State v. Mathews-Buckley

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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 120,585

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

STATE OF KANSAS,
Appellee,

v.

DAISY MATHEWS-BUCKLEY,
Appellant.


MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Harvey District Court; MARILYN M. WILDER, judge. Opinion filed November 15,
2019. Affirmed.

Submitted for summary disposition pursuant to K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6820(g) and (h).

Before ARNOLD-BURGER, C.J., PIERRON and STANDRIDGE, JJ.

PER CURIAM: Daisy Mathews-Buckley appeals the district court's decision to
revoke her probation. We granted Mathews-Buckley's motion for summary disposition
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 7.041A (2019 Kan. S. Ct. R. 47). After a complete
review of the record, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

After a bench trial on stipulated facts, the district court found Mathews-Buckley
guilty of trafficking contraband in a correctional facility, unlawful possession of
methamphetamine, possession of drug paraphernalia, and no proof of insurance. Because
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of her criminal history score of F, Mathews-Buckley faced a presumptive sentence. See
K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 21-6804(a).

Based on an agreement between the parties, the State joined Mathews-Buckley in
asking for a dispositional departure to probation. The court followed the recommendation
of the parties and sentenced Mathews-Buckley to a controlling term of 55 months
imprisonment but granted her probation. The court granted Mathews-Buckley's motion
for departure based on her pregnancy, need to care for her young children, and
amenability to probation.

Less than four months later, Mathews-Buckley admitted that while on probation
she used marijuana and methamphetamine, attempted to tamper with a drug test,
associated with individuals who possessed methamphetamine, was unsuccessfully
discharged from a drug treatment program, and failed to report to her probation officer as
required.

The district court revoked Mathews-Buckley's probation and ordered her to serve a
modified sentence of 36 months' imprisonment. In revoking her probation, the district
court reasoned that prison was a better option for her safety and the safety of her unborn
child. Mathews-Buckley timely appealed the revocation of her probation.

ANALYSIS

Mathews-Buckley acknowledges that the district court had the discretion to revoke
her probation under the circumstances. See K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 22-3716(c)(9)(B) (district
court may revoke probation without intermediate sanctions if probation assignment was
originally granted as a result of a dispositional departure).

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Once a probation violation has been established, the decision to revoke probation
is within the sound discretion of the district court. See State v. Skolaut, 286 Kan. 219,
227-28, 182 P.3d 1231 (2008). Judicial discretion is abused if the action "(1) is arbitrary,
fanciful, or unreasonable, i.e., if no reasonable person would have taken the view adopted
by the trial court; (2) is based on an error of law, . . . ; or (3) is based on an error of fact."
State v. Jones, 306 Kan. 948, Syl. ¶ 7, 398 P.3d 856 (2017). Mathews-Buckley bears the
burden to show an abuse of discretion by the district court. See State v. Rojas-Marceleno,
295 Kan. 525, 531, 285 P.3d 361 (2012).

Mathews-Buckley does not argue the district court's decision was based on an
error of law or an error of fact. Instead, she asserts the district court's decision was
unreasonable. Her argument is unpersuasive. Mathews-Buckley violated her probation
shortly after sentencing. She was given a dispositional departure from a presumptive
prison sentence so she could care for her child and her pregnancy. Her violations
included using methamphetamine, associating with people who possesses
methamphetamine, failing to complete drug treatment, failing to report to her probation
officer and attempting to tamper with a drug test. All of the violations, to which she
stipulated, were in direct conflict with the reasons she was given a departure to begin
with—to care for her child and her pregnancy. Mathews-Buckley fails to meet her burden
to show that no reasonable person would have taken the view adopted by the district
court. See 295 Kan. at 531.

Affirmed.