In re V.B.

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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

Nos. 120,523
120,524

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

In the Matter of
V.B.

MEMORANDUM OPINION


Appeal from Johnson District Court; THOMAS E. FOSTER, judge. Opinion filed September 27,
2019. Affirmed.

Jacob M. Gontesky, assistant district attorney, Stephen M. Howe, district attorney, for appellant.

Michael J. Bartee, of Michael J. Bartee, P.A., of Olathe, for appellee.

Before STANDRIDGE, P.J., PIERRON and ATCHESON, JJ.

PER CURIAM: The State appeals the district court's denial of its motion to waive
V.B. to adult status for prosecution.

FACTS

On February 12, 2018, the State charged V.B. with theft of a firearm in case No.
18JV198. During the pendency of the theft charge, on May 31, 2018, the State charged
him with attempted second-degree murder in case No. 18JV665. Four days later, the State
moved to waive V.B. to adult status for prosecution in 18JV665. On June 27, the State
moved to waive V.B. to adult status for prosecution in 18JV198. The State amended the
complaint in 18JV665 to include charges for attempted aggravated robbery and
possession of marijuana on December 4, 2018.
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On December 7, 2018, the district court heard the motions. The court took judicial
notice of 14JV1218, 14JV1474, 17JV1516, 18JV198, 18JV665, and 17JC662. The State's
first witnesses testified about the facts in 18JV665. Shawnee Police Officer David
Brandau testified he responded to a call for shots fired on May 25, 2018. The call was
upgraded to a call for a person shot. When he arrived, he saw a vehicle disabled in the
roadway with multiple bullet holes and the victim sitting on the ground with a bullet
wound to his left torso. Brandau later obtained a warrant and searched V.B.'s residence.
In the furnace closet, he found a bag containing a jar of marijuana, a spare magazine to a
handgun, baggies, and a 9 mm Smith & Wesson handgun. Brandau confirmed there was
no indication of who owned the gun. However, Dustin Calvin, forensic scientist at the
Johnson County Crime Lab latent print section, testified he had recovered V.B.'s
fingerprint on the slide of the handgun as well as on the jar containing marijuana.

In preparation for the waiver hearing, Laura Brewer, chief court services officer,
reviewed police reports, lab reports, and photographs for the two pending cases. She also
reviewed the case files of V.B.'s previous court involvement for both juvenile
delinquency and child in need of care (CINC) cases. She reviewed performance reports
from the juvenile detention center (JDC); his psychological evaluation; and school
records, including his individualized education program (IEP). She interviewed V.B. in
July 2018.

The State focused Brewer's testimony on the eight factors in K.S.A. 2018 Supp.
38-2347(d), which a district court must consider when determining whether to waive a
juvenile to adult status for prosecution:

"(1) The seriousness of the alleged offense and whether the protection of the
community requires prosecution as an adult or designating the proceeding as an extended
jurisdiction juvenile prosecution;
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"(2) whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent,
premeditated or willful manner;
"(3) whether the offense was against a person or against property. Greater weight
shall be given to offenses against persons, especially if personal injury resulted;
"(4) the number of alleged offenses unadjudicated and pending against the
juvenile;
"(5) the previous history of the juvenile, including whether the juvenile had been
adjudicated a juvenile offender under this code or the Kansas juvenile justice code and, if
so, whether the offenses were against persons or property, and any other previous history
of antisocial behavior or patterns of physical violence;
"(6) the sophistication or maturity of the juvenile as determined by consideration
of the juvenile's home, environment, emotional attitude, pattern of living or desire to be
treated as an adult;
"(7) whether there are facilities or programs available to the court which are
likely to rehabilitate the juvenile prior to the expiration of the court's jurisdiction under
this code; and
"(8) whether the interest of the juvenile or of the community would be better
served by criminal prosecution or extended jurisdiction juvenile prosecution.
"The insufficiency of evidence pertaining to any one or more of the factors listed
in this subsection, in and of itself, shall not be determinative of the issue. Subject to the
provisions of K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 38-2354, and amendments thereto, written reports and
other materials relating to the juvenile's mental, physical, educational and social history
may be considered by the court."

Of the eight factors for consideration, Brewer testified that only the second and third,
which are specific to the alleged offenses, supported waiver. She stated five of the
remaining six factors favored extended juvenile jurisdiction prosecution (EJJP). As for
the sixth factor, she stated it did not support waiver, but she did not clarify if it supported
EJJP or standard juvenile jurisdiction.

