State v. Flores

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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 113,807

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

STATE OF KANSAS,
Appellant,

v.

ANGELA FLORES,
Appellee.


MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Reno District Court; TIMOTHY J. CHAMBERS, judge. Opinion filed February 12,
2016. Affirmed.

Keith E. Schroeder, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellant.

Sam S. Kepfield, of Hutchinson, for appellee.

Before GARDNER, P.J., HILL and POWELL, JJ.

POWELL, J.: The State brings this interlocutory appeal challenging the district
court's suppression of Angela Flores' confession to committing arson of her own trailer.
Because we find the State's brief to be so inadequate as to be virtually akin to a failure to
brief the issue and because we agree with the district court's findings that Flores'
confession was not voluntary, we affirm.

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On July 7, 2014, in Hutchinson, the trailer of Angela Flores and her fiancé,
Thomas Morales, Jr., caught on fire. Flores was present at the time of the fire. Early in
the investigation, Flores accused Morales of setting the fire; because of this accusation,
Detective Dean Harcrow of the Hutchinson Police Department requested Flores come to
the police department for questioning and provide the clothes she had on the day of the
fire as evidence. Flores complied and came to the police station with her mother.

The interrogation room was a small room containing a rectangular table. The door
to the room contained a window and was shut during the interrogation; the door remained
unlocked. Harcrow's service weapon was on his hip during the interrogation, and his
badge was on display. Another officer was monitoring the interview room; however,
Harcrow testified the other officer was not standing right outside the door.

Flores' videotaped interrogation began at 11:13 p.m. on the night her trailer burned
down and lasted about an hour and 20 minutes with a 15-minute break. Flores received
no Miranda warnings. Harcrow testified that Flores was initially not a suspect. During
the beginning of the interrogation, Harcrow asked Flores about her relationship with
Morales and what she did the day of the fire. It was revealed that Flores and Morales had
an extensive history of domestic abuse. Thirty minutes into the interrogation Harcrow
directly asked Flores if she started the fire. Flores started sobbing. Harcrow kept
questioning her, insisting all he wanted was the truth. Crying, Flores stated, "I don't want
to talk anymore." However, Harcrow continued the interrogation, stating, "You need to
get everything out right now." Flores continued to cry. Harcrow then said that he was
going to talk to his supervisor and asked Flores if she needed anything, to which she
replied, "I want out of here now" and then chuckled. Harcrow told her that she needed to
stay in the interview room while he talked to his supervisor and then left her alone for
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about 15 minutes. She continued to cry through this break. During the break, Harcrow
spoke with other detectives who talked with Flores' mother and neighbors.

Harcrow returned to the interrogation room and again told Flores that they needed
to be honest with each other so they could "work things out." He told Flores that Morales
could not have started the fire because he was with her mom at the time the fire started.
Harcrow repeatedly asked Flores how the fire started. He then stated, "You aren't going
to jail or anything . . . so don't worry about that." Throughout the questioning, Harcrow
told Flores that he needed the truth in order to be able to get her the help she needed. The
questioning continued, and Flores asked if the officers were still going to take her clothes.
Harcrow answered, "We're going to do that." The questioning became more aggressive at
that point, with Harcrow again asking why she started the fire. The following exchange
occurred:

FLORES: "Stop it! You're trying to trap me again so I'll get fucking arrested."
HARCROW: "No."
FLORES: "I don't want to go to jail."
HARCROW: "I'm not taking you to jail."
FLORES: "Stop it!"
HARCROW: "I'm not taking you to jail. You're going to walk out of here tonight."

During this exchange Flores continued to sob. She then said, "Quit fooling me! If
you're going to lock me up just lock me up." Harcrow again assured Flores that he was
not going to arrest her and then stated, "I just want to know why, that's all I want to
know, and then we can get out of here." At this point Flores confessed. She said that she
was tired of being accused of cheating, being put down, and not being allowed to do
anything.

Harcrow continued to ask more questions about the fire and reassured Flores that
she would not be arrested as she continued to cry. Flores stated she started the fire with a
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lighter. Harcrow again told Flores she would not be arrested then said he was going to
talk to her mom and then she would get out of the interrogation room. As Harcrow left,
Flores sobbed, "Let me go now! I hate being locked up in this room." At the end of the
interrogation, Flores' mother entered the room with a bag of fresh clothes. Three officers
entered the room and gave Flores a brown paper bag in which to put her clothes.

