State v. Adams

1

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 114,472

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

STATE OF KANSAS,
Appellee,

v.

VALENTAE ADAMS,
Appellant.


MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; CHRISTOPHER M. MAGANA, judge. Opinion filed
December 23, 2016. Affirmed.

Ryan J. Eddinger, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.

Lesley A. Isherwood, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Derek
Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.

Before PIERRON, P.J., ATCHESON and ARNOLD-BURGER, JJ.

Per Curiam: Defendant Valentae Adams appeals from the Sedgwick County
District Court's denial of his motion to withdraw an Alford plea before he was sentenced
on one count of aggravated indecent solicitation of a child. Adams contends his lawyer
failed to adequately represent him leading up to the plea and he felt pressured to agree to
the plea the morning his jury trial was set to begin. After an evidentiary hearing, the
district court rejected Adams' claims, finding he was competently represented and
voluntarily entered his plea. We discern no error in the district court's ruling and,
therefore, affirm.
2


The Sedgwick County District Attorney charged Adams with aggravated indecent
liberties with a child, an off-grid felony violation of K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5506(b)(3)(A)
that carries a life sentence. We need not recount the circumstances underlying the charge
in any detail and mention only that Adams was alleged to have victimized a female
relative, who was then 4 years old. The court-appointed lawyer representing Adams
worked out an agreement with the prosecutor calling for Adams to enter an Alford plea to
aggravated indecent solicitation of a child, a severity level 5 person felony violation of
K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5508(b). Given Adams' anticipated criminal history, the
sentencing range for the amended charge was 31 to 34 months in prison. Under the plea
arrangement, the prosecutor could ask for the maximum sentence, while Adams reserved
the right to argue for any lawful sentence. In an Alford plea, a defendant maintains his or
her innocence (or at least doesn't admit guilt) but pleads guilty anyway, typically to take
advantage of a beneficial sentencing arrangement. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S.
25, 37-38, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970); State v. Ebaben, 294 Kan. 807, 807,
281 P.3d 129 (2012).

The district court accepted Adams' plea at a hearing and scheduled a sentencing
date. Before sentencing, Adams filed a motion to withdraw his plea. The district court
then appointed a new lawyer to represent Adams and held an evidentiary hearing on the
motion. Both Adams and his original lawyer testified at the hearing. The district court
denied the motion and ultimately sentenced Adams to serve 31 months in prison followed
by lifetime postrelease supervision. Adams has appealed and asserts as his sole issue the
denial of the motion to withdraw the plea.

A defendant may withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing in the discretion of the
district court upon a showing of good cause. K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3210(d)(1). District
courts should look at three primary factors to determine if a defendant has shown good
cause to withdraw a plea: (1) whether the defendant was represented by competent
3

counsel; (2) whether the defendant was misled, coerced, mistreated, or unfairly taken
advantage of; and (3) whether the plea was fairly and understandingly made. State v.
Garcia, 295 Kan. 53, 62-63, 283 P.3d 165 (2012) (noting that these factors—commonly
known as the Edgar factors from State v. Edgar, 281 Kan. 30, 36, 127 P.3d 986 [2006]—
establish a sound benchmark); State v. Williams, 290 Kan. 1050, 1053, 236 P.3d 512
(2010). All three factors need not favor the defendant to warrant relief from a plea, and
the district court may consider other relevant circumstances based on the facts of the
particular case. See Garcia, 295 Kan. at 63 (district court not confined to Edgar factors);
Williams, 290 Kan. at 1054 (all of the Edgar factors need not favor defendant; court may
consider other circumstances); State v. Aguilar, 290 Kan. 506, 512-13, 231 P.3d 563
(2010). In assessing the competency of defense counsel, the district court can find
"lackluster" advocacy sufficient to show inadequate representation—a standard
considerably more relaxed than the one for constitutionally deficient representation. See
Aguilar, 290 Kan. at 513.

Because the governing statute expressly affords the district court discretion in
ruling on a defendant's motion to withdraw a plea before sentencing, an appellate court
reviews the determination for abuse of discretion. State v. White, 289 Kan. 279, 284-85,
211 P.3d 805 (2009). A district court may be said to have abused its discretion if the
result reached is "arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable." Unruh v. Purina Mills, 289 Kan.
1185, 1202, 221 P.3d 1130 (2009). That is, no reasonable judicial officer would have
come to the same conclusion if presented with the same record evidence. An abuse of
discretion may also occur if the district court fails to consider or to properly apply
controlling legal standards. State v. Woodward, 288 Kan. 297, 299, 202 P.3d 15 (2009).
A district court errs in that way when its decision "'goes outside the framework of or fails
to properly consider statutory limitations or legal standards.'" 288 Kan. at 299 (quoting
State v. Shopteese, 283 Kan. 331, 340, 153 P.3d 1208 [2007]). Finally, a district court
may abuse its discretion if a factual predicate necessary for the challenged judicial
4

decision lacks substantial support in the record. State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, Syl. ¶ 3,
256 P.3d 801 (2011) (outlining all three bases for an abuse of discretion).

