In re Estate of Frost

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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 119,026

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

In the Matter of the Estate of
JACK W. FROST.


MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Johnson District Court; MICHAEL P. JOYCE, judge. Opinion filed March 1, 2019.
Affirmed.

Jane Frost, appellant pro se.

Timothy J. Sear and Kelly D. Stohs, of Polsinelli PC, of Overland Park, for appellees John L.
Frost and Country Club Trust Co., NA.

Before MALONE, P.J., HILL, J., and WALKER, S.J.

PER CURIAM: Jack W. Frost passed away in 2002. After his will entered probate,
his wife, Jane L. Frost, made a series of claims against the estate. Jane eventually settled
her claims against the estate, and the estate was closed in 2005. Almost 12 years later,
Jane filed a petition asking the district court to reopen Jack's estate because of fraud. The
district court denied her petition, finding that she did not present grounds to reopen the
estate under K.S.A. 59-1501a. Jane appeals, arguing that the district court erred in failing
to interpret her petition as a motion for relief from judgment under K.S.A. 2018 Supp.
60-260(b). But Jane's petition to reopen the estate was untimely no matter how it should
have been interpreted. As a result, we affirm the district court's judgment.



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FACTS

Jack and Jane Frost married in 1977. The couple both had children from previous
marriages but had no children together. In 1984, they purchased a home in California as
joint tenants. Five years later, they sold their California home, receiving a $1.6 million
net profit. Jack deposited the profit in his personal trust account. He then gave Jane
$500,000 from the sale and invested the rest in various assets, including putting an
addition on their Kansas home.

In 1999, Jack redrafted his will. He left all his tangible personal property, other
than a stamp collection, to Jane. He also directed that all other property be added to his
trust and administered and distributed according to the trust agreement. He designated his
son, John Frost, and Country Club Bank as co-executors of his estate and as co-trustees.

Jack eventually was diagnosed with lung cancer and emphysema. On December 9,
2002, while in the hospital, Jack signed a codicil to his will drafted by Elizabeth Ferrari
of Lathrop & Gage. The codicil provided that if Jane predeceased him or did not survive
him for at least six months, his tangible personal property would go to Jane's children,
rather than to his children. The next day, Jack passed away.

In June 2003, the district court admitted Jack's will to probate and named John and
Country Club Bank as co-executors. Jane filed a petition for her elective share as the
surviving spouse, claiming she had: (1) a right to an elective share of Jack's augmented
estate; (2) a right to statutory allowance; (3) a right to one-half of any real estate
conveyed during the marriage without her consent; and (4) a right to the homestead.

In October 2003, Jane filed several more petitions making claims against the
estate. Jane claimed that she and Jack had acquired community property while in
California, and her rights to that property superseded any claims by the estate or by Jack's
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trust. She claimed that the couple's California home was community property, and she
was entitled to $118,980 from its sale that she never received. She also alleged that she
had loaned $335,000 to Jack, which he had never repaid.

John and Country Club Bank denied Jane's claims and sent her interrogatories and
requests for production of documents related to her claims. In her interrogatory
responses, Jane argued that she could not list all the property she claimed was in Jack's
augmented estate because she did not have all of Jack's files. She alleged the files were
taken from her home by Ferrari and a representative of Country Club Bank. She also
alleged John had erased files from Jack's computer.

In April 2004, Jane petitioned to remove John as co-executor and co-trustee. Jane
claimed John was acting against the estate's interests and her interests for his own
personal gain. She noted that John had denied her claims against the estate. She again
alleged that John had deleted emails and files from Jack's computer that contained Jack's
personal investment information after Jack's death. But the district court never held a
hearing or ruled on Jane's petition because the parties agreed to settle.

On May 24, 2005, the parties entered a settlement agreement and mutual release of
claims. Jane received the couple's Kansas home and $400,000. Jane, the Country Club
Bank, John, and Jack's other children all agreed to release any present or future claims
they might have against the estate or each other. The district court approved the
agreement a week later. Jane later filed a notice of dismissal, requesting that her petitions
be dismissed with prejudice. The estate was closed in September 2005.

On August 29, 2017, almost 12 years after Jack's estate was closed, Jane filed a
pro se motion titled "Petition to Reopen the Estate Because of Fraud." She alleged that
John and others had conspired to defraud her of the community property she rightfully
owned. She again claimed John and others had come to her home soon after Jack's death
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to remove documents and had withheld information that she needed to prove her property
interest. Jane's petition to reopen the estate, including later amended petitions, failed to
cite any statutory authority on which she based her requested relief.

The district court held a hearing on October 18, 2017. At the hearing, Jane
testified that the couple's California home was community property. She also presented
the home's deed which stated the home was held in joint tenancy. She presented Jack's
checking account registers to show that Jack had originally deposited the profits from the
California home into his own trust account, then deposited $500,000 into one of Jane's
accounts and invested the rest in various assets. Jane believed that because Jack had
commingled the profits from the California home with other assets in the estate, the rest
of the estate had also become community property and she was entitled to at least half.

Jane told the court that she knew the California home had been community
property during the original probate case, but she did not know the deed said it was held
in joint tenancy. Jane testified that John had denied that she had a community property
interest at that time. She also testified that John, along with others, took documents from
her home and Jack's computer to prevent her from knowing the California home was held
in joint tenancy. Jane testified that years after the estate closed, she found Jack's
checkbook registers among items she had brought with her when she moved back to
California. She asserted that the registers helped to prove her claims against the estate.

