State v. Garcia

1

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 115,163

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

STATE OF KANSAS,
Appellee,

v.

RICHARD BENJAMIN VELOS GARCIA,
Appellant.


MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Nemaha District Court; JAMES A. PATTON, judge. Opinion filed November 18,
2016. Affirmed.

Caroline M. Zuschek, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.

Brad M. Lippert, county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.

Before BRUNS, P.J., GREEN, J., and WILLIAM S. WOOLLEY, District Judge, assigned.

Per Curiam: Richard Benjamin Velos Garcia appeals the district court's
imposition of lifetime postrelease supervision for his conviction of rape of a child under
the age of 14. Garcia argues that lifetime postrelease supervision constitutes cruel and/or
unusual punishment in violation of § 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights and the
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Based on our review of the record
in light of the factors set forth in State v. Freeman, 223 Kan. 362, 574 P.2d 950 (1978),
and its progeny, we conclude that the district court's imposition of lifetime postrelease
supervision on Garcia did not constitute cruel and/or unusual punishment under either the
Kansas or United States Constitutions. Thus, we affirm.
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FACTS

The underlying facts are not in dispute. In 2008, Garcia pled no contest to raping a
child under the age of 14. Specifically, the State alleged that Garcia had sexual contact—
including sexual intercourse—with his 5-year old niece. In exchange for his plea to the
rape charge, the State agreed to dismiss an aggravated indecent liberties charge against
Garcia.

The district court accepted Garcia's plea and found him guilty on the rape charge.
Subsequently, Garcia filed a motion for downward departure, which was granted by the
district court. Ultimately, he was sentenced to 120 months of prison time, with 36 months
of postrelease supervision.

On October 29, 2015, a hearing was held to determine whether Garcia should be
sentenced to mandatory lifetime postrelease supervision. At the hearing, Garcia
challenged the constitutionality of the statutory requirement. However, the district court
determined that requiring Garcia to undergo lifetime postrelease supervision does not
violate either the Kansas Constitution or the United States Constitution. Accordingly, the
district court corrected Garcia's sentence and imposed the requirement of lifetime
postrelease supervision.

ANALYSIS

The only issue presented on appeal is whether lifetime postrelease supervision—as
applied to him—constitutes cruel and/or unusual punishment. Under Kansas law, a
district court is mandated to impose lifetime postrelease supervision for a conviction of a
"sexually violent crime." See K.S.A. 22-3717(d)(1)(G), (d)(2)(A). A district court's
failure to comply with the lifetime postrelease statute results in an illegal sentence. See
State v. Baber, 44 Kan. App. 2d 748, 753-54, 240 P.3d 980 (2010).
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An illegal sentence can be corrected at any time. K.S.A. 22-3504(1). Here, the
district court was required to correct Garcia's sentence from 36 months' postrelease
supervision to lifetime postrelease supervision, barring a successful claim that such a
sentence constituted cruel and/or unusual punishment in his particular case. See State v.
Ballard, 289 Kan. 1000, 1010-12, 218 P.3d 432 (2009).

Section 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights

Section 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights states: "Excessive bail shall
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishment inflicted."
In Freeman, the Kansas Supreme Court interpreted § 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of
Rights to prohibit punishment "so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted
that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.
[Citations omitted.]" 223 Kan. at 367. The Freeman court established three factors to
weigh when assessing proportionality challenges under § 9:

"(1) The nature of the offense and the character of the offender should be
examined with particular regard to the degree of danger present to society; relevant to this
inquiry are the facts of the crime, the violent or nonviolent nature of the offense, the
extent of culpability for the injury resulting, and the penological purposes of the
prescribed punishment;

"(2) A comparison of the punishment with punishments imposed in this
jurisdiction for more serious offenses, and if among them are found more serious crimes
punished less severely than the offense in question the challenged penalty is to that extent
suspect; and

"(3) A comparison of the penalty with punishments in other jurisdictions for the
same offense." 223 Kan. at 367.

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No one factor controls. State v. Mossman, 294 Kan. 901, 908, 281 P.3d 153
(2012). While one consideration "'may weigh so heavily that it directs the final
conclusion,'" each part of the test should be given consideration. 294 Kan. at 908 (quoting
State v. Ortega-Cadelan, 287 Kan. 157, 161, 194 P.3d 1195 [2008]). A challenge to the
proportionality of a sentence is necessarily a factual inquiry. 294 Kan. at 908 (quoting
Ortega-Cadelan, 287 Kan. at 161).

Determining whether a sentence constitutes cruel or unusual punishment under § 9
of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights requires a court to make legal and factual
determinations. State v. Funk, 301 Kan. 925, 933, 349 P.3d 1230 (2015). When a case-
specific cruel or unusual punishment decision is appealed, this court reviews the district
court's factual findings for substantial competent evidence. 301 Kan. at 933. The district
court's legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. 301 Kan. at 933.

