Siler v. U.S.D. No. 512

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No. 103,714

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

ROZANNE M. SILER,
Appellant,

v.

SHAWNEE MISSION SCHOOL DISTRICT, USD 512,

and

THOMAS MCGEE,
Appellees.


SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

1.
When a workers compensation settlement leaves the issue of future medical
payments open, an administrative law judge's preliminary order under K.S.A. 44-534a
regarding those payments is not a termination or modification of the award.

2.
A workers compensation final settlement award in which the issue of future
medical treatment is left open is not a final settlement on that issue.

3.
An administrative law judge's jurisdiction to issue a preliminary order involves the
interpretation of K.S.A. 44-534a. This court has unlimited review over statutory
interpretation.

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4.
Under K.S.A. 44-534a, an employee or the employer may make application for a
preliminary hearing on the issue of furnishing medical treatment.

5.
When the parties do not agree on future medical treatment that has been left open
in a workers compensation settlement award, the administrative law judge has
jurisdiction to hear the issue under K.S.A. 44-534a.

6.
No workers compensation preliminary finding or preliminary award is appealable
by any party, and the same shall not be binding in a full hearing on the claim.

7.
After an administrative law judge has entered a preliminary order under K.S.A.
44-534a, the Workers Compensation Board does not have jurisdiction to review that
order unless the administrative law judge exceeded his or her jurisdiction.

8.
This court does not have jurisdiction to review a decision of the Workers
Compensation Board when the Board did not have jurisdiction.

Appeal from Workers Compensation Board. Opinion filed April 1, 2011. Appeal dismissed.

James E. Martin, of Law Offices of James E. Martin, Chartered, of Overland Park, for appellant.

Douglas M. Greenwald and Frederick J. Greenbaum, of McAnany, Van Cleave & Phillips, P.A.,
of Kansas City, for appellees.

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Before MALONE, P.J., MARQUARDT and LEBEN, JJ.

MARQUARDT, J.: Rozanne M. Siler appeals from an order of the Workers
Compensation Board (Board) finding that an administrative law judge (ALJ) had
jurisdiction to issue a preliminary order denying her future psychotherapy treatment.
Shawnee Mission School District (U.S.D. 512) argues that the ALJ's preliminary order
was not a final order and this court does not have jurisdiction to hear her appeal. We
agree and dismiss the appeal.

Siler, a teacher for U.S.D. 512, was struck by lightning on August 30, 2001, as she
was walking students to cars during a thunderstorm. Siler suffered injuries including
herniated disks and pain along her right side. On January 21, 2003, the parties designated
Dr. Blake Wendelburg and his associates at the Midwest Pain Management &
Diagnostics Center as Siler's authorized treating physicians along with any referrals Dr.
Wendelburg deemed necessary for her treatment. Dr. Wendelburg referred Siler to Dr.
Ashcraft for pain treatment and Dr. Sabapathy for psychotherapy.

A settlement hearing was held on September 6, 2007, at which Siler agreed to
accept $50,000 in settlement of all her claims except her right to future medical
treatment. The ALJ stated at the settlement hearing that Siler's future medical treatment
would "remain open upon proper application to the director unless the parties otherwise
agree."

U.S.D. 512 paid Siler's medical bills for approximately 7 years until it requested
an independent psychiatric evaluation of Siler's condition. The psychiatric examination
was performed on February 24, 2009, by Dr. Patrick L. Hughes. Dr. Hughes determined
that Siler had learned "biofeedback and self relaxation techniques that are helpful for
patients with chronic pain, so [she] is in no need of further therapy sessions to utilize
those techniques." Dr. Hughes concluded:
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"Long term psychotherapy is at best fruitless, and at worst, counter therapeutic
for patient's [sic] who's [sic] primary problem is a Histronic Personality Disorder or
somatizing/ chronic subjective pain, so she needs no further such therapy for any
psychiatric sequellae of her August 2001 lighting injuries. However, given her now
significant dependence on Dr. Sabapathy, it would be medically and ethically appropriate
to authorize three more 'termination of therapy' sessions for the patient with Dr.
Sabapathy, after she finishers her 8 therapy session course of 'desensitization' therapy.
Should Mrs. Siler want to continue in long term psychotherapy with Dr. Sabapathy after
the desensitization sessions, that of course is certainly her right as an American patient,
but the need for any further long term therapy with Dr. Sabapathy beyond that point
cannot be attributed in any medically credible way to the psychiatric effects of her
August 2001 lightening strike at her former workplace."

On March 30, 2009, U.S.D. 512 sent a "seven-day demand/notice of intent" to
discontinue Siler's psychotherapy because the ongoing treatment "is not related to the
accident and goes beyond reasonable and necessary treatment." On April 14, 2009,
U.S.D. 512 filed an application for a preliminary hearing on its intent to discontinue
Siler's psychotherapy. Dr. Hughes' report was attached to the application. Siler objected
to the ALJ using a preliminary hearing to evaluate her need for future psychotherapy.

Notwithstanding Siler's objection, a preliminary hearing was held on August 17,
2009. At the hearing, 415 pages of Siler's medical records were entered into the record.
Siler and her husband both testified at the hearing. The ALJ entered a preliminary order
requiring Dr. Sabapathy to "follow Dr. Hughes' recommended treatment plan" for
discontinuing Siler's psychotherapy. The ALJ filed a written preliminary order on August
19, 2009, reiterating its findings of August 17 and stating that long-term psychotherapy
would no longer benefit Siler.

In support of the ALJ's preliminary order, U.S.D. 512 cited Folk v. Haldex Brake
Systems, Workers Compensation Board Docket Nos. 528,343 & 1,011,042, filed
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November 2006, in which a preliminary hearing was used to terminate or alter an award
that left open future medical care.

