the bromocriptine [Parlodel] to have participated in exacerbating [Jennifer's] pregnancy-induced hypertension," concluding that "in reasonable medical probability, Parlodel contributed to Ms. Bishop's death."
The plaintiffs assert that the conclusions of Drs. Gould, Saade, and Davies were based upon the standard medical methodology of "differential diagnosis." Differential diagnosis is defined as "[t]he determination of which of two or more diseases with similar symptoms is the one from which the patient is suffering, by a systematic comparison and contrasting of the clinical findings." Stedman's at 474. According to plaintiffs, each of the three experts compared symptoms of different conditions and excluded alternative causes of the cerebral edema during their depositions.
Dr. Gould compared symptoms of various conditions and ruled out various bacteria as the likely cause of Bishop's death, including pneumonia, uterine infection, and infectious meningitis. She reported that: (1) stains revealed no bacteria capable of causing disease, (2) minor signs of an infection were more likely attributable to the respirator than to pneumonia, (3) evidence of a uterine infection was inconsistent with the sort of infection that is usually the cause of a patient's death, and (4) the existence of "pinpoint hemorrhages" in the meninges ruled out the possibility of infectious meningitis.
Dr. Saade compared symptoms of different conditions and excluded both eclampsia and infection from his differential diagnosis. He noted that eclampsia will usually look different from the type of seizure suffered by Jennifer, while the presence of an infection was doubtful because her uterus (the likely source of an infection) evidenced no signs of an infection. Finally, Dr. Davies compared symptoms from different diseases and ruled out bacteremia, sepsis, meningitis, an alternative medication, and a preexisting seizure disorder as the causes of Jennifer's death.
The Sandoz Cross-examination
Sandoz, in countering plaintiffs' causation testimony, claims that plaintiffs' experts: (1) are unable to identify any human study to support their hypotheses, (2) admit that no epidemiological evidence concludes that Parlodel causes cerebral edema; (3) are not aware of any study demonstrating a statistically significant rise in blood pressure associated with the use of Parlodel; (4) admit that there is no epidemiological evidence that a single dose of Parlodel can cause seizure, hypertension, or death; (5) admit there is no statistically significant epidemiology demonstrating an increased incidence of stroke, seizure, myocardial infarction, or hypertension with Parlodel use; and (6) are not aware of any epidemiological studies associating Parlodel with any cardiac events.
Sandoz emphasizes that Jennifer Bishop ingested only a single tablet of Parlodel.
The District Court's Ruling
The district court, in ruling that the plaintiffs failed in their proof of medical causation, observed that plaintiffs' experts testified "using the correct 'magic words' of probability, plaintiffs' expert witnesses improperly offer medical causation opinions concerning Parlodel without general acceptance of the bases for those opinions within the relevant scientific community as required by Canaan and Frye." See State v. Canaan, 265 Kan. 835, 848-49, 964 P.2d 681 (1998); Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
The district court emphasized a lack of evidentiary support for the methodology and conclusions of plaintiffs' experts' opinions concerning general causation. Thus, plaintiffs were prevented from meeting their burden of establishing that the opinions were "generally accepted as reliable within the relevant scientific community." In addition, the district court noted that "the studies, literature and other evidence upon which plaintiffs' experts purport to rely for their general causation opinions concerning the alleged causal relationship between Parlodel and serious injuries are not sufficient legally reliable support for such opinions." The district court decided that a lack of evidentiary support for the experts' opinions concerning a specific causation prevented the plaintiffs from sustaining their burden of proving that these opinions were "generally accepted as reliable within the relevant scientific community."
The district court acknowledged, in dismissing plaintiffs' case with prejudice, that several pending motions were rendered moot by the causation ruling.
Summary Judgment
Before moving onto our analysis of Frye's application here, a comment on summary judgment is in order. Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. K.S.A. 60-256(c). Summary judgment decisions are reviewed de novo. See Mark Twain Kansas City Bank v. Kroh Bros. Dev. Co., 250 Kan. 754, Syl.¶ 2, 863 P.2d 355 (1992). We resolve all facts and inferences which may reasonably be drawn from the evidence in favor of the party against whom the ruling is sought. Bergstrom v. Noah, 266 Kan. 847, 871, 974 P.2d 531 (1999).
