IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS
No. 92,032
RYAN MONTOY, et al.,
Appellees/Cross-appellants,
v.
STATE OF KANSAS, et al.,
Appellants/Cross-appellees.
Appeal from Shawnee district court; TERRY L. BULLOCK, judge. Opinion filed January 3, 2005. Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Curtis L. Tideman, of Lathrop & Gage L.C., of Overland Park, argued the cause, and Kenneth L. Weltz and Alok Ahuja, of the same firm, and David W. Davies, assistant attorney general, and Phill Kline, attorney general, were with him on the briefs for appellant/cross-appellee State of Kansas.
Dan Biles, of Gates, Biles, Shields & Ryan, P.A., of Overland Park, argued the cause, and Rodney J. Bieker, of Kansas Department of Education, and Cheryl Lynne Whelan, of Lawrence, were with him on the briefs for appellants/cross-appellees Janet Waugh, Sue Gamble, John Bacon, Bill Wagnon, Connie Morris, Bruce Wyatt, Kenneth Willard, Carol Rupe, Iris Van Meter, Steve Abrams, and Andy Tompkins.
Alan L. Rupe, of Kutak Rock LLP, of Wichita, argued the cause, and Richard A. Olmstead, of the same firm, and John S. Robb, of Somers Robb & Robb, of Newton, were with him on the briefs for appellees/cross-appellants.
Wm. Scott Hesse, assistant attorney general, was on the brief for defendants/cross-appellees Governor Kathleen Sebelius and State Treasurer Lynn Jenkins.
Jane L. Williams, of Seigfreid, Bingham, Levy, Selzer & Gee, of Kansas City, Missouri, was on the brief for amicus curiae Kansas Families United for Public Education.
Patricia E. Baker, of Kansas Association of School Boards, of Topeka, was on the brief for amicus curiae Kansas Association of School Boards.
David M. Schauner and Robert Blaufuss, of Kansas National Education Association, of Topeka, were on the brief for amicus curiae Kansas National Education Association.
Joseph W. Zima, of Topeka Public Schools, was on the brief for amicus curiae Unified School District No. 501, Shawnee County, Kansas.
Michael G. Norris and Melissa D. Hillman, of Norris, Keplinger & Hillman, L.L.C., of Overland Park, were on the brief for amici curiae Unified School Districts Nos. 233, 229, and 232, Johnson County, Kansas.
Anne M. Kindling, of Goodell, Stratton, Edmonds & Palmer, L.L.P., of Topeka, was on the brief for amicus curiae Unified School District No. 512, Shawnee Mission, Kansas.
Bernard T. Giefer, of Giefer Law LLC, of WaKeeney, was on the brief for amici curiae Unified School District No. 208, Trego County, Kansas (WaKeeney), et al. (60 other Kansas school districts).
Thomas R. Powell and Roger M. Theis, of Hinkle Elkouri Law Firm L.L.C., of Wichita, were on the brief for amicus curiae Unified School District No. 259, Sedgwick County, Kansas.
Janice L. Mathis, of Rainbow/PUSH Coalition, of Atlanta, Georgia, was on the brief for amicus curiae Rainbow/PUSH Coalition.
Cynthia J. Sheppeard, of Weathers & Riley, of Topeka, was on the brief for amicus curiae Kansas Action for Children.
Bob L. Corkins, of Lawrence, was on the brief for amicus curiae Kansas Taxpayers Network.
Kirk W. Lowry, of Kansas Advocacy & Protective Services, of Topeka, was on the brief for amicus curiae Kansas Advocacy & Protective Services.
Per Curiam: The defendants in this case, the State of Kansas (appellant/cross-appellee) along with Janet Waugh, Sue Gamble, John Bacon, Bill Wagnon, Connie Morris, Bruce Wyatt, Kenneth Willard, Carol Rupe, Iris Van Meter, Steve Abrams and Andy Tompkins (the State Board of Education related defendants) (appellants/cross-appellees) appeal from a decision of the district court holding that the Kansas School District Finance and Quality Performance Act (SDFQPA), K.S.A. 72-6405 et seq., is unconstitutional.
