In re Application for Change of Name of Straith

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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 113,384

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

In the Matter of the Application for Change of Name of
CHRISTOPHER V. STRAITH (DUSTIN J. STRAIT)
Appellant.


MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Pawnee District Court; BRUCE T. GATTERMAN, judge. Opinion filed January 22,
2016. Affirmed.

Dustin-Christopher Joachim Verlen Strait, appellant pro se.

Brenda West Hagerman, of Larned State Hospital, for appellee.

Before GARDNER, P.J., HILL and POWELL, JJ.

Per Curiam: Dustin J. Strait, a resident at Larned State Hospital (LSH) and
patient of the Kansas Sexual Predator Treatment Program (SPTP), appeals pro se the
district court's refusal to find LSH in contempt for its failure to comply with an ex parte
name change order he obtained in 2001. Because we find that Strait failed to follow the
proper procedure in attempting to hold LSH in contempt, we affirm the district court.

In March 2001, Strait (then named Christopher V. Straith) was found by the
District Court of Brown County, Kansas, to be a sexually violent predator and was
subsequently involuntarily committed to the SPTP.

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On June 5, 2001, Strait filed an ex parte petition to change his name in the Pawnee
County District Court. In it, he sought to change his name from "Christopher V. Straith"
to "Kristoffer Joachim Verlen Straith" but later amended his petition to change his name
to "Dustin-Christopher Joachim Verlen Strait." According to LSH, notice of this petition
was not provided to the Kansas Department of Corrections (who maintained supervision
of Strait), the Kansas Department for Aging and Disability Services (KDADS), or the
staff at LSH who had lawful custody of Strait as a committed sexual predator. Strait
maintains he alerted LSH in January 2002.

On September 17, 2001, a district judge signed a document captioned "Notice and
Order for Name Change," authorizing the name change of Christopher Verlen Straith to
Dustin-Christopher Joachim Verlen Strait. The document further provided that the court
would notify the proper agencies of the name change. Neither Strait nor the district court
provided LSH with notice of the name change.

On or around February 1, 2010, LSH received legal pleadings unrelated to this
appeal from a patient named Dustin J. Strait. In attempting to verify whether this
individual was a patient at LSH, clinical information staff confirmed that Christopher V.
Straith had changed his name to Dustin J. Strait. Two days later, upon request, the district
court provided LSH with a certified copy of the order that had changed Strait's name.
That same day, Strait's patient information form at LSH was updated to include an also-
known-as (a/k/a) name of Dustin J. Strait in addition to the name he carried when he was
committed.

On April 19, 2014, Strait filed a pleading with the district court captioned "Motion
for Final Judgment," seeking to compel LSH to comply with his name-change order from
2001. LSH was not provided with notice of Strait's motion. On May 6, 2014, the district
court ordered Strait to give notice in writing to all interested parties before a hearing on
his motion could be held. On June 4, 2014, Strait again filed a pleading captioned
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"Motion for Final Judgment" and, once again, LSH was not provided with notice of
Strait's submission.

On July 18, 2014, the district court sent an order to KDADS' legal counsel
requesting a written response to Strait's submission. KDADS and LSH filed a response,
and on November 3, 2014, the district court denied Strait's motion, noting (1) Strait
obtained his name change through an ex parte process without providing notice to various
Kansas agencies and LSH, (2) Strait was committed as a sexually violent predator and
convicted of felonies under the name of Christopher V. Straith, and medical records must
refer to Strait under that name as a matter of law, and (3) KDADS and LSH agreed that
Strait may refer to himself by any name he wished so long as his medical records at LSH
continued to display his commitment name of Christopher V. Straith, in addition to his
legal name so as to comply with all legal requirements of his civil commitment. Strait
timely appeals the district court's order.

Strait's brief makes a number of rambling arguments without providing any
elaboration or support. However, construed liberally, we divine the essence of Strait's
argument to be that the district court erred when it ignored the fact that LSH was in
indirect contempt of court when it refused to acknowledge his 2001 name change. See
Makthepharak v. State, 298 Kan. 573, 581, 314 P.3d 876 (2013) (pro se pleading to be
construed liberally). We review de novo whether the alleged conduct is contemptuous. In
re Marriage of Shelhamer, 50 Kan. App. 2d 152, 154, 323 P.3d 184 (2014).

The district court, in denying Strait's motion, side-stepped the question of whether
LSH was in contempt. Instead, the district court made findings suggesting that the
original name change order was defective because proper notice had not been given to
interested parties and that LSH was compelled by law to utilize the name contained in
Strait's convictions and civil commitment. This notwithstanding, we find Strait's
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contempt action fails because he failed to follow the procedures for an indirect contempt
allegation.

For all indirect contempt of court actions, K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 20-1204a provides
the required procedure. These statutory procedures must be followed in order to succeed
on an allegation of indirect contempt of court. Meigs v. Black, 25 Kan. App. 2d 241, 242,
960 P.2d 770 (1998). At no time has Strait complied with any of the legal requirements of
K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 20-1204a. Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying
Strait's motion.

Affirmed.