State v. Alderson

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

No. 106,471

STATE OF KANSAS,
Appellee,

v.

SHAWN ALDERSON,
Appellant.


SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

1.
A sentencing court may require a convicted person to both serve a sentence of
imprisonment and pay restitution.

2.
A sentencing court may, in its discretion, order the withholding of a certain
amount as restitution from an inmate's entire monthly prison account. If the court intends
that restitution is to be levied against an inmate while the inmate is incarcerated, the court
must declare that intention unambiguously.

3.
It is the role of the Kansas Prisoner Review Board, not the courts, to set conditions
of parole.

4.
Equitable principles may not operate to convert a legally valid order of sentencing
into an illegal sentence.

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5.
When the district court enters a judgment that is correct in its result but is based on
incorrect reasoning, appellate courts will affirm the judgment of that court.

Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; CLARK V. OWNS II, judge. Opinion filed April 11, 2014.
Affirmed.

Sean M.A. Hatfield, of Maughan & Maughan LC, of Wichita, argued the cause, and Carl F.A.
Maughan, of the same firm, was with him on the briefs for appellant.

Boyd K. Isherwood, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Julie A. Koon, assistant
district attorney, Nola Tedesco Foulston, former district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and
Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with him on the briefs for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

ROSEN, J.: Shawn Alderson, who is serving a life sentence for first-degree murder,
appeals from the summary denial of his motion for release from a restitution order.

The underlying facts of Alderson's convictions are set out in State v. Alderson, 260
Kan. 445, 922 P.2d 435 (1996). He was convicted of one count of felony murder and one
count of aggravated battery. This court affirmed the convictions, vacated the upward
durational departure sentence, and remanded. The new sentence, which was imposed on
October 30, 1996, and which was the same upward departure sentence of life
imprisonment with a consecutive sentence of 86 months for aggravated battery, was
affirmed by this court in State v. Alderson, 266 Kan. 603, 972 P.2d 1112 (1999).

The issue of restitution was not addressed in the previous two appeals. The
sentencing court ordered Alderson to pay restitution to various individuals and entities,
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including a hospital, insurance companies, and the Kansas Crime Victims Compensation
Board, totaling $119,899.86. This amount was based on the calculations made at the
original sentencing hearing. It appears that no restitution has ever been collected from
Alderson.

On September 20, 2009, Municipal Services Bureau, a private corporation, sent
Alderson a notice that he had "outstanding court fine(s)" and that he had to pay
$150,903.74 "immediately." The notice stated that "the Kansas Attorney General has
authorized Municipal Services Bureau . . . to contact you regarding the outstanding court
fine(s)." Alderson filed a pro se motion in district court requesting release from the
restitution order based on dormancy, which the district court summarily denied. Alderson
took a timely appeal to this court.

The district court ruled that Alderson's restitution was not yet due and the
dormancy petition was premature. Whether Alderson is currently subject to the court's
restitution order is a question of law, and questions of law are subject to unlimited
review. See, e.g., State v. Trotter, 296 Kan. 898, 902, 295 P.3d 1039 (2013).

The application of the dormancy statute, K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 60-2403, to crime
restitution orders issued under K.S.A. 22-3424(d) (Furse 1995) and K.S.A. 1996 Supp.
60-4301 et seq. is an issue of first impression before this court.

In denying Alderson's motion, the district court accepted the State's argument that
restitution cannot be enforced against a defendant while the defendant is incarcerated.
This argument is based on older cases. See, e.g., State v. DeHerrera, 251 Kan. 143, 155,
834 P.2d 918 (1992) (defendant may not be ordered to pay restitution while incarcerated
even if defendant is able to pay); State v. Bowers, 239 Kan. 417, 428, 721 P.2d 268
(1986); State v. McNaught, 238 Kan. 567, 589, 713 P.2d 457 (1986). More recent
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opinions of our Court of Appeals have also relied on that older line of cases. See, e.g.,
State v. Robards, 31 Kan. App. 2d 1138, 78 P.3d 825 (2003), rev. denied 277 Kan. 927
(2004). These decisions were grounded in the language of earlier versions of K.S.A. 21-
4603(2), which did not include restitution as an item that could be combined with other
parts of a sentence.