The plaintiffs in this case, U.S.D. No. 305 (Salina) and U.S.D. No. 443 (Dodge City), along with 36 individually named students in those districts, cross-appeal from the district court's determination that the legislature did not abrogate the constitutional obligations of the State Board of Education.
The constitutionality of the statutory scheme for funding the public schools in Kansas is at issue in this appeal. Because this court's resolution of this issue will have statewide effect and require legislative action in the 2005 legislative session, we announce our decision in this brief opinion. A formal opinion will be filed at a later date.
After examining the record and giving full and complete consideration to the arguments raised in this appeal, we resolve the issue as follows:
1. We reverse the district court's holding that SDFQPA's financing formula is a violation of equal protection. Although the district court correctly determined that the rational basis test was the proper level of scrutiny, it misapplied that test. We conclude that all of the funding differentials as provided by the SDFQPA are rationally related to a legitimate legislative purpose. Thus, the SDFQPA does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Kansas or United States Constitutions.
2. We also reverse the district court's holding that the SDFQPA financing formula has an unconstitutional disparate impact on minorities and/or other classes. In order to establish an equal protection violation on this basis, one must show not only that there is a disparate impact, but also that the impact can be traced to a discriminatory purpose. Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272, 60 L. Ed. 2d 870, 99 S. Ct. 2282 (1979). No discriminatory purpose was shown by the plaintiffs. Thus, the SDFQPA is not unconstitutional based solely on its "disparate impact."
3. We affirm the district court's holding that the legislature has failed to meet its burden as imposed by Art. 6, § 6 of the Kansas Constitution to "make suitable provision for finance" of the public schools.
The district court reached this conclusion after an 8-day bench trial which resulted in a record of approximately 1,400 pages of transcript and 9,600 pages of exhibits. Most of the witnesses were experts in the fields of primary and secondary education. The trial followed this court's decision in Montoy v. State, 275 Kan. 145, 152-53, 62 P.3d 228 (2003) (Montoy I), in which we held, in part, that the issue of suitability was not resolved by U.S.D. No. 229 v. State, 256 Kan. 232, 885 P.2d 1170 (1994), cert. denied 515 U.S. 1144 (1995). We had held in U.S.D. No. 229 that the SDFQPA as originally adopted in 1992 made suitable provision for the finance of public education. See 256 Kan. at 254-59. Later, in Montoy I, we noted that the issue of suitability is not stagnant but requires constant monitoring. See 275 Kan. at 153.
Following the trial, the district court made findings regarding the various statutory and societal changes which occurred after the decision in U.S.D. No. 229 and affected school funding. Regarding societal changes, the district court found: (1) 36% of Kansas public school students now qualify for free or reduced-price lunches; (2) the number of students with limited proficiency in English has increased dramatically; (3) the number of immigrants has increased dramatically; and (4) state institutions of higher learning now use more rigorous admission standards.
Additionally, the district court found a number of statutory changes made after the decision in U.S.D. No. 229 which affected the way the financing formula delivers funds: (1) the goals set out in K.S.A. 72-6439(a) were removed; (2) the SDFQPA's provision requiring an oversight committee to ensure fair and equitable funding was allowed to expire; (3) the low enrollment weighting was changed; (4) correlation weighting was added; (5) at-risk pupil weighting was changed; (6) the mill levy was decreased from 35 mills to 20 mills; (7) a $20,000 exemption for residential property was added to the mill levy, also decreasing revenue; (8) a new facilities weighting was added; (9) special education funds were added to the calculation to increase the base on which the local option budget funding was calculated; (10) ancillary weighting was added; (11) the cap on capital outlay authority was removed; and (12) most special education funds were limited to reimbursement for 85 percent of the costs incurred in hiring special education teachers and paraprofessionals.
Our standard of review requires us to determine whether the district court made findings of fact which are supported by substantial competent evidence and are sufficient to support the conclusions of law. McCain Foods USA, Inc. v. Central Processors, Inc., 275 Kan. 1, 12, 61 P.3d 68 (2002). We conclude that the district court's findings regarding the societal and legislative changes are supported by substantial competent evidence.
