Clarkson v. Lehman

1

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 116,334

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

ELIZABETH CLARKSON,
Appellant,

v.

TABITHA LEHMAN, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ELECTIONS
COMMISSIONER OF SEDGWICK COUNTY, KANSAS,
Appellee.


MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; TIMOTHY G. LAHEY, judge. Opinion filed August 31,
2018. Appeal dismissed.

Randall K. Rathbun and Benjamin K. Carmichael, of Depew, Gillen, Rathbun & McInteer, LC, of
Wichita, for appellant.

Michael L. North, assistant county counselor, for appellee.

Before ATCHESON, P.J., BUSER, J., and BURGESS, S.J.

BUSER, J.: This appeal is the latest legal effort by Elizabeth Clarkson to obtain
"Real Time Audit Logs" (RTAL), a specific brand name of what is generically referred to
in the industry as "Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trails" (VVPAT) used by the Sedgwick
County Election Office in its voting machines. Clarkson filed this lawsuit against Tabitha
Lehman, the Sedgwick County, Kansas, Election Commissioner, in order to obtain,
review, and analyze RTAL to assess the accuracy of voting machines at a Wichita polling
site in 2014.
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As discussed below, upon our review of the district court's judgment, the record on
appeal, the parties' appellate briefs, oral argument, and supplemental briefs, we conclude
this appeal is moot, and that no exception to the mootness doctrine warrants our review of
the district court's judgment. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The parties agree that:

"RTAL are paper strips loaded in voting machines. Their function is to allow the voter to
confirm his or her vote on any candidate or question by comparing his or her choice with
the paper strip that is shown in a small portal or window in the voting machine itself. . . .

"RTAL are not limited to 'statistical information,' but contains information such as the
identification of the voting equipment used to cast the ballot, the time the vote session
started, the precinct, the ballot style and language used, and which candidate or ballot
initiative was selected by the voter."

Clarkson separately asserts, however, that "another purpose for RTALs is for recounts
and audits."

Clarkson's quest for RTAL began on June 18, 2013, when she initially filed a pro
se Kansas Open Records Act (KORA) lawsuit against Lehman as Sedgwick County
Elections Commissioner. See K.S.A. 45-215 et seq. In her lawsuit, Clarkson asserted that
RTAL were open public records under KORA. By obtaining access to RTAL, Clarkson
claimed she could "verify the official outcome for precinct 208, in which she resides and
votes, by conducting a post-election audit of the results for the November 2010 general
election." Clarkson alleged she was a professional statistician with over 25 years'
experience and was "competent to perform a post-election audit."

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In her lawsuit, Clarkson sought the following relief: "[A] court order instructing
[Lehman] to allow Elizabeth Clarkson and her designated assistants access to the [R]TAL
paper tape records of the November 2010 general election for Precinct 208 in Sedgwick
County in order to conduct an audit of the results." Lehman objected to any disclosure of
RTAL because, in her opinion, they were not public records subject to disclosure under
KORA.

After a bench trial, on August 26, 2013, District Judge Mark Vining entered
judgment in favor of Lehman and ruled that the election commissioner was not required
to disclose the RTAL that Clarkson sought in her KORA lawsuit. In particular, the
district judge reasoned:

"[E]lection results, voting records are in an area of law that is specifically set out
in statutes separate and distinct from [KORA] and how elections are run and what records
are kept. And while there is no specific exemption that I can find in [KORA] itself, I do
find based upon the information that is provided in the election definitions and
applications in Article 25 that the request that you have made is outside of the scope of
what is considered open records information and should not be disclosed."

Clarkson did not appeal the district court's judgment.

