261 Kan. 936
(933 P2d 134)
No. 76,624
LAYTON RANDALL LEMUZ, a minor, by and through Randall R. Lemuz and Sandra J. Lemuz, his mother and father, natural guardians and next friends, and RANDALL R. LEMUZ and SANDRA J. LEMUZ, individually, Plaintiffs, v. MERLE J. FIESER, M.D., WILLIAM T. KING, M.D., and CENTRAL KANSAS MEDICAL CENTER, Defendants.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1. Determining whether a statute violates the constitution is a question of law. When determining a question of law, this court may exercise an unlimited de novo standard of review.
2. A statute is presumed constitutional, and all doubts must be resolved in favor of its validity. If there is any reasonable way to construe a statute as constitutionally valid, the court must do so. A statute must clearly violate the constitution before it may be struck down.
3. A claim of corporate negligence against a hospital is based upon the basic principle of negligence, a common-law remedy which was recognized at the time the Kansas Constitution was adopted.
4. If a remedy protected by due process is abrogated or restricted by the legislature, such change is constitutional if the change is reasonably necessary in the public interest to promote the general welfare of the people of the state, and the legislature provides an adequate substitute remedy to replace the remedy which has been restricted.
5. Major statutory enactments establishing a broad, comprehensive statutory remedy or scheme of reparation in derogation of a previously existing common-law remedy may be subsequently amended or altered without each such subsequent change being supported by an independent and separate quid pro quo.
6. In considering the adequacy of the quid pro quo of comprehensive legislation, which substitutes a statutory remedy for one that formerly existed at common law, and its sufficiency to support subsequent amendments or modifications which diminish the substitute remedy originally granted, no hard and fast rule can apply to all cases. In reviewing the sufficiency of the substitute remedy as it applies to amendment or modification of comprehensive remedial legislation, each determination must be made on a case-by-case basis. The proper test to apply is whether the substitute remedy would have been sufficient if the modification had been a part of the original legislative act. If so, then no new or additional quid pro quo is necessary to support the modification of the act against an attack under § 1 and § 18 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights.
On certification of a question of law from the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, FRANK G. THEIS, judge. Opinion filed March 7, 1997. The question certified is determined.
Mark A. Furney, of Overland Park, argued the cause, and Donald S. Andersen and James Long, of Andersen & Long, of Wichita, were with him on the briefs for plaintiffs.
Steven C. Day, of Woodard, Blaylock, Hernandez, Roth & Day, of Wichita, argued the cause and was on the briefs for defendants.
Randall E. Fisher, of Law Offices of Randall E. Fisher, of Wichita, was on the brief for amicus curiae Kansas Trial Lawyers Association.
Marta Fisher Linenberger and Wayne T. Stratton, of Goodell, Stratton, Edmonds & Palmer, L.L.P., of Topeka, were on the brief for amicus curiae Kansas Hospital Association.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ABBOTT, J.: This case is before the court on a question certified by the United States District Court for the District of Kansas under the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, K.S.A. 60-3201 et seq. Judge Frank G. Theis certified to this court the following question:
"Does K.S.A. 65-442(b) or K.S.A. 40-3403(h), as interpreted in the case of McVay v. Rich, 255 Kan. 371, 874 P.2d 641 (1994), violate either Section 1 or Section 18 of the Bill of Rights of the Kansas Constitution?"
The facts, as set forth in the district court's order certifying this question, are as follows:
"[T]his is essentially a medical malpractice action filed by the minor plaintiff and his parents against two medical doctors, Merle Fieser, M.D. and William King, M.D. and Central Kansas Medical Center. The action arises out of the birth of Layton Randall Lemuz at Central Kansas Medical Center (CKMC). Dr. Fieser was the treating physician during Sandra Lemuz's pregnancy and was the attending physician at delivery. Dr. King's role is not specified in the complaint. Plaintiffs allege that Dr. Fieser was negligent in her care and treatment of Sandra Lemuz and in the delivery and subsequent treatment of Layton Randall Lemuz. Plaintiffs allege negligence on the part of CKMC in granting obstetrical privileges to Dr. Fieser, when CKMC was aware of Dr. Fieser's alleged incompetence. Plaintiffs further allege negligence on the part of CKMC in its failure to order Dr. Fieser to transfer the minor plaintiff to a hospital with the personnel and facilities to care for a neurologically depressed newborn. Both Layton Randall Lemuz and his mother Sandra J. Lemuz allege personal injuries as a result of the defendant's conduct.