The plaintiffs argued and the district court found that the cumulative result of these changes is a financing formula which does not make suitable provision for finance of public schools, leaving them inadequately funded. Before determining whether there is substantial competent evidence to support these findings, we must examine the standard for determining whether the current version of the SDFQPA makes suitable provision for the finance of public school education. The concept of "suitable provision for finance" encompasses many aspects. First and perhaps foremost it must reflect a level of funding which meets the constitutional requirement that "[t]he legislature shall provide for intellectual, educational, vocational and scientific improvement by establishing and maintaining public schools . . . ." (Emphasis added.) Kan. Const. art. 6, § 1. The Kansas Constitution thus imposes a mandate that our educational system cannot be static or regressive but must be one which "advance[s] to a better quality or state." See Webster's II New College Dictionary 557 (1999) (defining "improve"). In apparent recognition of this concept, the legislature incorporated performance levels and standards into the SDFQPA and, although repealing the 10 goals which served as the foundation for measuring suitability in the U.S.D. No. 229 decision, has retained a provision which requires the State Board of Education to design and adopt a school performance accreditation system "based upon improvement in performance that reflects high academic standards and is measurable." K.S.A. 72-6439(a). Moreover, the legislature mandated standards for individual and school performance levels "the achievement of which represents excellence in the academic area at the grade level to which the assessment applies." K.S.A. 72-6439(c).
Through these provisions, the legislature has imposed criteria for determining whether it has made suitable provision for the finance of education: Do the schools meet the accreditation requirements and are students achieving an "improvement in performance that reflects high academic standards and is measurable"? K.S.A. 72- 6439(a).
These student performance accreditation measures were utilized in 2001 when the legislature directed that a professional evaluation be performed to determine the costs of a suitable education for Kansas school children. In authorizing the study, the legislature defined "suitable education." K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 46-1225(e). The Legislative Education Planning Committee (LEPC), to whom the task of overseeing the study was delegated, determined which performance measures would be utilized in determining if Kansas' school children were receiving a suitable education. The evaluation, performed by Augenblick & Myers, utilized the criteria established by the LEPC, and, in part, examined whether the current financing formula and funding levels were adequate for schools to meet accreditation standards and performance criteria. The study concluded that both the formula and funding levels were inadequate to provide what the legislature had defined as a suitable education.
Although in Montoy I, 275 Kan. at 153-55, we concluded that accreditation standards may not always adequately define a suitable education, our examination of the extensive record in this case leads us to conclude that we need look no further than the legislature's own definition of suitable education to determine that the standard is not being met under the current financing formula. Within that record there is substantial competent evidence, including the Augenblick & Myers study, establishing that a suitable education, as that term is defined by the legislature, is not being provided. In particular, the plaintiff school districts (Salina and Dodge City) established that the SDFQPA fails to provide adequate funding for a suitable education for students of their and other similarly situated districts, i.e., middle- and large-sized districts with a high proportion of minority and/or at-risk and special education students. Additional evidence of the inadequacy of the funding is found in the fact that, while the original intent of the provision for local option budgets within the financing formula was to fund "extra" expenses, some school districts have been forced to use local option budgets to finance general education.
Furthermore, in determining if the legislature has made suitable provision for the finance of public education, there are other factors to be considered in addition to whether students are provided a suitable education. Specifically, the district court found that the financing formula was not based upon actual costs to educate children but was instead based on former spending levels and political compromise. This failure to do any cost analysis distorted the low enrollment, special education, vocational, bilingual education, and the at-risk student weighting factors.
Thus, there is substantial competent evidence to support the district court's findings discussed above. These findings are sufficient to support the conclusion that the legislature has failed to "make suitable provisions for finance" of the public school system as required by Art. 6, § 6 of the Kansas Constitution.
4. As to the cross-appeal, we affirm the district court's holding that the legislature has not usurped the powers of the State Board of Education.
In addressing the appropriate remedy, as the district court noted, there are "literally hundreds of ways" the financing formula can be altered to comply with Art. 6, § 6. Similarly, there are many ways to re-create or reestablish a suitable financing formula. We do not dictate the precise way in which the legislature must fulfill its constitutional duty. That is for the legislators to decide, consistent with the Kansas Constitution.
