Easter v. Sedgwick County Sheriff's Civil Service Bd.

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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 115,485

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

JEFF EASTER,
SHERIFF OF SEDGWICK COUNTY, KANSAS,
Appellant,

v.

SEDGWICK COUNTY, KANSAS,
SHERIFF'S CIVIL SERVICE BOARD,
Appellee.


MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; SETH L. RUNDLE, judge. Opinion filed February 3, 2017.
Reversed and remanded.

J. Steven Pigg, of Fisher, Patterson, Sayler & Smith, LLP, of Topeka, for appellant.

David G. Crockett, of Crocket & Gilhousen, of Wichita, for appellee Sedgwick County, Kansas,
Sheriff's Civil Service Board.

Holly A. Dyer, of Foulston Siefkin LLP, of Wichita, for appellee Timothy Rickstrew.

Before BRUNS, P.J., MCANANY and BUSER, JJ.

Per Curiam: Sedgwick County Sheriff Jeff Easter appeals from the district court's
decision dismissing his appeal from a Sedgwick County Sheriff's Civil Service Board's
decision for lack of jurisdiction. Sheriff Easter had previously terminated Deputy
Timothy Rickstrew as an employee of the Sheriff's Department. The Civil Service Board,
however, reinstated the deputy, and Sheriff Easter filed a notice of appeal with the Board.
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In addition, Sheriff Easter filed a "Petition for Judicial Review and Appeal (Proceeding
pursuant to Chapter 60, K.S.A. 60-2101(d))" in the Sedgwick County District Court.
Although the notice of appeal named Deputy Rickstrew as a party, the petition did not
include him in the case caption. The district court dismissed the petition for lack of
jurisdiction based on his failure to list the deputy as a party. On appeal, Sheriff Easter
argues that the district court erred in dismissing his appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Because we find that Sheriff Easter obtained appellate jurisdiction pursuant to K.S.A. 60-
2101(d) upon timely filing his notices of appeal with the Civil Service Board, we reverse
the district court's dismissal and remand this action for further proceedings.

FACTS

Sheriff Easter terminated Deputy Rickstrew, who was a longtime employee of the
Sedgwick County Sheriff's Office, from his employment on June 26, 2015. In response,
Deputy Rickstrew timely filed a grievance with the Sedgwick County Sheriff's Civil
Service Board. On September 10, 2015, the Board issued a decision in the case of
"Timothy Rickstrew vs. Jeff Easter, Sedgwick County Sheriff." Evidently, neither party
was satisfied with the decision because Sheriff Easter filed a notice of appeal with the
Civil Service Board and Deputy Rickstrew filed a posthearing grievance.

The notice of appeal filed by Sheriff Easter on October 6, 2015, was captioned:
"Timothy Rickstrew vs. Jeff Easter, Sedgwick County Sheriff." On the same date, Sheriff
Easter filed a "Petition for Judicial Review and Appeal (Proceeding pursuant to Chapter
60, K.S.A. 60-2101(d))" in Sedgwick County District Court. The petition, however, was
captioned: "Jeff Easter, Sheriff of Sedgwick County, Kansas, vs. Sedgwick County,
Kansas, Sheriff's Civil Service Board." It appears from the record that Deputy Rickstrew
was served by Sheriff Easter with copies of both the notice of appeal and the petition for
judicial review. Additionally, Sheriff Easter attached a copy of the notice of appeal that
he had filed with the Civil Service Board to the petition for judicial review.
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On October 9, 2015, the Civil Service Board issued a decision on Deputy
Rickstrew's posthearing grievance. On October 20, 2015, Sheriff Easter filed an amended
notice of appeal with the Civil Service Board. Once again, the amended notice of appeal
was captioned: "Timothy Rickstrew vs. Jeff Easter, Sedgwick County Sheriff," and was
served on Rickstrew. On the same day, Sheriff Easter also filed an amended petition for
judicial review and appeal pursuant to K.S.A. 60-2101(d) in the Sedgwick County
District Court. As he had done in his original petition, the amended petition was
captioned: "Jeff Easter, Sheriff of Sedgwick County, Kansas, vs. Sedgwick County,
Kansas, Sheriff's Civil Service Board." Moreover, Sheriff Easter served Deputy
Rickstrew with a copy of the amended petition and attached a copy of the amended notice
of appeal filed with the Board.