The essential facts here are documented in the parties' summary judgment submissions. Our standard of reviewing summary judgment is well established. See e.g., Mitzner v. State Dept. of SRS, 257 Kan. 258, 260-61, 891 P.2d 435 (1995). We conclude that genuine issues of material fact regarding the cause of Jennifer's death remain.
The Frye Test
In Kansas, the admissibility of expert testimony is subject to K.S.A. 60-456(b). The Frye test, however, acts as a qualification to the 60-456(b) statutory standard. Frye is applied in circumstances where a new or experimental scientific technique is employed by an expert witness. Canaan, 265 Kan at 848.
We next undertake the analysis that leads us to the conclusion that Frye is not applicable here.
We adopted the Frye test in State v. Lowry, 163 Kan. 622, 629, 185 P.2d 147 (1947). Frye requires that before expert scientific opinion may be received into evidence, the basis of the opinion must be shown to be generally accepted as reliable within the expert's particular scientific field. If a new scientific technique's validity has not been generally accepted or is only regarded as an experimental technique, then expert testimony based upon the technique should not be admitted. Canaan, 265 Kan. at 848. In State v. Washington, 229 Kan. 47, 54, 622 P.2d 986 (1981), we identified the purpose of the Frye test:
"'Frye was deliberately intended to interpose a substantial obstacle to the unrestrained admission of evidence based upon new scientific principles. . . . Several reasons founded in logic and common sense support a posture of judicial caution in this area. Lay jurors tend to give considerable weight to "scientific" evidence when presented by "experts" with impressive credentials. We have acknowledged the existence of a ". . . misleading aura of certainty which often envelopes a new scientific process, obscuring its currently experimental nature."'" (Quoting People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 31-32, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 549 P.2d 1240 [1976].)
The district court here determined that: (1) Frye applied, and (2) plaintiffs' expert's opinions failed to meet Frye's foundational requirements. The experts' opinions failed to prove both general causation (the relationship between Parlodel and cerebral edema) and specific causation (the relationship between Parlodel and Jennifer's death).
The district court's use of Frye to dismiss plaintiffs' case with prejudice generates four questions: (1) What is our standard of review? (2) Does the expert testimony here fall under the "pure opinion" exception to the Frye test? (The term "pure opinion" was used in Florida Power & Light Co. v. Tursi, 729 So. 2d 995, 997 [Fla. Dist. App. 1999], discussed later in our opinion.) (3) Is differential diagnosis a "generally accepted" means of determining legal causation within the relevant scientific community? (4) Did the district court err in excluding all studies, reports, and literature upon which the plaintiffs' experts relied?
Our review of these four inquiries leads to the conclusion that plaintiffs' expert causation testimony is not subject to the Frye test. Our conclusion moots the need to reach a detailed discussion of differential diagnosis.
The Standard of Review
We first examine the appropriate standard for reviewing the district court's decision to strike plaintiffs' expert causation testimony. Sandoz correctly asserts that Kansas law has traditionally called for an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing the legal admissibility of expert testimony under the Frye test. Sandoz relies on Canaan, 265 Kan. at 848-49. In Canaan, we said that the district court's decision regarding the admissibility of expert testimony "will not be reversed on appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion." 265 Kan. at 848.
The plaintiffs concede that an abuse of discretion standard is used in most cases involving the admissibility of scientific evidence, but they argue that de novo review is appropriate here because the district court's failure "to correctly apply the Frye standard" presents an "abstract question of law." We agree. See Baker v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, 156 F. 3d 248, 252 (1st Cir. 1998).
The parties' disagreement on the standard of review seems rooted in an understandable debate over the nature of the abuse of discretion standard. Although abuse of discretion describes a highly deferential standard, it can refer to questions of law warranting independent appellate review. Questions of law are presented when an appellate court seeks to review the factors and considerations forming a district court's discretionary decision.
We observe that the United States Supreme Court in discussing labels for a standard of review has said:
"Little turns, however, on whether we label review of this particular question abuse of discretion or de novo, for an abuse-of-discretion standard does not mean a mistake of law is beyond appellate correction. A district court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law. [Citation omitted.] That a [sentencing guideline] departure decision, in an occasional case, may call for a legal determination does not mean, as a consequence, that parts of the review must be labeled de novo while other parts are labeled an abuse of discretion. [Citation omitted.] The abuse-of-discretion standard includes review to determine that the discretion was not guided by erroneous legal conclusions." Ko