It is clear increased funding will be required; however, increased funding may not in and of itself make the financing formula constitutionally suitable. The equity with which the funds are distributed and the actual costs of education, including appropriate levels of administrative costs, are critical factors for the legislature to consider in achieving a suitable formula for financing education. By contrast, the present financing formula increases disparities in funding, not based on a cost analysis, but rather on political and other factors not relevant to education.
We are aware that our decision (1) raises questions about continuing the present financing formula pending corrective action by the legislature; (2) could have the potential to disrupt the public schools; and (3) requires the legislature to act expeditiously to provide constitutionally suitable financing for the public school system. Accordingly, at this time we do not remand this case to the district court or consider a final remedy, but instead we will retain jurisdiction and stay all further proceedings to allow the legislature a reasonable time to correct the constitutional infirmity in the present financing formula. In the meantime, the present financing formula and funding will remain in effect until further order of this court.
We have in this brief opinion endeavored to identify problem areas in the present formula as well as legislative changes in the immediate past that have contributed to the present funding deficiencies. We have done so in order that the legislature take steps it deems necessary to fulfill its constitutional responsibility. Its failure to act in the face of this opinion would require this court to direct action to be taken to carry out that responsibility. We believe further court action at this time would not be in the best interests of the school children of this state.
The legislature, by its action or lack thereof in the 2005 session, will dictate what form our final remedy, if necessary, will take. To ensure the legislature complies with our holding, we will withhold our formal opinion until corrective legislation has been enacted or April 12, 2005, whichever occurs first, and stay the issuance of our mandate in this case.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
1 BEIER, J., concurring: I concur fully in the court's result and in the bulk of its rationale. I write separately only because I disagree with the holding of U.S.D. No. 229 v. State, 256 Kan. 232, 260-63, 885 P.2d 1170 (1994), that education is not a fundamental right under the Kansas Constitution. I believe it is. Thus I would not, as the court implicitly did on its way to the opinion in this case, rely on U.S.D. No. 229 to conclude that the Kansas school financing formula under SDFQAA did not violate the Equal Protection Clauses of the federal and state Constitutions. Rather, I would take the opportunity presented by this case to overrule the U.S.D. No. 229 holding on the status of the right to education under the Kansas Constitution.
In San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36 L. Ed. 2d 16, 93 S. Ct. 1278, reh. denied 411 U.S. 959 (1973), the United States Supreme Court held that education is not a fundamental right under the United States Constitution. In reaching this conclusion, the Court stated:
"[T]he key to discovering whether education is 'fundamental' is not to be found in comparisons of the relative societal significance of education as opposed to subsistence or housing. Nor is it to be found by weighing whether education is as important as the right to travel. Rather, the answer lies in assessing whether there is a right to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." 411 U.S. at 33-34.
Article 6, § 1 of our state constitution reads: "The legislature shall provide for intellectual, educational, vocational and scientific improvement by establishing and maintaining public schools, educational institutions and related activities." (Emphasis added.) Article 6, § 6 provides: "The legislature shall make suitable provision for finance of the educational interests of the state." (Emphasis added.)
If we were to apply the United States Supreme Court's straightforward pattern of analysis from Rodriguez, we would need to look no further than the mandatory language of these two constitutional provisions. Because they explicitly provide for education, education is a fundamental right.
It is certainly true, however, that our sister states, when faced with the question of whether their own constitutions make education a fundamental right, have not always been satisfied with the Rodriguez approach. For example, in Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1017 (Colo. 1982), the Colorado Supreme Court stated:
"While the [Rodriguez] test may be applicable in determining fundamental rights under the United States Constitution, it has no applicability in determining fundamental rights under the Colorado Constitution. This is so because of the basic and inherently different natures of the two constitutions . . . . [Footnote omitted.]
"The United States Constitution is one of restricted authority and delegated powers. As provided in the Tenth Amendment, all powers not granted to the United States by the Constitution, nor denied to the States by it, are reserved to the States or to the People. [Citations omitted.]