Two and a half years later, on February 2, 2015, Clarkson filed another pro se
lawsuit which is the subject of this appeal. In general, this lawsuit mirrored the 2013
lawsuit as it sought declaratory and injunctive relief for disclosure of RTAL under
KORA. Similar to her 2013 lawsuit, Clarkson sought "a court order instructing [Lehman]
to allow [Clarkson] and her designated assistants access to the Sedgwick County [R]TAL
paper tape records of the November 2014 general election in order to conduct an audit of
the results." According to Clarkson, she had "a colleague in the political science
department at Wichita State University who will provide assistance in the way of student
workers to help conduct the audit."
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After procedural rulings, on April 1, 2015, Clarkson filed a pro se "Amended
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Pursuant [to] K.S.A. 4[5]-222," and the
legal proceedings continued with Lehman, once again, as the defendant. In particular,
Clarkson sought "access to the [RTAL] from the November 2014 general election in
Sedgwick County, Kansas." Clarkson stated: "The selection of this specific dataset is
attributable to the increased voter turnout in general elections, which offers a larger and
more viable sample for statistical research purposes." Clarkson pled that "[s]uch an audit
is required in order to accurately assess and calculate the error rate of [v]oting
[m]achines." Her purpose in collecting, analyzing, and auditing the RTAL, according to
Clarkson, was "to write an academic journal research article on Voting Machine
performance. [Clarkson] intends to submit her findings of her audit of [RTAL] to an
appropriate peer-reviewed publication."

In her amended complaint, Clarkson averred that she had asked Lehman for access
to the RTAL pursuant to KORA but that her request was denied. Clarkson invoked
K.S.A. 45-222(a) and asked the district court to order injunctive or other relief to give her
access to the RTAL. According to Clarkson, her "audit of [RTAL] shall not involve
public records exempt from [KORA] at K.S.A. 45-211" and her "audit of [RTAL] shall
be strictly limited to access of a dataset for statistical analysis."

Notably, Clarkson did not request an election recount in either her 2013 pleading
or in her original or amended 2015 pleadings. The pleadings also did not refer to any
Kansas election statutes found in Chapter 25 of the Kansas Statutes Annotated.

Lehman filed an answer in response to the 2015 lawsuit. In the answer, Lehman
admitted that she had received an open records request from Clarkson after the November
2014 general election. This request was for election materials and records relating to
Clarkson's polling site at Countryside Christian Church. Lehman acknowledged
providing a variety of election materials and records to Clarkson in response to her
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request.

Lehman also confirmed that she had denied Clarkson's request for RTAL.
According to Lehman: "This was denied for several reasons, including that disclosure of
such would be contrary to Kansas criminal law; could identify specific results to
individual voters; was not subject to the [KORA], and would be unnecessarily
burdensome and expensive to produce." The answer also set forth affirmative defenses,
including that the "cause of action is barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral
estoppel. The identical issues presented by [Clarkson] in this action have previously been
litigated" in 2013.

At the conclusion of discovery, on January 6, 2016, Lehman filed a motion for
summary judgment. Lehman presented a three-part argument: First, she invoked the
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel to argue that Clarkson's KORA lawsuit
against Lehman in 2013 mirrored the same parties and legal issues in this 2015 lawsuit,
and as a consequence, barred the latest litigation. Second, Lehman asserted that under
K.S.A. 25-2422(a)(1), the release of RTAL was a violation of Kansas criminal law—
unauthorized disclosure of the contents of a ballot. Third, Lehman contended that because
RTAL are not open public records under KORA their disclosure may not be compelled.

The next day, on January 7, 2016, Clarkson filed a pretrial questionnaire, which
made no mention of KORA. Instead, Clarkson now stated that she had "made a timely
request for a recount after the November 2014 election. [Lehman] refused to allow the
recount. [Clarkson] seeks an order from the Court requiring [Lehman] to turn over RTAL
tapes in question[] so that an appropriate recount can be accomplished." Clarkson's
questionnaire identified only one question of law: "Is [Clarkson] entitled to a recount
pursuant to statute?"


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In her pretrial questionnaire, Lehman reiterated the issues raised in her motion for
summary judgment. She also contended:

"Any request for a 'recount' of the 2014 election is beyond the scope of requested relief in
[Clarkson's] Petition of February 2, 2015 which requests that she 'personally verify the
official outcome' of the 2014 general election in whole or in part to 'submit the results of
her audit to an appropriate peer-reviewed publication.' This is properly interpreted as a
petition for relief under [KORA], not for a recount under the Kansas Election Code at
Chapter 25 of [the Kansas Statutes Annotated]."

Lehman's questionnaire identified several questions of law challenging the legal propriety
of Clarkson's claim that RTAL should be disclosed to her pursuant to Kansas election
recount procedures. A pretrial conference order incorporating both parties' legal
contentions was filed by the district court on January 21, 2016.

