Schaeffer v. State

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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 119,345

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

JASON W. SCHAEFFER,
Appellant,

v.

STATE OF KANSAS,
Appellee.


MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Shawnee District Court; EVELYN Z. WILSON, judge. Opinion filed March 29, 2019.
Affirmed.

Gerald E. Wells, of Jerry Wells Attorney-at-Law, of Lawrence, for appellant.

Natalie Chalmers, assistant solicitor general, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.

Before LEBEN, P.J., BUSER and STANDRIDGE, JJ.

PER CURIAM: Jason W. Schaeffer pled guilty to first-degree murder, aggravated
kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and a weapons violation in 1994. These convictions
were upheld on Schaeffer's direct appeal. See State v. Schaeffer, 295 Kan. 872, 286 P.3d
889 (2012). In 2015, Schaeffer filed a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion making various claims for
relief. In a 24-page memorandum decision and order, filed on September 4, 2015, the
Honorable Evelyn Z. Wilson summarily denied the motion.

On appeal, Schaeffer contends the district court erred in denying the motion with
regard to two ineffective assistance of trial attorney claims: (1) failure to request a
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competency evaluation before trial, and (2) failure to object to the trial judge's comments
during sentencing. We will address each claim individually.

FAILURE TO REQUEST A COMPETENCY EVALUATION

On appeal, Schaeffer asserts "the real question is whether trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to request a competency evaluation faced with the evidence before
counsel at the time."

In its written decision denying Schaeffer's claim, the district court identified and
applied the controlling statute, K.S.A. 22-3302(1), regarding a defendant's competency to
stand trial. The district court also summarized the lack of evidence in the record to
indicate that Schaeffer was incompetent either before or during the trial. The district court
concluded: "[T]he facts of the case disclose no indication that either the [defense]
attorney, the prosecutor, or the judge believed that [Schaeffer] was at any time unable to
understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him."

Upon our independent review of the record, the parties' briefs, and the district
court's memorandum decision and order, we affirm the district court's ruling in
accordance with Supreme Court Rule 7.042 (2019 Kan. S. Ct. R. 48). In particular, we
affirm this issue under Rule 7.042(b)(2) because the appellate issue is without merit, and
Rule 7.042(b)(5) because the opinion or findings of fact and conclusions of law of the
district court adequately explain the decision.

FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THE TRIAL JUDGE'S COMMENTS AT SENTENCING

On appeal, Schaeffer also contends the district court erred "in analyzing the
gratuitous comments made by the [trial court] at Mr. Schaeffer's sentencing."
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In Schaeffer's direct appeal, our Supreme Court considered this same issue and
found the sentencing judge's comments were excessive and ill-advised and the judge
should have recused himself. Schaeffer, 295 Kan. at 876. But the Supreme Court held that
Schaeffer's claim failed because "he has not demonstrated that actual bias or prejudice
warrants setting aside his sentences." 295 Kan. at 876.

Schaeffer acknowledges that in his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion he only claimed error
on the part of the sentencing judge in making improper comments and that this issue was
previously raised by Schaeffer to no avail on direct appeal to the Kansas Supreme Court.
For the first time on appeal, Schaeffer now claims his attorney was ineffective by failing
to object in any way "to these obviously biased and corrosive comments by the
sentencing judge."

In considering Schaeffer's claim of trial court error in his K.S.A. 60-1507 motion,
the district court concluded:

"Plaintiff argues that the district court erred when it interjected comments
indicating personal bias and comments regarding Plaintiff's prior bad acts and mental
examination. The essence of this argument was previously raised in the Plaintiff's direct
appeal, and was denied by the Kansas Supreme Court. See State v. Schaeffer, 295 Kan. at
876-77. Because the issue is now res judicata, this Court summarily denies the Plaintiff's
Motion on this ground. See State v. Barnes, 37 Kan. App. 2d [136,] 139[, 149 P.3d 543
(2007)].

Upon our independent review of the record, the parties' briefs, and the district
court's memorandum decision and order, we affirm the district court's ruling denying
Schaeffer's K.S.A. 60-1507 motion on this basis. This affirmance is in accordance with
Supreme Court Rule 7.042. In particular, we affirm this issue under Supreme Court Rule
7.042(b)(2) because the appellate issue raised below is without merit, and Rule
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7.042(b)(5) because the opinion or findings of fact and conclusions of law of the district
court adequately explain the decision.

With regard to Schaeffer's new claim raised for the first time on appeal that his
trial attorney was ineffective for failing to object to the district court's sentencing
remarks, we will consider this issue upon the basis proffered by Schaeffer—consideration
of the theory is necessary to serve the ends of justice or to prevent denial of fundamental
rights. State v. Phillips, 299 Kan. 479, 493, 325 P.3d 1095 (2014).

In considering this aspect of Schaeffer's claim, we apply the two-prong ineffective
assistance of counsel test which requires a movant to prove that "(1) the performance of
defense counsel was deficient under the totality of the circumstances, and (2) prejudice,
i.e., that there is a reasonable probability the jury would have reached a different result
absent the deficient performance." Sola-Morales v. State, 300 Kan. 875, 882, 335 P.3d
1162 (2014).

In Schaeffer's direct appeal, our Supreme Court ruled that the trial judge's
sentencing remarks were in error. Schaeffer, 295 Kan. at 876. However, the Supreme
Court concluded the remarks were not prejudicial:

"[T]he judge plainly evaluated several of the sentencing factors enumerated in the then-
controlling K.S.A. 21-4606 (Ensley 1992). Those factors included: '[t]he defendant's
history of prior criminal activity; . . . [t]he extent of the harm caused by the defendant's
criminal conduct; . . . [w]hether the defendant intended that his criminal conduct would
cause or threaten serious harm; . . . [and t]he degree of the defendant's provocation.' The
judge mentioned Schaeffer's three prior juvenile adjudications. He was well aware of the
unprovoked and particularly cruel nature of Schaeffer's crimes in this case: Schaeffer
was the lone initiator; he escalated the situation's seriousness; he boastfully displayed
Riley's car with Riley in its trunk to a friend; and he mocked Riley by questioning him
about the comfort of his trunk ride just before summarily executing him. The judge also
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expressly considered the harm Schaeffer caused to Riley's family. The mere fact that
Schaeffer's sentences were harsh and consecutive does not establish actual prejudice."
(Emphasis added.) 295 Kan. at 876-77.

In short, our Supreme Court has previously found the trial judge's intemperate
comments did not prejudice Schaeffer's sentencing. This finding of no prejudice is res
judicata. See State v. Kingsley, 299 Kan. 896, 901, 326 P.3d 1083 (2014) (Where an
appeal is taken from a conviction or sentence imposed, the judgment of the appellate
court is res judicata as to all issues actually raised.). Even assuming defense counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to the comments, given our Supreme Court's finding that
there was no actual prejudice, Schaeffer cannot prove the second prong of the ineffective
assistance of counsel test. Accordingly, we affirm the district court on this aspect of
Schaeffer's argument.

Summary dismissal of a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion is appropriate when the motion,
files, and record in the case "conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief."
K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 60-1507(b). For all of the reasons stated in this opinion, the district
court did not err in summarily denying Schaeffer's motion.

Affirmed.