"Conversely, the Colorado Constitution is not one of limited powers where the state's authority is restricted to the four corners of the document. [Citation omitted.] The Colorado Constitution does not restrict itself to addressing only those areas deemed fundamental. Rather, it contains provisions which are . . . suited for statutory enactment . . . as well as those deemed fundamental to our concept of ordered liberty . . . . Thus, under the Colorado Constitution, fundamental rights are not necessarily determined by whether they are guaranteed explicitly or implicitly within the document."
Several other states also have rejected Rodriguez as the test for whether their state constitutional provisions on education demand recognition of a fundamental right. See Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), 18 Cal. 3d 728, 766-67, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 557 P.2d 929 (1976) (refusing to be constrained by whether rights and interests are explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by state constitution), cert. denied 432 U.S. 907 (1977); McDaniel v. Thomas, 248 Ga. 632, 646, 285 S.E.2d 156 (1981) ("explicit or implicit" guarantee model lacks meaningful limitation under state constitution); Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 803-05, 537 P.2d 635 (1975) (rejecting categorization of "fundamental" versus "non-fundamental" rights); Hornbeck v. Somerset Co. Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 650, 458 A.2d 758 (1983) (state constitution explicitly guarantees rights and interests not considered "fundamental"); Bd. of Edn. v. Walter, 58 Ohio St. 2d 368, 375, 390 N.E.2d 813 (1979) (state constitution not limited in power and contains provisions suitable for statutory enactment), cert. denied 444 U.S. 1015 (1980); Fair Sch. Finance Coun. v. State of Okla., 746 P.2d 1135, 1149 (Okla. 1987) (fundamental rights not necessarily determined by inclusion in state constitution); Olsen ex rel. Johnson v. State, 276 Or. 9, 19-20, 554 P.2d 139 (1976) (laws considered to be legislation included in state constitution; thus Rodriguez' method weak); see also Dayton, Serrano and its Progeny: An Analysis of 30 Years of School Funding Litigation, 157 Ed. Law. Rep. 447, 453 (2001) (most states reject Rodriguez test to determine existence of state constitutional right to education). In such states, Rodriguez' simple search for explicit or implicit recognition of a fundamental right to education in a constitution's language gives way to a variety of other patterns of analysis. For example, certain interests are deemed fundamental in California "because of their impact on those individual rights and liberties which lie at the core of our free and representative form of government." Serrano II, 18 Cal. 3d at 767-68.
At this point in time, courts in 15 states -- Alabama, California, Connecticut, Kentucky, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming -- appear to have recognized a fundamental right to education under their constitutions, employing various patterns of analysis. See Opinion of the Justices, 624 So. 2d 107, 157 (Ala. 1993) (advisory opinion) ("[T]he right to education in Alabama is fundamental" and implicitly guaranteed by the state constitution); Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I), 5 Cal. 3d 584, 608-09, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241 (1971) ("[T]he distinctive and priceless function of education in our society warrants, indeed compels, our treating it as a 'fundamental interest.'"); Horton v. Meskill (Horton I), 172 Conn. 615, 646, 376 A.2d 359 (1977) (state constitution specifically recognizes right to education; this right is "basic and fundamental"); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 206 (Ky. 1989) (framers of state constitution emphasized education as essential to welfare of citizens of Kentucky); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 313 (Minn. 1993) ("[W]e hold that education is a fundamental right under the state constitution, not only because of its overall importance to the state but also because of the explicit language used to describe this constitutional mandate."); Claremont School Dist. v. Governor, 142 N.H. 462, 473, 703 A.2d 1353 (1997) ("[E]ven a minimalist view of educational adequacy recognizes the role of education in preparing citizens to participate in the exercise of voting and first amendment rights. The latter being recognized as fundamental, it is illogical to place the means to exercise those rights on less substantial constitutional footing than the rights themselves."); Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J. 133, 147, 351 A.2d 713 (1975) ("[T]he right of children to a thorough and efficient system of education is a fundamental right."), cert. denied sub nom. Klein v. Robinson, 423 U.S. 913 (1975); Leandro v. State of North Carolina, 346 N.C. 336, 348, 488 S.E.2d 249 (1997) ("[T]he intent of the framers [of the state constitution] was that every child have a fundamental right to a sound basic education which would prepare the child to participate fully in society as it existed in his or