V.B.'s witnesses focused on factors related to his abilities and personality rather
than the offense-specific factors. Dr. Todd Shimmel, psychologist at Johnson County
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Mental Health testified V.B.'s intellectual functioning was in the lower one percentile for
his age range and, socially, he tended to be a follower and pleaser. Jeff Goss, who
coached V.B. in basketball at Lenexa Baptist Church, testified he knew V.B. had
challenges at home and V.B. had shown some maturity in that he appeared to have to
make a lot of his own decisions. He also viewed V.B. sitting through devotion time
before basketball, rather than goofing off like many other players, as a sign of maturity.

Tracy Mays, V.B.'s maternal aunt, stated he had lived with her since March 2018.
Before that, he lived with his mother and six siblings. V.B. was close with his younger
brother, who was the leader of the two. Tracy stated V.B. had always been a follower and
had gotten into trouble in the past because he followed the wrong people. She stated
V.B.'s mother passed away on May 4, 2018, and shortly thereafter his half sister from his
father's side was found dead. Shelby Coleman, KVC Behavioral Healthcare adoption case
manager, testified she had been working with V.B. since August 2018 and had a good
relationship with him. She stated she generally had to explain things to V.B. more than
once and was not sure if he fully understood what she was saying. She testified his level
of sophistication and maturity was below that of the average 16-year-old.

Rex Arthur, JDC case manager, testified V.B. had been in JDC for 192 days. He
had received eight behavioral reports in that time, three of which occurred in his first six
weeks at the facility. V.B.'s last report had been on September 28, 2018. He testified
V.B.'s behavior had significantly improved, and he had even received at least three ACE
awards for being the best-behaved resident during those weeks.

The district court considered the factors and found that V.B. was alleged to have
committed a very serious violent offense against a person that resulted in injury. The
court appeared to have been neutral regarding the fourth factor as it noted V.B. could
have had less or could have had more unadjudicated offenses. It found he had only been
adjudicated for two misdemeanors. In its consideration for the sixth factor, the court
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found a long history of investigations by the Department for Children and Families
(DCF). The court considered Dr. Shimmel's psychological evaluation, which indicated
V.B. was not as mature as others his age and Arthur's report that V.B. had demonstrated
his ability to improve in a structured environment. The court found a history of neglect in
V.B.'s home environment and no evidence to support a pattern of living as an adult or the
desire to be treated as an adult. The court held that the facilities and programs available in
the juvenile system were more appropriate for V.B. and, in weighing the community's
safety interests in a longer sentence in the adult system against the increased likelihood of
rehabilitation in the juvenile system, the court found the State had failed to meet its
burden to show V.B. should be waived to adult status for prosecution. The court denied
the State's motion. The State appeals.

ANALYSIS

The State claims the district court's factual findings as to the first four factors were
supported by substantial evidence and the legal conclusion that each of those factors
supported waiver was not an abuse of discretion. However, it contends the district court's
factual findings as to the fifth through eighth factors were not supported by substantial
evidence and the court based its ultimate legal conclusion on errors of fact and
unreasonable interpretations of law.

V.B. contends the district court's fact-finding was based on substantial evidence
and the State is asking us to make different findings of fact which permit it to draw
inferences in its favor. He claims the State misconstrued the court's findings as to the first
factor by limiting its findings to the first element of the factor. V.B. claims the court
made a negative finding as to the second element. He agrees with the State's assertion
that the court found the second and third factors favored waiver. However, he claims the
district court's findings as to the fourth through eighth factors were supported by
substantial evidence and in favor of EJJP.
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When reviewing a district court's determination of whether to waive a juvenile to
adult status for prosecution, an appellate court determines whether the district court's
factual findings are supported by substantial evidence. In re D.D.M., 291 Kan. 883, 892-
93, 249 P.3d 5 (2011). Substantial evidence is "evidence which possesses both relevance
and substance and which furnishes a substantial basis of fact from which the issues can
reasonably be resolved." 291 Kan. at 893 (citing State v. Mays, 277 Kan. 359, 363, 85
P.3d 1208 [2004]). We must accept the evidence and all inferences to be drawn from it
that support the district court's findings as true and give deference to its evaluation or
characterization of the facts. D.D.M., 291 Kan. at 893.