On February 1, 2016, Clarkson filed a response to Lehman's motion for summary
judgment. In this response, Clarkson contended the doctrines of res judicata and collateral
estoppel did not apply to bar this latest litigation because

"[t]he previous pro se case filed by Dr. Clarkson in 2013—to get results in her precinct
from the 2010 election—was based upon a request to see ballots under [KORA]. She did
not request a recount in that election.
"The issue of ballots as open records does not have anything to do with the
current litigation. Res judicata and collateral estoppel have no application whatsoever to
Dr. Clarkson's demand in this case for a statutorily based recount."

In reply to Clarkson's response to Lehman's summary judgment motion, the
election commissioner stated: "Through creative and calculated timing, [Clarkson] has
now taken the liberty to alter the very heart of her argument and change its focus from
one rooted in [KORA] to one now rooted in the Kansas election recount statutes."
Lehman argued that "regardless of how [Clarkson] labels this lawsuit, it is clear that her
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ultimate goal remains the same: to gain personal access to [RTAL] from the November
2014 General Election. This request is clearly one for records, not a recount." Lehman
also argued that the recount theory was flawed because Clarkson's request was
procedurally and substantively defective, that Kansas law did not allow the relief that she
was seeking, and disclosure of RTAL would still violate the criminal prohibitions of
K.S.A. 25-2422(a)(1). On the same day that Lehman filed her reply, February 10, 2016,
she also filed a motion to dismiss the amended petition for lack of subject matter and
personal jurisdiction.

A hearing on Lehman's motion for summary judgment and motion to dismiss was
held on February 18, 2016, before District Judge Timothy G. Lahey. On April 22, 2016,
the district court filed an order summarily denying Lehman's motion to dismiss. The
district court, however, granted summary judgment "on the issue of whether [Clarkson]
shall be granted access to [RTAL] for the 2014 election." This ruling was based on the
bar of collateral estoppel given that the 2013 lawsuit "dealt with a requested audit and the
action before the court here is a requested recount, in both cases the relief sought is
disclosure of RTAL." The district court also determined "that the RTAL is not a
statutorily identified method of voting and cannot be used in the recount process."

The district court, however, denied the motion for summary judgment "on the
issue of whether [Clarkson] is entitled to an election recount for the 2014 election" and
set the matter for trial subject to two limitations. First, the district court ruled that under
K.S.A. 25-3107(b) any recount would be limited to question submitted elections. Second,
under K.S.A. 25-3107(b): "[O]nly a special election board appointed by the county
election officer may conduct a recount of the ballots. As such, [Clarkson] is not legally
entitled to participate in the recount process."

No bench trial was held. A journal entry of judgment filed on June 23, 2016, stated
that on March 22, 2016, the parties made arguments to the district court which ruled:
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"The Court's analysis of this issue has already been the subject of a motion for
summary judgment. The Court hereby holds that [Clarkson] is not entitled to a recount in
the manner she seeks and her request is hereby denied. The Court adopts by reference its
ruling entered on February 18, 2016 on [Lehman's] motion for summary judgment."

Clarkson filed this timely appeal.

At oral arguments, Lehman advised our court that the results of the 2014 general
election in Sedgwick County had been certified as required by Chapter 25 of the Kansas
Statutes Annotated, and that any recount would not affect the outcome of that election.
After oral arguments, our court asked the parties to submit supplemental briefing on,
among other subjects: Is this appeal moot? If so, should this court retain the appeal?
Both parties filed timely supplemental responses.

ANALYSIS

As detailed in the factual and procedural background section, Clarkson's lawsuit
has transformed over time, leading to the question of whether, at this appellate stage of
the litigation, the actual controversy has ended and our court's judgment would be
ineffectual for any purpose. In other words, is this appeal moot?

As a general rule, Kansas appellate courts do not decide moot questions or render
advisory opinions. The mootness doctrine is one of court policy, which recognizes that
the role of the court is to "'determine real controversies relative to the legal rights of
persons and properties which are actually involved in the particular case properly brought
before it and to adjudicate those rights in such manner that the determination will be
operative, final, and conclusive.' [Citations omitted]." Stano v. Pryor, 52 Kan. App. 2d
679, 682-83, 372 P.3d 427 (2016) (quoting State v. Hilton, 295 Kan. 845, 849, 286 P.3d
871 [2012]).