First Freeman Factor

The first Freeman factor requires us to evaluate the nature of Garcia's offense and
his character. See Freeman, 223 Kan. at 367. Specifically, we must consider the degree
of danger presented to society by Garcia. See 223 Kan. at 367. This requires us to
evaluate the facts of the case, whether Garcia's crime was violent or nonviolent, the
culpability for any injuries that occurred through his crime, and the penological purposes
of his punishment imposed. See 223 Kan. at 367.

This factor is "inherentl factual, requiring examination of the facts of the crime
and the particular characteristics of the defendant." Ortega-Cadelan, 287 Kan. at 161.
The district court found rape of a child under the age of 14 poses a great danger to society
and is "highly significant to the level of punishment and control necessary for anyone
being convicted of that offense." The district court further found there is a significant
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"penological" purpose of a significant penalty for rape, and the court noted the offense is
of the highest severity level. We agree.

Garcia argues that this factor weighs in his favor because there was only one
victim, he cooperated with law enforcement officers, and he expressed remorse over his
actions. He also argues the fact that the district court granted him a downward departure
demonstrates that the nature of his crime and his character make the imposition of
lifetime postrelease supervision cruel and/or unusual. In support of his argument, Garcia
cites State v. Proctor, 47 Kan. App. 2d 889, Syl., 280 P.3d 839 (2012), in which a panel
of this court held that imposing lifetime postrelease supervision on a defendant for
aggravated indecent solicitation of a child would be constitutionally improper due to his
age and his negligible criminal history. 47 Kan. App. 2d. at 937-38; see State v. Proctor,
No. 104,697, 2013 WL 6726286 (Kan. App. 2013) (unpublished opinion).

While the defendant in Proctor was 19 years old and the victim was 12 years old,
Garcia was 26 years old and the victim was his 5-year-old niece. In other words, while
the defendant was 7 years older than the victim in the Proctor case, Garcia was 21 years
older than the victim in this case. Furthermore, while the defendant in Proctor was
convicted of aggravated indecent solicitation of a child—a severity level 5 person
felony—and two counts of lewd and lascivious behavior—severity level 9 person
felonies, Garcia was convicted of raping his young niece—a severity level 1 person
felony. Moreover, as the State points out, Proctor received probation while Garcia
received a significant prison sentence.

As emphasized by the Kansas Supreme Court in State v. Mossman, 294 Kan. 901,
281 P.3d 153 (2012), lifetime postrelease supervision serves multiple penological
purposes—including retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. 294 Kan.
at 911-12. These considerations are relevant in this case because lifetime postrelease
supervision will help to ensure that Garcia does not reoffend when he is released from
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prison by requiring that he maintain contact with his supervising officer. Lifetime
postrelease supervision also supports rehabilitation by providing Garcia with the
opportunity to successfully reenter society as long as he is complies with the conditions
of his release. Finally, lifetime postrelease supervision serves as punishment and
retribution for Garcia's conduct in raping his young niece.

Accordingly, we find that there was substantial competent evidence to support the
district court's findings under the first Freeman factor. Based on the serious nature of
Garcia's crime, the devastating emotional and psychological injuries he inflicted on his 5-
year-old niece, his character—including the possibility that he may reoffend in the future,
and the penological purposes served by lifetime postrelease supervision, we conclude that
the first Freeman factor weighs in favor of imposition of lifetime postrelease supervision
in Garcia's case.

Second Freeman Factor

The second Freeman factor requires us to compare Garcia's punishment with the
punishment imposed in this state for more serious crimes. See Freeman, 223 Kan. at 367.
Garcia argues that this factor weighs in his favor because sentences for second-degree
murder and other serious crimes do not include a requirement of lifetime postrelease
supervision. Thus, according to Garcia, a defendant convicted of any of these offenses
would eventually complete his or her sentence while Garcia will never receive a release
from supervision.

We reject the contention that the crimes listed by Garcia are "more serious" than
raping a child—a severity level 1 crime. In fact, most of the crimes listed by Garcia in his
brief as being more serious crimes are also severity level 1 offenses. Accordingly, the
crime of raping a child is just as serious a crime as intentional second-degree murder,
aggravated kidnapping, aggravated trafficking, and terrorism.
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It is important to note that the Kansas Supreme Court has previously rejected
attempts to focus on the potential consequences of violating lifetime postrelease
supervision in the future, finding that such consequences are a separate issue from the
question of disproportionality. See Mossman, 294 Kan. at 914-17. Moreover, our
Supreme Court has rejected attempts under the second Freeman factor to focus on the
length of postrelease supervision and instead has looked to the total length of the
sentence, including actual incarceration. Mossman, 294 Kan. at 912-13; State v.
Cameron, 294 Kan. 884, 893, 281 P.3d 143 (2012). For example, in Cameron, our
Supreme Court explicitly compared a sentence for a sexually violent crime—including
lifetime postrelease supervision—to the sentence for second-degree murder, including the
36-month postrelease supervision term, and stated:

"[W]hile a defendant subject to lifetime postrelease supervision is under a longer
cumulative sentence than a defendant sentenced for second-degree murder, a 'sentence to
lifetime postrelease supervision [for a sexually violent offense] is not grossly
disproportionate in relation to the sentence applicable to second-degree murder in Kansas
when we consider the penological purposes, the seriousness of the crime, and the other
concerns discussed in relation to the first Freeman factor.' [Citation omitted.]" 294 Kan.
at 893.