Appellate courts review the district court's determination of whether to waive the
juvenile status using the abuse of discretion standard. 291 Kan. at 893. Though the
district court must have considered the eight statutory factors, it was not constrained by
the insufficiency of the evidence to support one or more of the factors. 291 Kan. at 893.
Judicial discretion is abused if judicial action is (1) arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable;
(2) based on an error of law; or (3) based on an error of fact. State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541,
550, 256 P.3d 801 (2011).

The parties agree with the district court's factual findings that V.B. was accused of
violent person offenses in which a person had been injured. The parties agree with the
conclusions that the second and third factors favored a waiver. Thus, we need not review
them individually.

Factor One

K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 38-2347(d)(1) considers the seriousness of the alleged offense
and whether the protection of the community requires prosecution as an adult or
designating the proceeding as an extended jurisdiction juvenile prosecution.
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Here, the district court found the first factor was the severity level of the crime and
the seriousness of the alleged offense. The most serious offense was a level 3 felony—
use of a handgun, the shooting, and an injury. The court found it was one of the more
serious types of crimes that can be committed.

The State had charged V.B. with attempted second-degree murder, a level 3,
person felony, and during the commission of this crime a person was shot. Though the
district court did not make findings regarding the second element of the factor, the
element is the ultimate determination by the district court. To say the court found the
offense required adult prosecution would render the remaining seven factors futile. It
appears the court's focus on the first element of the factor shows the State had met its
burden in showing the seriousness of the offense and the severity of the offense presented
a concern of community protection. The court seemingly weighed this factor in favor of
waiver. The district court's findings are supported by substantial evidence.

Factor Four

K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 38-2347(d)(4) considers the number of alleged offenses
unadjudicated and pending against the juvenile.

The district court found "there could be less, there could be more. There are four
in this case." The State asserts the district court's findings were based on substantial
evidence. It seems V.B. interpreted the State's agreement as an interpretation that the
factor weighed in favor of waiver. However, the State made no such assertion. As V.B.
noted, it seems the court viewed this factor neutrally. However, under K.S.A. 2018 Supp.
38-2347(a)(1), the court must presume a juvenile to be a juvenile unless the State rebuts
the presumption by a preponderance of the evidence. Therefore, although the court did
not specify whether it held this factor to weigh in favor of adult or juvenile prosecution,
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the State failed to rebut the presumption and so it should weigh in favor of V.B. being
prosecuted as a juvenile.

Factor Five

K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 38-2347(d)(5) concerns the previous history of the juvenile,
including whether the juvenile had been adjudicated a juvenile offender under this code
or the Kansas Juvenile Justice Code and, if so, whether the offenses were against persons
or property, and any other previous history of antisocial behavior or patterns of physical
violence.

Regarding V.B.'s court history, the district court found, "There is some previous
history as a juvenile which I believe are all misdemeanors. . . . It was a misdemeanor
battery charge, misdemeanor theft, theft of a bicycle. There was a charge of a firearm
theft. No prior felonies." The court held that if V.B. had been tried as an adult, he would
have a criminal history score of H, putting him "on the lower end of the criminal history
as far as [the] adult sentencing grid goes."

The State contends the district court provided insufficient attention to factor five.
It appears the State is asking us to reevaluate and recharacterize the evidence such that it
supports a waiver. However, the court did not disregard the evidence presented for factor
five, rather, it placed more value on V.B.'s criminal history and possible criminal history
score than the pattern of behaviors the State emphasized.

The State claims the district court minimized V.B.'s juvenile delinquent and CINC
referrals. But the court took judicial notice of all prior cases. The State argued in closing
that in 2015 and 2016 V.B. had been on probation for a total of 16 months and he had a
history of antisocial behavior and physical violence, in support of waiver.

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Contrary to the State's assertions, Brewer testified this factor supported EJJP. She
explained V.B. had a total of eight prior referrals. Three of those were CINC referrals,
and the remaining are all misdemeanor referrals. Brewer noted that V.B. had been on
probation for misdemeanor battery through which he received limited services. She
testified that the bulk of his probation was the requirement that he complete the Healthy
Boundaries class, but after his probation had been extended he was ultimately released
from probation as unsuccessful due to his failure to complete the class. She explained
unsuccessful release means court services did not feel there were any further services that
probation could offer to aid the client in successfully completing probation. She noted
that during his time on probation V.B. was in middle school, he had issues with
transportation, and he was not able to make it to classes and meetings with his probation
officer. There was also a concern that he did not have a medical card and so could not
attend the classes. She stated there were "issues beyond the control of him at that age."