"The certification issue arose from CKMC's motion for partial summary judgment. In that motion, CKMC argues that it cannot be held liable for damages caused by Dr. Fieser's alleged negligence, since Dr. Fieser was not an employee of CKMC. CKMC's argument is based on K.S.A. 40-3403(h) and 65-442(b), and McVay v. Rich, 255 Kan. 371 (1994).
"K.S.A. 40-3403(h) provides in pertinent part:
'A health care provider who is qualified for coverage under the [health care stabilization] fund shall have no vicarious liability or responsibility for any injury or death arising out of the rendering of or the failure to render professional services inside or outside this state by any other health care provider who is also qualified for coverage under the fund.'
"K.S.A. 65-442(b) provides:
'There shall be no liability on the part of and no action for damages shall arise against any licensed medical care facility because of the rendering of or failure to render professional services within such medical care facility by a person licensed to practice medicine and surgery if such person is not an employee or agent of such medical care facility.'
"In McVay v. Rich, 255 Kan. 371, 374-78 (1994), the Kansas Supreme Court held that these two statutes bar a claim of medical malpractice against a licensed hospital based on the rendering or failure to render professional services within the hospital by a physician who is licensed to practice medicine and who is covered under the Health Care Stabilization Fund if that physician is not an agent or employee of the hospital. The court refused to address a challenge to the constitutionality of the two statutes because that argument had not been raised below. Id. at 378-80.
"The parties are in agreement that Kansas law does not recognize the so-called 'corporate negligence' doctrine as it relates to hospitals--in other words, there is no cause of action against a hospital based upon a claim that the hospital negligently granted hospital privileges to a non-employee physician. Plaintiffs concede that the law, as presently interpreted, bars their claim for corporate negligence against CKMC. In response [to] CKMC's motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs argued that K.S.A. 40-3403(h) and 65-442(b) violated various provisions of the Kansas and United States Constitutions. Plaintiffs' arguments in opposing defendant's motion for summary judgment focus primarily on Kansas law, not federal constitutional principles.
"Plaintiffs argue that the statutes deprive plaintiffs of due process of law, in violation of section 18 of the Kansas Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs further argue that the statutes deprive plaintiffs of equal protection of the laws, in violation of section 1 of the Kansas Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
"Plaintiff[s] oppose the motion to certify. Plaintiffs request that this court address the state constitutional issues in conjunction with the federal constitutional issues. The court declines the invitation and shall grant the motion to certify. The court shall address the federal constitutional issues when and if the occasion arises.
"The parties acknowledge that the Kansas Supreme Court has addressed the constitutionality of K.S.A. 40-3403(h) on one occasion. In Bair v. Peck, 248 Kan. 824 (1991), the Kansas Supreme Court held that K.S.A. 40-3403(h) did not violate Section 1 (equal protection), Section 5 (right to trial by jury) or Section 18 (due process) of the Bill of Rights of the Kansas Constitution. Bair apparently involved an employer/employee relationship (respondeat superior) and not an independent contractor relationship (corporate negligence). Thus, while the Kansas Supreme Court has upheld 40-3403(h) in the context of respondeat superior, that court has not addressed the constitutionality of that provision in the context of corporate negligence. While this court does not believe this factual difference is dispositive, the plaintiffs believe otherwise.
"If this court were faced with a challenge to section 40-3403(h) only, the court would deny the motion to certify. However, since the Kansas Supreme Court has not had the opportunity to address the constitutionality of K.S.A. 65-442(b), the court finds it appropriate to certify the question as presented. A determination on the constitutionality of the two statutes may be determinative of the claims against CKMC. There is no controlling precedent on the constitutionality of K.S.A. 65-442(b). While this court believed that the Kansas Supreme Court's decision in Bair v. Peck is determinative of the constitutionality of K.S.A. 40-3404(h), the parties are entitled to present their arguments to that court regarding the distinction between employee and independent contractor."