On August 20, 2009, Siler requested the Board's review of the ALJ's preliminary
order. Siler questioned "[w]hether the administrative law judge had the authority to
proceed . . . to terminate or amend medical care following the entry of an Award." The
decision of the ALJ was reviewed by one Board member as statutorily provided. See
K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 44-551(i)(2)(A). The Board member's decision of December 21,
2009, found:

"The preliminary hearing procedure utilized by the ALJ in this instance is
appropriate. Additionally, the decision of the ALJ is within her jurisdiction and authority
and, thus, not reviewable by the Board at this time. The Preliminary Decision of the ALJ
remains in full force and effect and the appeal of the claimant is dismissed."

Siler timely appeals.

The only issue Siler raises in her brief to the court is:

"What is the proper procedure, if one exists in this case, to change medical
providers after a workers' [sic] compensation claim has been settled pursuant to K.S.A.
44-531 and K.A.R. 51-3-1(d) with specific provisions for specific medical providers."

Siler's issue involves questions of fact and law. The question of fact is whether the
ALJ changed the terms of Siler's final award on the issue of all future medical payments.
The issues of law involve interpretation and application of K.S.A. 44-531, K.S.A. 44-
534a, and K.A.R. 51-3-1(d).

Siler argues that the settlement agreement and 2007 stipulated order provided her
with a right to continued medical treatment prescribed by Dr. Wendelburg. It is true that
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Dr. Wendelburg was her authorized treating physician; however, the agreement and order
are silent on what medical treatment was authorized. Siler argues that K.A.R. 51-3-1
provides when an award may be terminated and the ALJ improperly terminated her
award. What was agreed to in the settlement award was Siler's total compensation for her
lifelong injury. Siler overlooks the ALJ's statement at the hearing concerning her future
medical treatment: "The right to future medical treatment will remain open upon proper
application to the director unless the parties otherwise agree." The provisions of K.A.R.
51-3-1 are not applicable here because the ALJ did not terminate any part of Siler's final
award.

Siler next argues that the ALJ improperly modified her final award and K.S.A. 44-
528, not K.S.A. 44-532a, is the statute that allows modification of an award. Under
K.S.A. 44-528, a modification of a final award is appropriate when the condition of an
injured employee improves or deteriorates after a hearing and award.

In Nance v. Harvey County, 263 Kan. 542, 545-46, 962 P.2d 411 (1997), the
injured worker filed a petition with the ALJ claiming that his condition had deteriorated
from a 3.5% permanent partial functional impairment to a 50% partial general body
disability and increased his total award. 263 Kan. at 553-54. Our Supreme Court held that
Nance's deteriorating condition warranted a modification of the final award. The facts in
Nance are markedly different from Siler's case. U.S.D. 512 is not contesting the severity
of Siler's total disability; that was settled at the time the $50,000 lump sum settlement
was paid to Siler. U.S.D. 512 is contesting whether the lightning strike caused Siler's
need for additional psychotherapy. Dr. Hughes found that it did not, and the ALJ agreed.
When future medical payments are left open in a worker's compensation settlement
award, an ALJ's order under K.S.A. 44-534a regarding those payments is not a
termination or modification of the award.

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An ALJ's jurisdiction to issue a preliminary order involves the interpretation of
K.S.A. 44-534a. This court has unlimited review over statutory interpretation. Johnson v.
Brooks Plumbing, 281 Kan. 1212, 1213-14, 135 P.3d 1203 (2006).

K.S.A. 44-534a(a)(1) provides: "After an application for a hearing . . . the
employee or the employer may make application for a preliminary hearing, in such form
as the director may require, on the issues of the furnishing of medical treatment." A
workers compensation final settlement award that leaves open the issue of future medical
treatment is not a final settlement on that issue. U.S.D. 512 had the right to question
Siler’s future medical payments under K.S.A. 44-534a. K.S.A. 44-534a is the only statute
that covers disputes regarding future medical treatment. Therefore, the ALJ had
jurisdiction to determine whether continued treatment by Dr. Sabapathy was appropriate.

K.S.A. 44-534a(a)(2) provides: "Except as provided in this section, no such
preliminary findings or preliminary awards shall be appealable by any party to the
proceedings, and the same shall not be binding in a full hearing on the claim, but shall be
subject to a full presentation of the facts." K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 44-551(i)(2)(A) provides
that after an ALJ has entered a preliminary order under K.S.A. 44-534a, the Board does
not have jurisdiction to review that order unless the ALJ exceeded his or her jurisdiction.
Therefore, the Board in this case did not err when it determined that it did not have
jurisdiction to review the ALJ's preliminary order. Consequently, this court does not have
jurisdiction to review a decision of the Board when the Board did not have jurisdiction.

Finally, Siler still has the right to seek future medical treatment. In 2004, while the
stipulated order was in effect, the ALJ issued a preliminary order extending Dr.
Sabapathy's treatment for an additional 90 days over the objection of U.S.D. 512. If Siler
believes a course of treatment would be beneficial, she may seek her own preliminary
order authorizing treatment. Because she is still able to seek treatment, the ALJ's
preliminary order is not a termination of her right to seek treatment.
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The ALJ did not terminate any portion of Siler's final award. The ALJ is
authorized to issue a preliminary order on the issue of future medical treatment and
correctly exercised jurisdiction under K.S.A. 44-534a. Also, under K.S.A. 44-534a, this
court does not have jurisdiction to review the Board’s decision of an ALJ's preliminary
order.

Appeal dismissed.