Jane admitted that she had made the same community property claims in 2003 that
she was making in her petition to reopen the estate. She also admitted that some
documents she claimed had been taken from her home were submitted along with her
petitions in 2003. But she argued her current petition was distinguishable because she
now had all the necessary documents to prove the California home was community
property. Because she did not have the documents before, Jane claimed that she and her
attorneys could not make an accurate judgment on whether to settle.
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After hearing the evidence, the district court denied Jane's petition. The district
court explained that a petition to reopen an estate was designed to distribute property not
included in the inventory of the estate. The district court found that Jane had "entered into
a Settlement Agreement with advice of Counsel that settled all the claims that [she was
now making]." As a result, the district court concluded that Jane did not establish grounds
to reopen the estate. The district court later filed an order stating that "[b]ased on the
evidence presented, the Court finds no basis, pursuant to K.S.A. 59-1501a to reopen the
estate." Jane timely appealed the district court's judgment.

ANALYSIS

The district court denied Jane's petition under K.S.A. 59-1501a, which provides
that an estate may be reopened to: (1) distribute property of the decedent not included in
the estate's inventory and discovered after the estate is closed; or (2) execute or deliver a
deed to certain real property not executed or delivered before the estate closed. K.S.A.
59-1501a. On appeal, Jane does not argue that she showed grounds to reopen the estate
under this statute. Instead, she argues that the district court erred in construing her motion
as a petition to reopen the estate under K.S.A. 59-1501a. Jane acknowledges that she used
the word "reopen" in the title of her petition. But she points out that she also alleged
fraud. She argues that the district court should have interpreted her petition as a motion
for relief from judgment under K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 60-260(b).

John and Country Club Bank agree that K.S.A. 59-1501a does not apply because
Jane is not claiming she discovered property not included in the estate's inventory, nor is
she claiming any failure to execute or deliver a deed to real property before the estate
closed. They also agree that Jane's petition to reopen the estate appears to be seeking
relief from the final judgment because of fraud. But they argue the district court did not
err in denying her motion because it was untimely under K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 60-260(c).

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Generally, courts should liberally construe pro se pleadings, giving effect to the
pleading's content instead of the labels and forms used. State v. Kelly, 291 Kan. 563, 565,
244 P.3d 639 (2010). "Whether the district court correctly construed a pro se pleading is a
question of law subject to unlimited review." 291 Kan. at 565. And we review a district
court's ruling on a K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 60-260(b) motion for an abuse of discretion. Bazine
State Bank v. Pawnee Prod. Serv., Inc., 245 Kan. 490, 495, 781 P.2d 1077 (1989).

Under K.S.A. 59-2213, the district court in a probate proceeding retains
jurisdiction for 30 days after the entry of judgment. After that, a judgment may be
vacated or modified under K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 60-260(b). That statute gives district courts
authority to grant relief from a final judgment for these reasons:

"(1) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect;
"(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under subsection (b) of K.S.A. 60-259,
and amendments thereto;
"(3) fraud, whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic, misrepresentation or
misconduct by an opposing party;
"(4) the judgment is void;
"(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on an
earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no
longer equitable; or
"(6) any other reason that justifies relief."

A motion under K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 60-260(b) must be made within a reasonable
time, and a motion based on the reasons listed in K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 60-260(b)(1), (2),
and (3) must be made within one year of the judgment. K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 60-260(c).

Assuming, without deciding, that the district court should have construed Jane's
petition as a K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 60-260(b) motion, the district court did not err in denying
it because it was untimely. In her motions at the district court level and in her briefs on
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appeal, Jane makes clear she is asking for relief from the final judgment because of fraud.
But a motion for relief based on fraud must be brought within one year of the final
judgment. See K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 60-260(b)(3) and 60-260(c). Jane filed her motion
almost 12 years after the estate was closed, well outside the time limit.

Jane tries to circumvent the time limitations by arguing that she is seeking relief
under K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 60-260(b)(6), for "any other reason that justifies relief." She
asserts that a motion under K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 60-260(b)(6) must be brought within a
reasonable amount of time. Jane states she filed the motion two weeks after she received
the documents from her attorney, and she contends this is a reasonable amount of time.

But this argument also fails. A district court may not grant relief under K.S.A.
2018 Supp. 60-260(b)(6) "if the real reason for granting relief falls under one listed in
(b)(1) to (3) and more than a year has gone by since the entry of the judgment." In re
Estate of McLeish, 49 Kan. App. 2d 246, 260, 307 P.3d 221 (2013); see also In re
Marriage of Leedy, 279 Kan. 311, 323, 109 P.3d 1130 (2005). Jane has been clear that
she is alleging fraud, so her real reason for asking for relief falls under K.S.A. 2018 Supp.
60-260(b)(3). She cannot circumvent the time limitations on a motion for relief from
judgment because of fraud by now asking for relief under K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 60-
260(b)(6).

Finally, we observe that Jane brought her claim outside the statute of limitations
for fraud. As Jane notes, a fraud claim can be brought up to two years after the discovery
of the fraud. K.S.A. 60-513(a)(3). But "in no event shall an action be commenced more
than 10 years beyond the time of the act giving rise to the cause of action." K.S.A. 60-
513(b). So even if this court were to accept Jane's claim that she did not discover the
fraud until recently, the statute of limitations has already run because the alleged fraud
happened more than 10 years before she brought her claim.

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To sum up, even if the district court should have construed Jane's petition as a
motion for relief from judgment under K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 60-260(b), the motion was
untimely under K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 60-260(c). Moreover, Jane's fraud claims were barred
by the statute of limitations under K.S.A. 60-513(a)(3). If a district court reaches the
correct result, its decision will be upheld even though it relied on the wrong ground or
assigned erroneous reasons for its decision. Gannon v. State, 302 Kan. 739, 744, 357 P.3d
873 (2015). For these reasons, we conclude the district court did not err in denying Jane's
petition to reopen the estate.

Affirmed.