This court gave leave to the Kansas Hospital Association and the Kansas Trial Lawyers Association to file amicus curiae briefs in this case.
K.S.A. 40-3403(h) provides:
"A health care provider who is qualified for coverage under the [health care stabilization] fund shall have no vicarious liability or responsibility for any injury or death arising out of the rendering of or the failure to render professional services inside or outside this state by any other health care provider who is also qualified for coverage under the fund. The provisions of this subsection shall apply to all claims filed on or after [July 1, 1986]." (Emphasis added.)
The plaintiffs' claim is not based on vicarious liability. Instead, the plaintiffs allege that the hospital (CKMC) was independently negligent because it allowed Dr. Fieser to continue working on its staff, even though the hospital was aware of Dr. Fieser's alleged incompetence. Plaintiffs also allege negligence on the part of CKMC because it failed to order Dr. Fieser to transfer Layton Randall Lemuz to a hospital which had the facilities to care for a neurologically depressed newborn.
According to the plaintiffs, K.S.A. 40-3403(h) was adopted in response to the court's decision in McGuire v. Sifers, 235 Kan. 368, 681 P.2d 1025 (1984), which held that the doctrine of respondeat superior was applicable to professional corporations. Thus, the plaintiffs assert that K.S.A. 40-3403(h) only concerns and absolves health care providers of vicarious liability, rather than independent acts of negligence as the plaintiffs allege herein. Since, according to the plaintiffs, K.S.A. 40-3403(h) does not apply to or prohibit their claim of independent negligence against the hospital, the plaintiffs allege that constitutionality of 40-3403(h) is irrelevant here, despite the wording of the certified question.
However, in the case of McVay v. Rich, 255 Kan. 371, 874 P.2d 641 (1994), the plaintiff filed suit against a hospital, alleging that the hospital was independently negligent for continuing to grant hospital staff privileges to a nonemployee, nonagent physician when the hospital knew or should have known that the physician was incompetent. In McVay, this court held that 40-3403(h) applied to and in part prohibited the plaintiff's claim against the hospital, along with 65-442(b), even though the claim was one of independent liability, not just vicarious liability. This conclusion was based on the statutory language which provides that "[a] health care provider . . . shall have no vicarious liability or responsibility for any injury or death arising out of . . . ." (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 40-3403(h). McVay interpreted the italicized term above as absolving a hospital not just from vicarious liability but from any responsibility, including independent liability, for the acts of a physician. Under this interpretation, a hospital could not be independently negligent for the injury or death of a patient arising out of the negligence of a nonemployee, independent contractor physician who was covered by the Health Care Stabilization Fund, even if the hospital allowed the physician to continue working on its staff knowing that the physician was incompetent (corporate negligence). Thus, K.S.A. 40-3403(h) does apply and prohibit the plaintiff's claim of corporate negligence against the hospital. As such, the constitutionality of this statute is important.
In Bair v. Peck, 248 Kan. 824, 811 P.2d 1176 (1991), this court addressed the constitutionality of K.S.A. 40-3403(h). This court found that K.S.A. 40-3403(h) "bears a reasonable relationship to the objectives sought by the legislature and does not violate Section 1 of the Bill of Rights of the Kansas Constitution." 248 Kan. at 834. Further, this court found that the Health Care Provider Insurance Availability Act (Act), K.S.A. 40-3401 et seq., which is "a comprehensive compulsory insurance plan mandating minimum amounts of malpractice insurance as a condition of providing health care in Kansas," was an adequate quid pro quo or substitute remedy for the abrogation of the common-law remedy of vicarious liability against hospitals, even though this substitute remedy was not adopted simultaneously with the abrogation of the common-law remedy. Thus, this court held that 40-3403(h) was not unconstitutional under § 18 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. 248 Kan. at 844. Bair analyzed 40-3403(h) as if it only abrogated vicarious liability against hospitals, not as if it also abrogated independent liability against hospitals for negligently granting staff privileges to incompetent nonemployee physicians. Judge Theis certified the question so the plaintiffs could make the argument that this distinction in the application of K.S.A. 40-3403(h) altered the constitutional analysis of the statute. The plaintiffs do not make this argument. Instead, the plaintiffs argue that 40-3403(h) does not apply to their corporate negligence claim at all. Even if the plaintiffs had made this argument, distinguishing between vicarious liability and corporate negligence in determining whether 40-3403(h) violates the constitution, it would have failed.
