State v. Tannahill

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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 116,045

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

STATE OF KANSAS,
Appellee,

v.

WILBUR J. TANNAHILL,
Appellant.


MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Butler District Court; MICHAEL E. WARD, judge. Opinion filed February 24, 2017.
Affirmed.

Submitted for summary disposition pursuant to K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 21-6820(g) and (h).

Before MALONE, P.J., LEBEN and POWELL, JJ.

Per Curiam: Wilbur J. Tannahill appeals the district court's decision denying his
motion to correct illegal sentence. We granted Tannahill's motion for summary
disposition in lieu of briefs pursuant to Kansas Supreme Court Rule 7.041A (Kan. S. Ct.
R. 48). The State has filed no response.

On November 20, 2007, Tannahill was found guilty after a jury trial of aggravated
indecent liberties with a child. On January 7, 2008, the district court sentenced Tannahill
to 154 months' imprisonment. Tannahill's conviction was affirmed by this court in State
v. Tannahill, No. 100,288, 2010 WL 198484 (Kan. App. 2010) (unpublished opinion).
The Kansas Supreme Court denied Tannahill's petition for review on March 31, 2010.

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On January 27, 2016, Tannahill filed a pro se motion to correct illegal sentence
pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3504. In the motion, Tannahill alleged that his sentence was illegal
because neither the Kansas Constitution nor the legislature had vested the district court
with subject matter jurisdiction to sentence him. On February 11, 2016, the district court
summarily denied Tannahill's motion, specifically finding that K.S.A. 22-2601 conferred
subject matter jurisdiction on the district court. Tannahill timely appealed.

On appeal, Tannahill again claims that the district court "lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to impose a sentence on [him]." Whether jurisdiction exists is a question of
law over which an appellate court's scope of review is unlimited. State v. Dull, 302 Kan.
32, 61, 351 P.3d 641 (2015).

Article 3 § 6(b) of the Kansas Constitution provides that district courts shall have
such jurisdiction in their respective districts as may be provided by law. K.S.A. 20-301
provides that each county shall have a district court of record which shall have original
jurisdiction of all matters both civil and criminal, unless otherwise provided by law.
Moreover, as found by the district court in denying Tannahill's motion, K.S.A. 22-2601
confers subject matter jurisdiction on the district courts to try all felony and other
criminal cases arising under the statutes of the State of Kansas. Finally, K.S.A. 22-3424
authorizes the district court to render judgment and impose sentence in criminal cases.

Tannahill cites State v. Hall, 246 Kan. 728, 757, 793 P.3d 737 (1990), overruled
on other grounds by State v. Dunn, 304 Kan. 773, 375 P.3d 332 (2016), but this case
actually refutes his claim. In Hall, the Kansas Supreme Court stated: "Subject matter
jurisdiction lies in the district court and follows the defendant through the process of the
issuing of the complaint, arrest pursuant to a warrant, initial appearance, the setting or
denial of bond at the bond hearing, and the preliminary hearing, arraignment, and trial."
246 Kan. at 757. Moreover, as Tannahill acknowledges in his motion for summary
disposition, State v. Keel, 302 Kan. 560, 573-74, 357 P.3d 251 (2015), stands for the
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general proposition that the legislature intended district courts to have the authority to
sentence persons convicted of a felony. Clearly, the district court was vested with subject
matter jurisdiction to convict Tannahill of aggravated indecent liberties with a child and
to sentence him for this crime. We conclude the district court did not err in summarily
denying Tannahill's motion to correct illegal sentence.

Affirmed.