Because the district court's factual findings were supported by substantial
evidence, we would have to reweigh the evidence or recharacterize the facts to provide
the State with the outcome it seeks. However, that is outside the authority of the appellate
court.

Factor Six

K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 38-2347(d)(6) considers the sophistication or maturity of the
juvenile as determined by consideration of the juvenile's home, environment, emotional
attitude, pattern of living, or desire to be treated as an adult.

The district court found:

"In reviewing the Child in Need of Care petition, the facts alleged in that petition, . . . and
the testimony presented would indicate there is a challenging environment for [V.B.] to
grow up in. Talk about 22 DCF investigations concerning the family beginning in 1997
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including allegations of neglect, lack of supervision, lack of medical attention, emotional
issues, truancy, domestic violence, parental. It talks about encouraging unlawful behavior
by the children, parents having weapons, delinquency, addictions, homelessness.
"[W]e have a psychological evaluation and the IEP which also indicates the
challenges that [V.B.] has, and the education environment; and talking about some needs
for some accommodations in regard to his learning environment; and Dr. Shimmel's
report which talked about some of [V.B.'s] strengths including playing sports and being
kind to people. Certainly whatever happened in this case, this incident was not a kind
situation. That's Dr. Shimmel's comment. Dr. Shimmel did do some testing, standardized
testing that resulted in some scoring and some comparative percentile rankings for
[V.B.]. . . . Dr. Shimmel did have the opinion that . . . [V.B.] is not as mature as others of
his age. Dr. Shimmel also believes that [V.B.] is in need of extensive academics, court
services, and he would benefit from continued support of counseling. The testimony from
Mr. Arthur indicated [V.B.] can improve, can learn, especially in a controlled
environment. The evidence would show that there's been neglect in regard to [V.B.] in his
home environment. The evidence really doesn't indicate a pattern of living or desire to be
treated as an adult."

The State contends the district court's findings on the factor six were abbreviated.
It claims this factor is inherently subjective but there is no basis for it to be based on
comparison with others his age to determine maturity. The State claims the court's
findings were not sufficient as some witnesses indicated V.B.'s maturity and intelligence
were below average, while others testified he showed some independence and maturity.
The State is essentially asking us to reweigh the evidence and reverse the court's
determination of credibility of the witnesses, neither of which we can do. D.D.M., 291
Kan. at 893.

Brewer testified factor six did not support a waiver. She testified that despite
V.B.'s given age, he would turn 17 pretty quickly and his level of functioning was not
necessarily that of a normal almost 17-year-old. She testified school records showed V.B.
had an IEP for as long as he could remember, and he had challenges with learning. She
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indicated the psychological evaluation showed he was in the lower percentiles for IQ and
abilities. As far as his pattern of living or desire to be treated as an adult, she noted he had
never had a driver's license, lived on his own, had a bank account, or had any means of
supporting himself. She concluded: "I just think socially he's much younger than his
given age."

Dr. Shimmel testified that V.B. potentially suffered from PTSD, although he did
not see enough for a diagnosis. However, he had diagnosed V.B. with bereavement for
the recent death of his mother and with intellectual disability. V.B.'s full scale IQ score
was 67, placing him in the first percentile for his age range. The full scale score was
based on four skills, and V.B. did not score higher than the fifth percentile in any of
them. The assessment that measures personality suggested V.B. was a pleaser—a
follower who wants to comply. The test reflected distressing emotions, attention, and
some guardedness. Dr. Shimmel stated V.B. cognitively reflected feelings of inadequacy
or a tendency to think he was not very capable. The third assessment, which provided
insight into "how that person's doing, how they feel about themselves, their future,"
showed V.B. was stressed about his incarceration and regretful about being in jail. Some
of V.B.'s answers reflected his difficulty with reading and school and a desire to learn
more and do better. Dr. Shimmel concluded that

"based on [V.B.'s] intellectual testing, his IQ scores that came up based on the
descriptions of his struggles academically, even based on his aunt Tracy's description of
some of his involvement with the law, it just seems to speak to somebody that didn't have
the judgment, the decision-making of an average 16-year-old."