The discussion and conclusion in Bair--that 40-3403(h) does not violate § 1 or § 18 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights--is broad enough to apply to 40-3403(h) even if the statute does more than it was assumed to do in Bair by prohibiting not only actions for vicarious liability against hospitals, but also prohibiting actions for independent liability/corporate negligence against hospitals. See Bair, 248 Kan. at 830-34; 836-45. Thus, the plaintiffs' argument--that if 40-3403(h) prohibits an independent liability/corporate negligence action against a hospital, then the statute is an unconstitutional violation of § 1 or § 18 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights--must fail.
Finally, the determination of whether K.S.A. 40-3403(h), as interpreted in McVay, 255 Kan. 371, violates either § 1 or § 18 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights is irrelevant. This is because the second statute at issue in this certified question, K.S.A. 65-442(b), discussed below, also prohibits the plaintiffs' independent liability/corporate negligence action against the hospital in this case, and the statute is constitutional under § 1 and § 18 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. Thus, the plaintiffs' action against the hospital is properly barred by K.S.A. 65-442(b), regardless of the interpretation of 40-3403(h) and its constitutionality.
K.S.A. 65-442(b) provides:
"There shall be no liability on the part of and no action for damages shall arise against any licensed medical care facility because of the rendering of or failure to render professional services within such medical care facility by a person licensed to practice medicine and surgery if such person is not an employee or agent of such medical care facility." (Emphasis added.)
According to the certified facts, Dr. Fieser was not an employee or agent of CKMC. Any liability against CKMC for allowing Dr. Fieser to continue working on its staff when CKMC was aware of or should have been aware of Dr. Fieser's alleged incompetence or any liability against CKMC for failing to order Dr. Fieser to transfer Layton Randall Lemuz to a hospital which had the facilities to care for him is because of the failure to render professional services by Dr. Fieser, who is not an employee or agent of CKMC. Thus, K.S.A. 65-442(b) prohibits the plaintiffs' independent liability/corporate negligence action against CKMC. McVay, 255 Kan. 371, Syl. ¶ 1. However, the plaintiffs allege that K.S.A. 65-442(b) is invalid and does not prohibit their claim because it is in violation of the Kansas Constitution.
Section 1 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights
Section 1 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights provides:
"Equal Rights. All men are possessed of equal and inalienable natural rights, among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."
This section is typically considered the Equal Protection Clause of the Kansas Constitution. See Stephens v. Snyder Clinic Ass'n, 230 Kan. 115, 128, 631 P.2d 222 (1981). In their primary brief, the plaintiffs assert that 65-442(b) violates § 1 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. However, in their reply brief, the plaintiffs "abandon and waive, here and upon return to the United States District Court, their right to challenge these statutes based on the Kansas Constitution's guarantee of equal protection." The plaintiffs ask this court to "resist the defendant's invitation to consider the constitutionality of these statutes against an equal protection challenge" because "[d]oing so would be nothing less than . . . an advisory opinion." Since the plaintiffs have abandoned their equal protection challenge of this statute, it is not necessary to analyze the constitutionality of K.S.A. 65-442(b) under § 1, the Equal Protection Clause of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights.
Section 18 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights
Determining whether a statute violates the constitution is a question of law. When determining a question of law, this court may exercise an unlimited de novo standard of review. See State v. Mertz, 258 Kan. 745, 748, 907 P.2d 847 (1995). "A statute is presumed constitutional, and all doubts must be resolved in favor of its validity. If there is any reasonable way to construe a statute as constitutionally valid, the court must do so. A statute must clearly violate the constitution before it may be struck down." State v. Scherzer, 254 Kan. 926, Syl. ¶ 6, 869 P.2d 729 (1994); Boatright v. Kansas Racing Comm'n, 251 Kan. 240, 243, 834 P.2d 368 (1992). "This court not only has the authority, but also the duty, to construe a statute in such a manner that it is constitutional if the same can be done within the apparent intent of the legislature in passing the statute." State v. Durrant, 244 Kan. 522, 534, 769 P.2d 1174, cert. denied 492 U.S. 923 (1989).