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The mootness test has been described as a determination whether "it is clearly and
convincingly shown the actual controversy has ended, the only judgment that could be
entered would be ineffectual for any purpose, and it would not impact any of the parties'
rights. [Citation omitted.]" Wiechman v. Huddleston, 304 Kan. 80, 84, 370 P.3d 1194
(2016). Because mootness is a doctrine of court policy, which was developed through
court precedent, appellate review of the issue is unlimited. Hilton, 295 Kan. at 849.

Our review of the pleadings in the 2013 and 2015 lawsuits make clear that
Clarkson has sought disclosure of RTAL as open public records under KORA in order to
personally review and audit RTAL and conduct a statistical analysis to determine the
error rate of voting machines. Clarkson's intent upon completion of this analysis is to
write an academic research article to submit to a peer-reviewed journal for publication.

A plain reading of Clarkson's petitions filed in both the 2013 and 2015 litigations
shows three things: First, Clarkson has consistently and exclusively sought relief by
invoking KORA. Second, Clarkson never sought relief by invoking Kansas election laws
generally or election recounts as provided by K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 25-3107. Third, in all
her pleadings, Clarkson has sought to personally, or though her designees, review, audit,
and analyze the RTAL to determine voting machine accuracy.

As the parties prepared for trial and after Lehman filed her motion for summary
judgment, however, Clarkson abruptly abandoned her KORA claims. In response to
Lehman's motion, Clarkson definitively stated: "The issue of ballots as open records
does not have anything to do with the current litigation." Indeed, in arguing against the
motion, Clarkson's counsel conceded with regard to the dismissal of her 2013 litigation,
"I think Judge Vining was right [Clarkson] was not entitled to look at ballots under the
Open Records Act." Finally, unlike her prior pleadings, Clarkson's pretrial questionnaire
which was later incorporated into the district court's pretrial order contained no reference
to KORA.
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Instead, for the first time in this litigation, Clarkson sought access to RTAL by
way of the Kansas election recount statute, K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 25-3107. As reflected in
the pretrial order, however, Clarkson still sought "an order from the Court requiring
[Lehman] to turn over RTAL tapes in question[] so that any appropriate recount can be
accomplished."

Upon our review of this record, we agree with Lehman's view that after the filing
of the motion for summary judgment, Clarkson took the opportunity "to alter the very
heart of her argument and change its focus from one rooted in [KORA] to one now rooted
in the Kansas election recount statutes." Still, as Lehman argued, "regardless of how
[Clarkson] labels this lawsuit, it is clear that her ultimate goal remains the same: to gain
personal access to [RTAL] for the November 2014 General Election. This request is
clearly one for records, not a recount." We agree. While the legal basis for Clarkson's
request changed during litigation, Clarkson still sought RTAL from Lehman in order to
review and analyze the records.

At the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, Lehman protested that
Clarkson's change in the statutory basis for her lawsuit—from claims under KORA to
claims grounded in Kansas election laws—had nothing to do with her desire to overturn
any election result, but it was simply another method for her to conduct an audit and
publish a scholarly article on the results. Lehman suggested this reason for seeking a
recount was inappropriate because "[t]he purpose of a recount is [to] either alter or
confirm election results."

The district court followed up on this argument by proffering a hypothetical which
assumed arguendo that the court ordered Lehman to conduct a recount in this case. The
district court then asked, "So [Lehman] does a recount of whatever the appropriate scope
is? Then the case is over, right? There's no election contest." Clarkson's counsel agreed,
saying, "This doesn't have anything to do with election contests. That's the red herring in
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here."

In her supplemental briefing, Lehman contends this appeal is moot. She states:

"There is no basis in statutory law for believing that an election recount, even if
hypothetically ordered by a court, would legally be able to overturn election results after
certification has taken place. . . . [Lehman's] position is that potentially changing election
results is the only reason recounts are done. They are designed chronologically to be
accomplished before the canvassing process is completed as a goal of having elections
get to a defined finishing line. . . . Once the canvassing and certification process has
occurred, the election results cannot be altered. The actual controversy has ended and the
only remedy that the court would enter would be ineffectual."

In response, Clarkson simply states: "There is no guidance in Kansas for the
effect of a recount that takes place after the election results have been certified." For her
part, however, Clarkson readily admits the 2014 election results have been certified and
she does not claim that her purpose in requesting a recount is to alter or overturn any
election results. This is consistent with her pleadings and legal contentions found in the
pretrial order which did not suggest that she seeks a recount to alter or overturn any
election results.