Shelby Coleman testified about V.B.'s level of sophistication and maturity, stating
it was "below average of other 16 almost 17-year-olds that I work with on my case load if
I'm comparing it to the current population that I work with." In reference to [V.B's]
cognitive abilities, she stated:
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"I feel that when I explain things to [V.B.], I generally explain them more than one time.
So generally it's more than one way. Just because I want to make sure he's fully
understanding what I'm saying to him because sometimes I get the impression based on
this facial expression that he doesn't understand what I'm telling him. I understand that
this whole system can be a little confusing so I try to get creative to explain things to
him."

Jeff Goss was the only witness who testified that V.B. had demonstrated maturity
in that "there's certain things like during devotion time you had a lot of youth that goofed
off and didn't listen and you had to kind of tell, 'Hey, let's do the devotion then play
basketball.' [V.B.] would sit, he'd listen. You know, he wasn't disrespectful."

Contrary to the State's assertion, the district court's findings were sufficient.
Though the State contends there is no basis for determining this factor on comparison to
others of V.B.'s age, the psychological tests provided comparative percentile rankings by
age group. The comparison provides meaning to the numbers. It would make sense that,
if the testing provides comparative analysis, the court should consider analysis by
individuals who work with juveniles in V.B.'s age range to provide a gauge for their
conclusions. The court clearly considered the different witnesses' testimony as well as
V.B.'s family history with DCF as it referred to different sources of information in its
findings. The State's suggestion that we reweigh the evidence, placing Goss' testimony
above the other witnesses', is beyond our scope of review. The district court's findings
were supported by substantial evidence.

Factor Seven

K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 38-2347(d)(7) considers whether there are facilities or
programs available to the court which are likely to rehabilitate the juvenile prior to the
expiration of the court's jurisdiction under this code.
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Regarding the seventh factor, the district court found there were facilities and
programs available in both the juvenile and adult setting. The programs available within
the juvenile justice system were more appropriate for V.B. at that time and more likely to
rehabilitate him as compared to programs in the adult system.

The State contends the district court's findings were particularly
abbreviated and contends the evidence that the juvenile system would be more
effective was "weak." However, the State attempts to shift the burden in making
such an assertion. The court must have worked on the presumption that the
juvenile system was more appropriate than the adult system. The State had the
burden of rebutting the presumption and showing otherwise. K.S.A. 2018 Supp.
38-2347(a)(1). Yet, it provided no evidence to support the conclusion it asks us to
adopt.

Contrary to the State's claim of weak evidence, Brewer—the State's witness—
testified V.B. had "ample time available to him within the juvenile facility to complete
programming which could include individual counseling, educational programming,
aggression replacement training, Thinking for a Change, [and] more reformation
therapy." She stated there were many services available to him within the juvenile
correctional facility which she thought he could take advantage of. She stated that in the
six months he had been at JDC, he had shown a willingness and ability to comply with
things that were in his control. She stated the programs she believed would rehabilitate
V.B. were custodial services.

Rex Arthur testified that V.B.'s behavior had greatly improved since he entered
JDC. V.B. had worked and progressed in his reading abilities and with accepting help
from others. Arthur expressed that V.B.'s better self-esteem should help him be more
assertive in standing up for himself instead of falling into the negativity of others. He
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stated V.B. responded very well to the structure at JDC such that he had received the
ACE award three or four times.

The State contends the testimony about the programs and facilities likely to
rehabilitate V.B. are meaningless when considering his unsuccessful release from
probation when he had very little required of him at the time. However, the district court
gave more weight to the programs and facilities than to his previous failure to complete a
class. As Brewer testified, at the time of V.B.'s previous probation, he was in middle
school and could not make it to appointments or class because he had no access to
transportation or his medical card. The district court also considered V.B.'s positive
response to the structured environment in making its determination regarding this factor.
The court's findings were not abbreviated and were supported by substantial evidence.