The plaintiffs contend that K.S.A. 65-442(b) unconstitutionally violates § 18 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights, which provides:
"Justice without delay. All persons, for injuries suffered in person, reputation or property, shall have remedy by due course of law, and justice administered without delay."
The defendants assert that K.S.A. 65-442(b) does not violate § 18 because the statute does not implicate any interest protected by § 18. The defendants point out that the provisions of § 18 preserve the right to remedy by due course of law "only as to civil causes of action that were recognized as justiciable by the common law as it existed at the time our constitution was adopted." Leiker v. Gafford, 245 Kan. 325, 361, 778 P.2d 823 (1989), overruled on other grounds Martindale v. Tenny, 250 Kan. 621, 629, 829 P.2d 561 (1992). See Smith v. Printup, 254 Kan. 315, 332, 866 P.2d 985 (1993); Cott v. Peppermint Twist Mgt. Co., 253 Kan. 452, 481, 856 P.2d 906 (1993). Under the defendants' interpretation of this language, § 18 only protects common-law remedies as they existed at the time the Kansas Constitution was adopted and does not apply to or protect later judicial expansions of such remedies, such as the corporate negligence doctrine. According to the defendants, the corporate negligence doctrine did not exist at the time the Kansas Constitution was adopted. Instead, the doctrine was first developed in 1965 in the case of Darling v. Charleston Hospital, 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied 383 U.S. 946 (1966). Before this case, the defendants argue, it was universally agreed that hospitals were not liable for the negligence of nonemployee members of the medical staff and were not required to use reasonable care in recruiting staff physicians. See Insinga v. LaBella, 543 So. 2d 209, 212 (Fla. 1989). Since a cause of action for corporate negligence was not recognized at the time the Kansas Constitution was adopted, but is a judicial expansion of common-law negligence remedies, the defendants contend that the legislative preclusion of that cause of action by 65-442(b) does not implicate § 18. We disagree.
The plaintiffs' claim of corporate negligence against the hospital is based upon the basic principle of negligence, a common-law remedy which was recognized at the time the Kansas Constitution was adopted. In McVay, 255 Kan. 371, this court interpreted K.S.A. 65-442(b) to determine if it precluded corporate negligence lawsuits against hospitals. We noted that the theory of corporate negligence recognizes a "[hospital's] liability for negligently retaining or employing an independent contractor" because "'hospitals have an independent duty to ensure the health and safety of their patients,'" including "the duty to exercise reasonable care in granting, reviewing, and extending staff privileges." 255 Kan. at 374-75. Once this new duty for hospitals is plugged into an old cause of action, negligence, the hospital's liability under the corporate negligence doctrine develops. See Teft v. Wilcox, 6 Kan. *46 (1870) (finding that the common law allowed for the recovery of damages for negligent injuries), cited in Kansas Malpractice Victims Coalition v. Bell, 243 Kan. 333, 342, 757 P.2d 251 (1988), overruled in part on other grounds Bair, 248 Kan. 824.
Thus, corporate negligence causes of action are not "new" causes of action but are simply different applications of the basic concepts of negligence which existed at common law when the Kansas Constitution was adopted. As such, corporate negligence causes of action are protected by § 18. If this were not the case, then any evolution of negligence law since the time the Kansas Constitution was adopted could be abrogated without implicating § 18. Since K.S.A. 60-442(b) precludes a corporate negligence cause of action, it implicates § 18.
The defendants further argue that 65-442(b) and its preclusion of the corporate negligence doctrine do not implicate § 18 because the corporate negligence doctrine is merely a theory of recovery and not a separate remedy entitled to independent protection under § 18. The defendants point out that 65-442(b) does not provide hospitals with blanket immunity from tort liability or from the collection of tort damages. Instead, the defendants claim the plaintiffs remain free to pursue all traditional remedies against a hospital/defendant, except for this type of recovery for injuries caused by a staff physician. However, if the plaintiffs are able to prove a staff physician's negligence caused their injury, then, according to the defendants, the plaintiffs will still receive a full remedy in the form of a judgment against the staff physician, even if the plaintiffs cannot sue the hospital for corporate negligence based on these injuries. Thus, for their personal injury suffered, the plaintiffs still have a remedy by due course of law by suing the staff physician. As such, the defendants contend that the plaintiffs are not deprived of a remedy for their injuries under 65-442(b), but are merely precluded from a certain type of recovery for their injuries, that is, suing the hospital for corporate negligence. Hence, the defendants allege that 65-442(b) does not abrogate a remedy or implicate § 18. We disagree.