From our review, it is apparent that whether or not a recount is ordered in this
case, there is no actual controversy between the parties with regard to whether any of the
2014 general election results are final. Quite simply, the results of any recount would not
affect the outcome of the election. As a consequence, any judgment rendered by our court
regarding the election recount would be moot—ineffectual with regard to affecting the
outcome of the 2014 election and have no impact on the parties' rights in that election.

Is there another purpose for our court to consider this appeal? From the pleadings
it is apparent that Clarkson has sought to obtain RTAL in order to conduct a statistical
12

analysis for purposes of preparing an academic paper. Similarly, although her legal
justification morphed from being grounded in KORA to being based on Kansas election
laws, it is also apparent that Clarkson still sought access to RTAL in order to accomplish
this academic pursuit.

In the pretrial order, for example, Clarkson contended that she "seeks an order
from the Court requiring [Lehman] to turn over RTAL tapes in question[] so that an
appropriate recount can be accomplished." (Emphasis added.) During the hearing on the
motion for summary judgment, however, Clarkson's position was muddled. Clarkson's
counsel argued:

"The issue is is she entitled to RTAL[?].
"Well, she is not entitled to it in terms of putting them in the trunk of her car and
taking them home and looking at them. But certainly if you read the statute the statute
says she can direct the way—the methodology of the recount. She's entitled to do that."

The district court clarified, "So you're not asking that she get these [RTALs]?
That's not what the request is when you are asking for that? You are not asking that she
personally be provided this information?" Clarkson's counsel answered, "We're not
entitled to that."

Later, however, Clarkson's counsel argued:

"[A] recount, is an open meeting under the statute and she has a right to be in right there
on the front row. The county commissioners or the board will direct the election
commissioner to put together a special election board that will go through and look at the
RTALs.
"Now, here's what we are now focused on in this case because my client believes
that the RTALs are not the same as what is being reported. That's why [Clarkson] wants
to look at the RTALs. That's why we assume they're fighting so hard to have us [not] look
at the RTALs. We want to see them. We have a right to see them in a recount.
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"That's the purpose of this lawsuit, Your Honor." (Emphases added.)

Lehman's counsel responded:

"This notion [that Clarkson] want[s] to do a recount so that [Clarkson] can sit there and
look over their shoulder and see what there is as well. They might be open to an open
meetings recount by a special election board, but that does not mean individuals are
allowed to go ahead and look over [the] shoulder of the election board to see the accuracy
of what they are doing. There is a space they have to give because they're not allowed to
do that. They are not allowed. They can be there, but they don't get to participate in the
process, Your Honor.
"So, I think by that statement that counsel put in there we really have gotten into
the essence of what they are wanting. They are conceding they can't get our RTALs
through the [KORA] so they are trying an end around. We want a recount and they will
be there and Miss Clarkson or anybody else in this courtroom and understand her
credentials mean nothing in this regard when we're talking about open meetings, open
courtroom. Anybody can go and look. They can't stand there and look over the special
election board's shoulders and see what the results are. That's not the case."

In ruling on the summary judgment motion the district judge sided with Lehman
on this point: "I also agree . . . [Clarkson] is not entitled to participate in the recount. . . .
I don't think that's really even an issue at this point." (Emphasis added.) The district
court's ruling was memorialized in its order partially granting summary judgment:
"Under K.S.A. 25-3107(b) only a special election board appointed by the county election
officer may conduct a recount of the ballots. As such, [Clarkson] is not legally entitled to
participate in the recount process. [Lehman's] Motion for Summary Judgment is granted
on this issue." (Emphasis added.)

Importantly, in her supplemental briefing, Clarkson acknowledges this argument:
"The district court based its decision on the fact that it believes [Clarkson] was seeking
disclosure of the RTALs and she would not be entitled to participate in the recount. This
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point was conceded by [Clarkson] at the hearing on summary judgment. [Clarkson]
acknowledged that she might not be appointed to actively participate in the recount."
(Emphasis added.) According to Clarkson, this is because under Kansas Election
Standards promulgated by the Kansas Secretary of State and the Kansas County Clerks
and Election Officials Association, "only members of the special recount board or the
country election officer or office staff may handle ballots or participate in conducting the
recount."