On November 23, 2015, the Civil Service Board filed an answer in the district
court in which it argued that the appeal should be dismissed because Deputy Rickstrew
was not named as a party in the amended petition. Specifically, the Civil Service Board
alleged that because Sheriff Easter had failed to include Deputy Rickstrew in the caption
of the amended petition, the appeal had not been properly perfected. On November 30,
2015, Sheriff Easter filed a motion for an order determining that he had properly
perfected his appeal or, in the alternative, for leave to join Deputy Rickstrew as a party to
the appeal.

On December 18, 2015, the district court held a hearing on the motions filed by
the parties. At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court granted the parties leave to
file additional briefs on the effect of Sheriff Easter's failure to name Deputy Rickstrew in
the caption of the petition for judicial review and appeal. On January 21, 2016, the
district court entered an order denying Sheriff Easter's motion to add Deputy Rickstrew.
In addition, the district court found that the failure to include Deputy Rickstrew in the
caption of the petition for judicial review and appeal was "a fatal jurisdictional bar to
review mandating dismissal of the case."
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A few weeks later, Sheriff Easter filed a motion to clarify and/or alter or amend
the district court's decision. He also sought leave to file a second amended petition for
judicial review and appeal. On February 22, 2016, Sheriff Easter also filed a premature
notice of appeal from the district court's order of dismissal. The following week, the
district court denied Sheriff Easter's motion to clarify. Furthermore, it denied his motion
for leave to amend the petition for judicial review and appeal.

In response, Sheriff Easter filed an amended notice of appeal on March 7, 2016.
While this appeal was pending, Deputy Rickstrew submitted an application for leave to
file an amicus brief. Chief Judge Thomas E. Malone denied the motion as being
unnecessary. Rather, Chief Judge Malone found that since Deputy Rickstrew was a party
to the underlying administrative proceeding, he had standing to participate in this appeal
as an appellee if he desired to do so. Thus, Deputy Rickstrew filed a brief and his
attorney participated in oral argument held on January 10, 2017.

ANALYSIS

The issue on appeal is whether the district court has appellate jurisdiction to hear
Sheriff Easter's appeal from the decision of the Sedgwick County Sheriffs Civil Service
Board relating to the termination of Deputy Rickstrew's employment. Accordingly, it is
important to recognize at the outset that the right to appeal is entirely statutory and that
the limits of our jurisdiction are imposed by the legislature. State v. Berreth, 294 Kan. 98,
Syl. ¶ 2, 273 P.3d 752 (2012); see also Harsch v. Miller, 288 Kan. 280, 287, 200 P.3d
467 (2009). In other words, Kansas courts have jurisdiction to entertain an appeal in a
civil case if that appeal is taken within the time limitations and in the manner prescribed
by the applicable statutes. See Wiechman v. Huddleston, 304 Kan. 80, 86-88, 370 P.3d
1194 (2016).

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Whether jurisdiction exists is a question of law over which we exercise unlimited
review. State v. Looney, 299 Kan. 903, 906, 327 P.3d 425 (2014). Likewise, the
interpretation of a statute is also a question of law over which we also exercise unlimited
review. State v. Eddy, 299 Kan. 29, 32, 321 P.3d 12, cert. denied 135 S. Ct. 91 (2014).
Moreover, when a district court has dismissed an action for lack of jurisdiction, our
review is unlimited. See Northern Natural Gas Co. v. ONEOK Field Services Co., 296
Kan. 906, 916, 296 P.3d 1106, cert. denied 134 S. Ct. 162 (2013).