Based on the analysis in Mossman and Cameron, we conclude that the imposition
of lifetime postrelease supervision for the crime of rape of a child under 14 years of age
is not grossly disproportionate to the sentence imposed for other offenses in Kansas.
Accordingly, the second Freeman factor does not weigh in Garcia's favor.

Third Freeman Factor

The third Freeman factor requires this court to compare Garcia's punishment with
the punishment that other states impose for the same offense. See Freeman, 223 Kan. at
367. Garcia argues that this factor weighs in favor of finding his sentence
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unconstitutional because Kansas' mandatory imposition of lifetime postrelease
supervision for a conviction of a sex offense "is the harshest and most severe in the
country." He points to the fact that "many other states" allow offenders to be released
from postrelease supervision upon meeting certain criteria.

In Mossman, the Kansas Supreme Court addressed a similar argument. In doing
so, it found:

"[L]ess than half of states provide for lifetime postrelease supervision of some or all sex
offenders and, because several states have a mechanism for termination of the postrelease
supervision under certain conditions, only a handful of states impose punishment as
absolute as Kansas' requirement. Nevertheless, Kansas is not alone in imposing
mandatory lifetime postrelease supervision for crimes such as [aggravated indecent
liberties with a child], and we are not aware of any court that has found lifetime
postrelease supervision of a violent sex offender to be cruel and unusual punishment."
Mossman, 294 Kan. at 920.

The same rationale was used in Cameron, 294 Kan. at 894-95, and in Funk, 301
Kan. at 942. In the present case, Garcia does not offer any new arguments to invite
reconsideration. As such, there is no need to reevaluate this factor. See State v. Ross, 295
Kan. 424, 428, 284 P.3d 309 (2012). Thus, we conclude that the third Freeman factor
does not weigh in Garcia's favor.

Eighth Amendment Claim

Garcia's brief argues in passing that imposing lifetime postrelease supervision on
him also violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. However, he
provides no separate analysis for his Eighth Amendment challenge. Generally, a point
merely raised incidentally in a brief is deemed abandoned. State v. Llamas, 298 Kan. 246,
264, 311 P.3d 399 (2013). Nevertheless, we will briefly address whether Garcia is
entitled to relief under the Eighth Amendment.
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The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
"[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted." The United States Supreme Court has found that "[t]he concept of
proportionality is central to the Eighth Amendment. Embodied in the Constitution's ban
on cruel and unusual punishments is the 'precept of justice that punishment for crime
should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.'" Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48,
59, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010).

In State v. Gomez, 290 Kan. 858, Syl. ¶ 5, 235 P.3d 1203 (2010), the Kansas
Supreme Court looked to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Graham in
laying the framework for analyzing Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment
challenges and stated:

"In conducting an Eighth Amendment analysis to determine whether a sentence
for a term of years is grossly disproportionate for a particular defendant's crime, a court
must begin by comparing the gravity of the offense and the severity of the sentence. This
analysis can consider a particular offender's mental state and motive in committing the
crime, the actual harm caused to the victim or to society by the offender's conduct, any
prior criminal history, and a particular offender's propensity for violence. In the rare case
in which this threshold comparison leads to an inference of gross disproportionality, the
court should then compare the defendant's sentence with the sentences received by other
offenders in the same jurisdiction and with the sentences imposed for the same crime in
other jurisdictions. If this comparative analysis validates an initial judgment that the
sentence is grossly disproportionate, the sentence is cruel and unusual."

For the reasons we have previously stated, the first Freeman factor weighs in favor
of imposition of lifetime postrelease supervision in this case. Furthermore, in comparing
the gravity of Garcia's offense with the severity of the sentence does not result in an
inference of gross disproportionality. Because Garcia fails to satisfy the threshold test for
determining whether a sentence is cruel and unusual punishment, further consideration of
his case-specific Eighth Amendment claim is unnecessary.
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Summary

In summary, after considering each of the Freeman factors, we find that the
district court's imposition of lifetime postrelease supervision was not so disproportionate
to Garcia's conviction that "it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of
human dignity." See Freeman, 223 Kan. at 367. Accordingly, we conclude that Garcia's
sentence to lifetime postrelease supervision does not constitute cruel or unusual
punishment in violation of § 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. Likewise, we
conclude that Garcia's sentence of lifetime postrelease supervision does not violate the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. We, therefore,
affirm Garcia's sentence.

Affirmed.