So, on appeal, we are presented with a case where regardless if the district court
was right or wrong in denying Clarkson an election recount, there is no real controversy
regarding the validity of the election results. Moreover, the parties agree that even if a
recount was appropriate, and RTAL was reviewed by a special election board, Clarkson
would not be entitled to participate in the recount and have access to RTAL in order to
conduct a statistical analysis to verify the accuracy of voting machines used at her polling
site. In short, at this stage of the litigation, there does not appear to be an actual
controversy before us that requires a judicial resolution that will be operative under the
circumstances of this case. See Stano, 52 Kan. App. 2d at 682-83. This appeal is moot.

Moreover, a careful reading of Clarkson's supplemental brief shows that she does
not argue that her appeal is not moot. Rather, Clarkson claims that two exceptions to the
mootness doctrine—the vital rights exception and public interest exception—apply to this
case, and require our court to consider the appeal despite the fact it is moot.

We agree with Clarkson that there are two exceptions to the mootness doctrine. As
our court recently described them:

"First, where a judgment is not enforceable only because of lapse of time or other
changed circumstances and where dismissal of an issue will adversely affect rights vital
to one of the parties, a court may address the issue. . . . Second, where an issue, although
15

moot, is capable of repetition and raises concerns of public importance, a court may
address the issue. [Citations omitted.]" State v. DuMars, 37 Kan. App. 2d 600, 605, 154
P.3d 1120 (2007).

With regard to the vital rights exception, Clarkson asserts she has a statutory right
to a recount under K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 25-3107. While that may be true, the gravamen of
Clarkson's cause of action—whether couched as a KORA claim or an election recount
claim—was to obtain access to RTAL in order to analyze whether the voting machines
were properly recording ballots. As conceded by Clarkson in her supplemental briefing,
however, she now acknowledges that the recount process she sought would not afford her
the opportunity to conduct such an analysis.

Moreover, the district court's partial summary judgment order did not deny
Clarkson the right to a recount. Rather, the district court ruled that while a special
election board could conduct a recount, Clarkson was "not legally entitled to participate
in the recount process." (Emphasis added.) And in its final journal entry of judgment, the
district court adopted its prior findings, ruling that Clarkson was "not entitled to a recount
in the manner she seeks." (Emphasis added.)

Although Clarkson's academic curiosity about the accuracy of electronic voting
machines may be a worthwhile inquiry, she has not identified a specific legal right related
to recounts—the ultimate ground on which she premised her action—that has been
impaired or thwarted by the district court's judgment, particularly with respect to the
2014 voting and in light of her concessions.

Clarkson also asserts that the public interest exception is applicable to this appeal.
She argues our court "should retain Clarkson's appeal and issue an opinion on the use of
RTALs in recounts. It is undoubtedly of public importance that the counties in this state
know whether RTALs are valid to use as the basis for a recount or not."
16

This second exception to the general rule relating to mootness is recognized when
the case involves a question of public interest even though the case has become moot as
to the present parties. In the context of this exception: "Public importance means more
than that certain members of the general public are interested in the decision of the appeal
from motives of curiosity or because it may bear upon their individual rights or serve as a
guide for their future conduct. [Citation omitted.]" State v. Hayden, 52 Kan. App. 2d 202,
206, 364 P.3d 962 (2015); Hilton, 295 Kan. at 851.

As a general rule, Kansas appellate courts do not render advisory opinions.
Clarkson's claim that it is of public importance for Kansas counties to know whether
RTAL may be used in election recounts is an expansive permutation of her discrete cause
of action. Clarkson's lawsuit and the district court's judgment is quite narrow in scope and
effect. The district court's judgment is limited to the unique facts of this case and we
discern no public importance or purpose in broadly espousing generalized legal authority
on the use of RTAL in statewide election recounts. Moreover, as described in the factual
and procedural section of this opinion, the bench trial did not involve presentation of
evidence on the issue of the use of RTAL in Sedgwick County, other Kansas counties, or
nationally. The absence of a fully developed factual record in this regard is another
reason to resist any temptation to render an advisory opinion.

We hold that Clarkson's appeal is moot and no exceptions warrant our review of
the district court's judgment. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.