her lifetime."); Bismarck Public School Dist. 1 v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247, 256 (N.D. 1994) ("The parties agree that the right to education is a fundamental right under the North Dakota Constitution."); Brigham v. State, 166 Vt. 246, 262, 692 A.2d 384 (1997) (emphasizing importance of education to self-government and state's duty to ensure proper dispersion); Scott v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 379, 386, 443 S.E.2d 138 (1994) (finding state constitution's language clear and unambiguous; state should assure opportunity for fullest development through education); Seattle School Dist. v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 511, 585 P.2d 71 (1978) ("The [state constitution's] singular use of the term 'paramount duty,' when taken together with its plain English meaning, is [a] clear indication of the constitutional importance attached to the public education of the State's children."); Pauley v. Kelly, 162 W. Va. 672, 707, 255 S.E.2d 859 (1979) (finding education is fundamental right under state constitution's mandatory requirement of "thorough and efficient system of free schools"); Kukor v. Grover, 148 Wis. 2d 469, 496, 436 N.W.2d 568 (1989) ("'[E]qual opportunity for education' is a fundamental right," as emphasized by Wisconsin's case law and legislature's involvement); Washakie Co. Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 333 (Wyo. 1980) ("In light of the emphasis which the Wyoming Constitution places on education, there is no room for any conclusion but that education for the children of Wyoming is a matter of fundamental interest."), cert. denied 449 U.S. 824 (1980).
Meanwhile, six states -- Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Maryland, New York, and Ohio -- have rejected arguments that their state constitutions establish education as a fundamental right. See Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1017 (noting Colorado Constitution not restricted to areas deemed fundamental; on its face, does not establish education as fundamental right); Levittown UFSD v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 43, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643, 439 N.E.2d 359 (1982) (The state constitution "does not automatically entitle [education] to classification as a 'fundamental constitutional right' triggering a higher standard of judicial review for purposes of equal protection analysis."); Bd. of Edn., 58 Ohio St. 2d at 374 (rejecting the Rodriguez analysis which would have established education as a fundamental right under Ohio's constitution); Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 649 ("[E]ducation 'can be a major factor in an individual's chances for economic and social success as well as a unique influence on a child's development as a good citizen and on his future participation in political and community life.' [Citation omitted.] Nevertheless, we conclude that education is not a fundamental right for purposes of equal protection analysis."); McDaniel, 248 Ga. at 647 (noting complexity of school financing and management, remaining consistent with Rodriguez, and holding education "per se" not fundamental right); Thompson, 96 Idaho at 805 (refusing to classify right to education as fundamental; holding schemes for school funding unconstitutional could negatively affect funding for other local services).
The exact nature of any right to education under the Oklahoma Constitution is currently unclear. See Fair Sch. Finance Coun., 746 P.2d at 1149-50 (Okla. 1987) (Even "[a]ssuming that education is a fundamental interest, the question remains as to what is the exact nature of the interest guaranteed. . . . We find no authority to support the plaintiffs' contention that the school finance system should be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny."). The status of any right in Arizona also is unclear at this time. See Shofstall v. Hollings, 110 Ariz. 88, 90, 515 P.2d 590 (1973) ("We hold that the [state] constitution does establish education as a fundamental right of pupils between the ages six and twenty-one years."); but see Roosevelt Elem. School Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 179 Ariz. 233, 238, 877 P.2d 806 (1994) ("We do not understand how the rational basis test can be used when a fundamental right has been implicated. . . . If education is a fundamental right, the compelling state interest test [strict scrutiny] ought to apply. . . . [I]f the rational basis test properly applies, education is not a fundamental right.").
Those courts that recognize a fundamental right to education under their state constitutions also vary on the extent to which they permit the right's status to strengthen judicial review of specific legislative enactments. Some apply strict scrutiny when they review statutes on school funding. See, e.g., Serrano I, 5 Cal. 3d 584 (state funding scheme invidiously discriminates against poor; no compelling state purpose necessitates state's inequitable method of financing education); Scott v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 379, 386, 443 S.E.2d 138 (1994) (state's s