Factor Eight

K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 38-2347(d)(8) considers whether the interests of the juvenile or
of the community would be better served by criminal prosecution or extended jurisdiction
juvenile prosecution

The district court found:

"Criminal prosecution would extend juvenile jurisdiction. The community's interest
would be that—I guess there's a couple different ways you can look at it. One is you try
to take [V.B.] and put him in a place where community can't be affected for a certain
period of time; and then, eventually he would get out; and then, how we determine if the
community is safer or less safe at that point; and plus the fact he was incarcerated a
certain number of years and couldn't hurt anybody, and then released, and what—to what
extent is he rehabilitated, and is he a danger to the community then or not? Is juvenile
justice going to do a better job of helping [V.B.] be the best person he can be, but that
will be an earlier date. And then he's released, and so, the community was safe while he
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was incarcerated; and then, how is the community affected once he's released?
Difficult—difficult to know. Experts say it's 25 when the adult brain is fully developed.
". . . I do find that having considered all these factors that the community in the
long run, and hopefully in the short run too, and for [V.B.] in both the short and long run,
to continue to treat him as a juvenile in the juvenile system."

The State contends the district court's findings are abbreviated and more
speculative than supported. It asserts the court proposed questions about V.B.'s and the
community's best interests in length of incarceration and likelihood of rehabilitation
without resolving the apparent conflict. The State claims that in making its findings, the
court failed to appreciate the impact a lengthier sentence would have on the safety of the
community.

V.B. asserts the district court's statements were merely its expression of the factors
it weighed in determining what was in the best interests of V.B. and the community. The
court had to choose between a lengthier sentence during which the community was safe
from V.B., but with little confidence in rehabilitation, or a shorter sentence during which
V.B. would have a greater likelihood of rehabilitation, providing a greater chance of
community safety after his release. In making the above statements, the court was being
candid in its evaluation. Ultimately, the court expressed its determination that in the long-
and short-term, both the community's and V.B.'s interests were better served with
juvenile prosecution.

The State takes issue with the district court's statement that the brain is not fully
developed until age 25 because it indicates the court does not believe juveniles should
ever be waived to adult status and it was not supported by the record. However, the
presumption is that juveniles should not be prosecuted as adults and so the court's starting
point should reflect that. Absent a showing that the court regularly abuses its discretion
by denying waiver, the appearance of being against waiver is of no consequence. Further,
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the statement about brain development is common knowledge, and so, the district court
did not make any extrajudicial fact-finding.

The district court's findings are in line with its previous findings that the juvenile
system offers a better chance of rehabilitation and are supported by substantial evidence.
The speculation by the court was merely it openly discussing the factors it weighed in
making the determination. The court's determination that the community and V.B. were
better served by juvenile prosecution showed its emphasis on short- and long-term safety
through rehabilitation.

The district court's findings of fact with regard to all eight of the factors listed in
K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 38-2347(d) are based on substantial competent evidence.

Legal Conclusion

Finally, the State argues the district court's legal conclusion is an abuse of
discretion as it was based on an error of law and it was an unreasonable interpretation of
the statute. The State makes the same arguments for the factual errors as above. As
discussed above, the district court's factual findings were supported by substantial
competent evidence. Again, the State is essentially asking us to reweigh the evidence and
recharacterize the facts in a way that supports waiver. However, that is outside the scope
of our review.

Following its K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 38-2347(d) analysis, the district court concluded:

"I find that the State has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that
the community would be safer if we went to criminal prosecution. There's lots of services
in the juvenile system that have not been—that are available and have not been tried yet
for [V.B.]. There—hasn't shown a desire to be treated as an adult. I guess at times he's out
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there acting like an adult. That seems more like his life circumstances than his preference
or his desire. I know these doctors like Dr. Shimmel thinks if you work hard you can
catch up to others of your age. I guess some of them; and there are programs that can help
you do that in the juvenile justice system as opposed to sending a young man with this
personal intellectual system in the adult system. I think he's going to have even more
challenges while he's dealing with that and after he's released."

Though the court did not specify in its findings whether each factor weighed in favor of
waiver or EJJP, the court summed up the evidence it gave the greatest weight in the
paragraph above.

Under K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 38-2347(a)(1), a juvenile is presumed to be treated as a
juvenile unless the State proves otherwise. The district court properly began with such a
presumption, and the witnesses' testimony strengthened the presumption. The court's
findings of fact were supported by substantial competent evidence and sufficiently
provided how it evaluated and characterized the evidence to reach its conclusion. The
court's conclusion aligned with its factual findings and was a reasonable interpretation of
the law. The district court did not abuse its discretion.

Affirmed.