On appeal, Adams says his original trial lawyer did not prepare for trial and, thus,
inadequately represented him. And he says his lawyer made no effort to secure civilian
clothing for him to wear in front of the jury, so when he was presented with the plea offer
the morning of trial, he thought he would have to wear the jail uniform during the trial.
Adams also contends the poor legal representation and lack of civilian attire together
effectively coerced him to accept the plea arrangement.

At the hearing on the motion to withdraw his plea, Adams testified that his
original lawyer met with him just three times before trial. Adams explained that, as a
result, he considered the lawyer insufficiently prepared to try the case properly. He told
the district court his lawyer made comments he construed to indicate her lack of interest
in his case or an unwillingness to advocate effectively for him. Adams also said he
believed he would have to wear the jail uniform in front of the jury. The original lawyer
testified that she actually had met with Adams four times. She said she had two
investigators working on the case and was prepared to go to trial. The lawyer denied
making the comments Adams attributed to her. The district court did not specifically
address that conflict in the evidence. The lawyer also testified she told Adams she would
have civilian clothes for him. The lawyer explained that had the plea failed for some
reason, she had sufficient time to get the clothing to Adams before jury selection would
have begun that afternoon.

On appeal, Adams pitches his argument principally at the first Edgar factor
addressing the competency of counsel and submits the limited number of visits he had
with his original lawyer translates to lack of preparation and, in turn, incompetence. But
we reject that equivalence. There is no direct or automatic correlation between the
number of client meetings and preparedness for trial or overall competence. Here, Adams'
5

lawyer had investigators working on the case. Although there was a lengthy gap between
the early and later meetings Adams had with his original lawyer, an investigator met with
him in between. The investigators also spoke with several potential trial witnesses.

The lawyer secured what looked to be a favorable plea bargain for Adams that
would likely result in his serving less than 3 years in prison as compared to a life
sentence on the initial charge. All of that points toward a competent lawyer doing his or
her job. Adams does not suggest some compelling defense his lawyer left unexplored.
Nor does he identify specific things his lawyer refused to do despite his request or things
his lawyer simply should have done in defending him but didn't. The district court
correctly concluded the limited number of meetings between Adams and his original
lawyer—whether three or four—failed to show inadequate or lackluster representation.

During the plea hearing, the district court inquired of Adams if he knew of any
reason his plea should not be accepted. Adams told the district court he did not. And later
during the hearing, he told the district court he made the decision to plead to the reduced
charge freely and voluntarily. Adams also said he was satisfied with his legal
representation. Those statements cut against the arguments Adams made in the district
court for withdrawing his plea and support the district court's ruling denying the motion.
Adams has never argued he failed to understand the legal implications of the plea to the
reduced charge or the potential sentence he might receive as a result.

We find Adams' argument that he felt coerced into taking the plea agreement
rather than going to trial because he thought he would have no civilian clothing to wear in
front of the jury to be similarly unavailing. Adams said nothing during the plea hearing to
suggest he was coerced in any way and certainly did not specifically mention the lack of
civilian clothing. Likewise, his original lawyer testified at the hearing on the motion that
she had informed Adams he would have civilian clothes for trial. Adams never suggested
he was told otherwise.
6


In ruling on Adams' motion to withdraw the plea, the district court identified and
analyzed the Edgar factors. The district court also made a number of factual findings in
explaining the decision to deny the motion. Those findings appear to be consistent with
the evidence, and Adams does not argue otherwise. In short, the district court understood
the governing legal principles and accurately perceived the relevant record evidence in
reaching its decision. The remaining consideration on appeal is whether that ruling
represents an abuse of discretion because it is so far afield that no reasonable judicial
officer would have come to the same conclusion. We comfortably say the decision fell
within the broad discretion afforded district courts in weighing motions to withdraw pleas
before sentencing.

Adams failed to establish good cause with respect to any of the Edgar factors or
any other considerations bearing on his decision to enter an Alford plea to the reduced
charge. The record evidence shows: Adams' original lawyer adequately represented him
and secured a favorable disposition of the case; Adams was neither coerced nor otherwise
taken advantage of in the plea proceedings; and Adams understood the plea. We discern
no abuse of discretion in the district court's ruling denying the motion to withdraw the
plea.

Affirmed.