Under the corporate negligence doctrine, a hospital has an independent duty to insure the health and safety of its patients by exercising reasonable care in the granting, reviewing, and extending staff privileges to independent contractor physicians. The plaintiffs' action against the hospital is not just another form of recovery for the breach of the doctor's duty. Instead, it is a separate remedial action taken to recover for a separate breach of the hospital's duty. While the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover twice for the same injury caused by two separate breaches of two independent duties, the plaintiffs are entitled to seek a remedy from each defendant who breached a duty owed to them, and then keep only one recovery. K.S.A. 65-442(b) prevents the plaintiffs from seeking a remedy against the hospital for the hospital's breach of a duty owed to the plaintiffs. We hold that the right to seek this remedy existed at common law when the Kansas Constitution was adopted; thus, 65-442(b) and its preclusion of this remedy implicate § 18.
Section 18 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights is the section which provides due process protection. The standard in Kansas for reviewing § 18 due process challenges is:
"If a remedy protected by due process is abrogated or restricted by the legislature, 'such change is constitutional if "the change is reasonably necessary in the public interest to promote the general welfare of the people of the state," Manzanares v. Bell, 214 Kan. 589, 599, 522 P.2d 1291 (1974), and the legislature provides an adequate substitute remedy' to replace the remedy which has been restricted." Bonin v. Vannaman, 261 Kan. 199, 217, 929 P.2d 754 (1996) (citing Aves v. Shah, 258 Kan. 506, 521, 906 P.2d 642 [1995]).
The plaintiffs assert that this is an inappropriate standard to use in reviewing § 18 challenges because § 18 does more than just protect against due process violations. The plaintiffs argue that they have a right to bodily integrity, including the right not to be exposed to an incompetent physician. The plaintiffs also argue that private law duties and remedies give substance to this fundamental right of bodily integrity. According to the plaintiffs, § 18 is a recognition of the State's duty to implement and enforce private law. The plaintiffs claim that the right to receive a remedy for the breach of the hospital's private law duty to protect their bodily integrity is specifically protected by § 18, and when this right is taken away by statute, the statute violates § 18.
Based on this analysis, the plaintiffs contend that § 18 is more than just the state's equivalent to federal due process protection. Instead, the plaintiffs assert that § 18 is a separate and distinct clause of the Kansas Constitution which is designed to protect fundamental rights of bodily integrity. Plaintiffs complain that since § 18 is a specific clause of the Kansas Constitution which provides protection for fundamental rights of bodily integrity, not just due process protection, the rational basis test is not a strict enough standard to apply when evaluating possible § 18 violations.
Instead of using the rational basis test to evaluate § 18 challenges, the plaintiffs ask this court to draw from both the heightened scrutiny doctrine of equal protection and the compelling state interest test of substantive due process to determine that legislation will only be upheld under § 18 if it is narrowly tailored to substantially further a legitimate interest of the State. The plaintiffs claim that such a test would allow for meaningful judicial review of a specific clause of the Kansas Constitution.
Section 18 is already reviewed under a standard which is more stringent than the rational basis test. This court uses the rational basis test for some equal protection challenges raised under § 1 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. This test, also known as the reasonable basis test, provides:
"'The "reasonable basis" test is violated only if the statutory classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the state's legitimate objective. The state legislature is presumed to have acted within its constitutional power, even if the statute results in some inequality. Under the reasonable basis test, a statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.'" Aves, 258 Kan at 525 (quoting Leiker, 254 Kan. at 363-64).
This court does not use such a standard for § 18 due process challenges. Instead, this court uses the quid pro quo test to review challenges under § 18. This test provides:
"If a remedy protected by due process is abrogated or restricted by the legislature, 'such change is constitutional if "[1] the change is reasonably necessary in the public interest to promote the general welfare of the people of the state," Manzanares v. Bell, 214 Kan. 589, 599, 522 P.2d