On July 22, 2014, Flores was charged with one count of arson. After multiple
continuances, Flores filed a motion to suppress confession on March 17, 2015. After an
evidentiary hearing the district court judge granted Flores' motion. In his written opinion
the judge stated:

"[T]he Court finds a reasonable person would believe their freedom was deprived during
the interrogation and they were not free to leave.
. . . .
"When Detective Harcrow returned for the second portion of the interrogation
Miranda warnings easily could have been given to the Defendant. Instead, Detective
Harcrow made a decision not to advise the Defendant of her rights. Instead, Detective
Harcrow made a decision he was not going to arrest the Defendant that evening and do so
on a later date believing, as is the State's position, that negated the requirement for
imposition of the requirements of Miranda."

The State timely appeals.

DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN GRANTING THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS?

The standard of review of a district court's decision on a motion to suppress is a
mixed standard. State v. Morton, 286 Kan. 632, 638, 186 P.3d 785 (2008). First, we
review the district court's factual findings to determine whether they are supported by
substantial competent evidence. Second, the ultimate legal conclusion is reviewed using a
de novo standard. In reviewing the factual findings, we do not reweigh the evidence or
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assess the credibility of witnesses. See State v. Gibson, 299 Kan. 207, 215-16, 322 P.3d
389 (2014).

"Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966),
holds that the State may not use statements stemming from a custodial interrogation of a
defendant unless the State demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards to secure the
defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. [Citation omitted.]" State v. Heath, 264
Kan. 557, 590, 957 P.2d 449 (1998).

Miranda warnings are required for custodial interrogations but are not required for
noncustodial questioning. State v. Jacques, 270 Kan. 173, 186, 14 P.3d 409 (2000). "An
objective standard is used to judge whether an interrogation is custodial. The proper
analysis is how a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have understood the
situation." State v. Fritschen, 247 Kan. 592, Syl. ¶ 2, 802 P.2d 558 (1990). This
determination must be made on a case-by-case basis. State v. Torres, 280 Kan. 309, Syl. ¶
3, 121 P.3d 429 (2005). When determining if the interrogation is custodial or
noncustodial,

"[f]actors to be considered . . . include: (1) the interrogation's place and time; (2)
the interrogation's duration; (3) the number of police officers present; (4) the conduct of
the officers and the person subject to the interrogation; (5) the presence or absence of
actual physical restraint or its functional equivalent, such as drawn firearms or a stationed
guard; (6) the status of the person being questioned as a suspect or a witness; (7) whether
the person being questioned was escorted by the police to the interrogation location or
arrived under his or her own power; and (8) the interrogation's result, i.e., whether the
person was ultimately allowed to leave, detained further, or arrested. No one factor
outweighs another, nor do the factors bear equal weight. Every case must be analyzed on
its own particular facts. [Citation omitted.]" State v. Schultz, 289 Kan. 334, 341, 212 P.3d
150 (2009).

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If a defendant does not receive warnings pursuant to Miranda and the
interrogation is held to be a noncustodial interrogation, then the evidence may be
admitted. Conversely, if a defendant does not receive Miranda warnings and the
interrogation is held to be a custodial interrogation, then the evidence must be
suppressed. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d
694 (1966). "'"'The burden of proving that a confession . . . is admissible is on the
prosecution, and the required proof is by a preponderance of the evidence.'"'" State v.
Swanigan, 279 Kan. 18, 23, 106 P.3d 39 (2005) (quoting State v. Sanders, 272 Kan. 445,
452, 33 P.3d 596 [2001], cert. denied 536 U.S. 963 [2002]).

Here, the State, after a perfunctory listing of the factors to consider that we have
noted above, simply states: "These factors, even if established as true, do not necessarily
conclusively establish that the confession was involuntary." The State's argument is
shockingly sparse, especially in light of the fact that it has the burden of proof to show
the confession was admissible. The State provides no argument as to how the confession
was indeed voluntary. We find the State's argument so lacking as to be akin to a failure to
brief the issue, tempting us to dismiss the State's appeal on this basis alone. See State v.
Boleyn, 297 Kan. 610, 633, 303 P.3d 680 (2013) (issue not briefed deemed waived and
abandoned); State v. Llamas, 298 Kan. 246, 264, 311 P.3d 399 (2013) (point raised
incidentally and not argued deemed abandoned).

However, in the interests of justice, we have instead conducted an independent
review of the entire record and have no trouble concluding that the district court was
correct in its determination that Flores' confession was involuntary. The interrogation
took place late at night in a police interrogation room with other police officers nearby.
During the course of the interrogation, the detective's questioning became accusatory and
the detective made multiple promises to Flores that she would not be arrested. The
detective also ignored Flores' multiple requests to leave and cease the interrogation.

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Based on these facts and others in the record, a reasonable person would not have
felt free to leave during this questioning; thus, this was a custodial interrogation. Because
Flores did not receive any Miranda warnings prior to this interrogation, the district
court's findings were supported by substantial competent evidence and the confession
was properly suppressed.

Affirmed.