Here, the Sedgwick County Sheriff's Civil Service Board functions pursuant to
K.S.A. 19-4304 et seq. as well as under Sedgwick County Charter Resolution 60. As a
permanent employee of the Sheriff's Office, Deputy Rickstrew had the right to seek
review of his termination by requesting a hearing before the Civil Service Board. K.S.A.
19-4327(b). In turn, the Civil Service Board was authorized to receive evidence at the
hearing and to determine the "reasonableness" of Sheriff Easter's personnel decision. See
K.S.A. 19-4311(h); K.S.A. 19-4327(b), (d).

As a party aggrieved by the decisions issued by the Civil Service Board, Sheriff
Easter had the right to appeal under K.S.A. 60-2101(d). See Denning v. Johnson County
Sheriff's Civil Service Board, 299 Kan. 1070, 1074-75, 329 P.3d 440 (2014); see also
Landau v. City Council of Overland Park, 244 Kan. 257, 273, 767 P.2d 1290 (1989)
(noting that county actions are specifically excluded from the Kansas Judicial Review
Act, K.S.A. 77-601 et seq.). K.S.A. 60-2101(d) provides that "[a] judgment rendered or
final order made by a political or taxing subdivision, or any agency thereof, exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions may be reversed, vacated or modified by the district
court on appeal."

Furthermore, K.S.A. 60-2101(d) specifically provides that "it shall be sufficient
for an aggrieved party to file a notice that such party is appealing from such judgment or
order with such subdivision . . . within 30 days of its entry . . . ." (Emphasis added.)
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Accordingly, pursuant to the plain and unambiguous language of the statute, we find that
Sheriff Easter perfected his appeal by filing the notice of appeal and the amended notice
of appeal with the Sedgwick County Sheriff's Civil Service Board within 30 days after
the decisions were entered.

As indicated above, Deputy Rickstrew was expressly named as a party in the
caption of the notice of appeal and in the caption of the amended notice of appeal. In
addition, Deputy Rickstrew was served with a copy of both of these notices of appeal.
We, therefore, conclude that the district court not only had appellate jurisdiction but also
an obligation to review the Civil Service Board's decisions. See K.S.A. 60-2101(d) ("The
clerk shall thereupon docket the same as an action in the district court, which court shall
then proceed to review the same, either with or without additional pleadings and
evidence, and enter such order or judgment as justice shall require." [Emphasis added.])

We do not believe it is necessary to spend a great deal of time on reviewing the
cases cited by the district court in deciding to dismiss Sheriff Easter's appeal for lack of
jurisdiction. We note, however, that Booher v. Wisner, 65 Kan. 860, 70 P. 581 (1902);
Bender v. Smith, 60 Kan. 857, 56 P. 484 (1899); and Falk v. Kansas City, W. & N.W.R.
Co., 10 Kan. App. 576, 62 P. 430 (1900), did not involve administrative appeals. Of
course, none of these cases discusses K.S.A. 60-2101, which was not enacted by the
Kansas Legislature until 1963. Likewise, it does not appear that the plaintiffs in those
cases even attempted to join the unnamed party. Thus, these cases provide little—if
any—guidance in the case before us.

Unfortunately, the parties and the district court made this action much more
complicated than it needed to be. Rather than simply looking to the plain language of
K.S.A. 60-2101(d), the district court decided to rely on cases decided by the Kansas
Supreme Court more than 60 years before the adoption of the Kansas Code of Civil
Procedure. Of course, Sheriff Easter did not help matters by filing the petition for judicial
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review and appeal—that appears to have been unnecessary in light of the filing of the
notices of appeal with the Civil Service Board—using a different caption than was used
below. As a practical matter, the district court could have saved itself, the parties, and this
court difficulty if it had simply granted Sheriff Easter's motion to amend given the fact
that jurisdiction had already been obtained by the timely filing of the notices of appeal
with the Civil Service Board.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.