Subsequent changes in the statutory scheme, however, have provided that a
sentencing court could require a convicted person to both serve a sentence of
imprisonment and pay restitution. In Puckett v. Bruce, 276 Kan. 59, 61-62, 73 P.3d 736
(2003), this court upheld a district court order permitting the Department of Corrections
to collect restitution from the defendant's prison account while the defendant was
incarcerated. The court distinguished Puckett's arguments, noting that they were based on
K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-4603 (now K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 21-6702), which applied to crimes
committed prior to July 1, 1993, and which, unlike K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-4603d, forbade
a court to order restitution and a simultaneous term of incarceration. The new statutory
scheme allows restitution in addition to other sentencing terms. See K.S.A. 2013 Supp.
21-6604(b)(1). Given that some inmates may have substantial assets when they are
sentenced, or may acquire assets, as through inheritance, it is sensible that in those
situations victims should not have to wait an indefinite period of time to receive
compensation.

The journal entry of sentencing set a total restitution amount of $119,899.86 and
added the comment: "The Court finds that restitution is owed in this case, as set out
below, and advises the Secretary of Corrections' Board of Pardon and Parole that
defendant's release from incarceration should be made contingent upon defendant making
restitution." This language was ambiguous. It is not clear whether the court intended that
Alderson be subject to the restitution order during the time of his incarceration or that the
order of restitution become effective only upon his conditional release from confinement.
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K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-4603d(b)—the predecessor statute to K.S.A. 2013 Supp.
21-6604(b)—gave the district court the discretion to order at sentencing the withholding
of a certain amount as restitution from an inmate's entire monthly prison account.
Puckett, 276 Kan. at 63. This was not done in the present case. If the district court
intended that Alderson be subject to the collection of restitution while he is incarcerated,
it was required to declare that intention unambiguously. See Bowers, 239 Kan. at 428.
The restitution amount therefore did not become due at the time of sentencing or while
Alderson is incarcerated.

If it was an enforceable order, then the order would necessarily become effective
should Alderson ever be paroled. This is also not a legally viable option. It is well
established that a sentencing court does not have the authority to impose parole
conditions. It is the role of the Kansas Prisoner Review Board, not the courts, to set
conditions of parole. See State v. Clark, 298 Kan. ___, Syl. ¶ 3, 317 P.3d 776 (2014);
State v. Waggoner, 297 Kan. 94, 100, 298 P.3d 333 (2013); State v. Mason, 294 Kan.
675, 677, 279 P.3d 707 (2012).

We conclude that the district court did not enter an enforceable restitution
judgment when it sentenced Alderson. It instead provided an advisory calculation of
damages for the benefit of the Kansas Prisoner Review Board. There being no judgment
of restitution, the judgment could not become dormant. The notice that Municipal
Services Bureau sent Alderson erroneously asserted that he was in default on a judgment,
even if the notice was commissioned on behalf of the district court. Equitable principles,
such as quasi-estoppel, cannot be used to convert a legal criminal sentence into an illegal
sentence.

When it denied Alderson's dormancy claim, the district court relied on Robards,
31 Kan. App. 2d 1138, and ruled that the statutory period to enforce the judgment would
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begin when he is released from prison. Because of statutory changes, Robards no longer
accurately describes the law in this state. The district court was correct, however, in
rejecting Alderson's petition seeking a declaration of dormancy. Because there is no
pending judgment ordering Alderson to pay restitution, the district court had no
jurisdiction to release an obligation on his part.

When the district court enters a judgment that is correct in its result but is based on
incorrect reasoning, this court will affirm. See State v. Hall, 297 Kan. 709, 715, 304 P.3d
677 (2013); Schoenholz v. Hinzman, 295 Kan. 786, 797, 289 P.3d 1155 (2012).

Affirmed.