State v. Thaxton

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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

No. 117,965

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

STATE OF KANSAS,
Appellee,

v.

CURTIS ANTHONY THAXTON,
Appellant.


MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Wyandotte District Court; WESLEY K. GRIFFIN, judge. Opinion filed August 10,
2018. Affirmed.

Carol Longenecker Schmidt, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.

Nicholas Campbell, assistant district attorney, Mark A. Dupree Sr., district attorney, and Derek
Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.

Before BUSER, P.J., MALONE and STANDRIDGE, JJ.

PER CURIAM: Curtis Anthony Thaxton appeals following his convictions of
possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia. Thaxton claims:
(1) the district court abused its discretion in denying defense counsel's requests to remove
four prospective jurors for cause during jury selection; (2) the district court erred in
instructing the jury in a manner that discouraged it from exercising its power of
nullification; and (3) the district court violated Thaxton's constitutional rights when it
increased his sentence based upon his prior criminal history, without requiring the State
to prove the criminal history to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Thaxton's jury selection
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claim does not require reversal because he has failed to show prejudice, and his other two
claims are meritless. Thus, we affirm the district court's judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 28, 2016, Brandy Blomgren reported to the police that someone had
stolen her 1999 Ford Explorer from the driveway in front of her house. Blomgren saw her
car drive down the street away from her house, but she did not see who was driving it.
About two weeks later, on February 11, 2016, Kansas City Police Officer Michael
Moulin was on patrol at night when he saw a Ford Explorer stopped on the side of the
street with a man, later identified as Thaxton, passed out in the driver's seat. Moulin
pulled up behind the Explorer and ran the vehicle's 60-day license tag. As the tag was
registered to a Mazda, Moulin believed that the Ford Explorer was possibly stolen.

Moulin eventually arrested Thaxton for suspicion of driving under the influence.
Moulin searched Thaxton and found a glass pipe and methamphetamine, confirmed by
field tests. Another officer ran the Ford Explorer's vehicle identification number and
discovered that the vehicle had been reported stolen.

On February 12, 2016, the State charged Thaxton with vehicle theft, possession of
methamphetamine, and possession of drug paraphernalia. The district court held a two-
day jury trial beginning on February 13, 2017. During jury selection, Thaxton's counsel
requested the removal of four prospective jurors for cause because they expressed
difficulty being fair in a drug case, but the district court denied each request. Thaxton
ultimately struck three of the four prospective jurors with his peremptory challenges, but
one of the challenged jurors remained on the jury.

Thaxton testified at trial as the only defense witness. He testified that he bought
the Ford Explorer from Bradley Gattis without knowing that it was stolen. Thaxton
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testified that he switched the tag so that he could drive the vehicle until it was properly
registered, not because he was trying to conceal the fact that it was stolen. He also
testified that he was not holding any drugs or a pipe. Thaxton argued to the jury that he
never knew the vehicle was stolen, thus lacking the culpable mental state of theft, and
that the officers planted the methamphetamine and the pipe.

The jury found Thaxton guilty of possession of methamphetamine and drug
paraphernalia but failed to reach a verdict on theft. The State later dismissed the theft
charge. On May 26, 2017, the district court sentenced Thaxton to a controlling term of 13
months' imprisonment and granted 18 months' probation. Thaxton timely appealed.

JURY SELECTION

Thaxton first claims the district court abused its discretion in denying defense
counsel's requests to remove four prospective jurors for cause during jury selection. Each
prospective juror stated that they would have difficulty being fair in a drug case because
of personal or family experiences. Thaxton ultimately struck three of the four prospective
jurors with his peremptory challenges, but one of the challenged jurors remained on the
jury. Thaxton cites Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 107 S. Ct. 2045, 95 L. Ed. 2d 622
(1987), a death penalty case, to support his claim that the district court's error must result
in the reversal of his convictions.

The State contends that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
challenges for cause. Alternatively, the State argues that even if the district court abused
its discretion in not striking the challenged jurors, Thaxton's convictions should not be
reversed because he has not made the required showing of prejudice.

The purpose of jury selection is to enable the parties to select jurors who are
competent to serve without bias, prejudice, or partiality. K.S.A. 22-3410(2)(i) states that a
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juror may be challenged for cause if his or her "state of mind with reference to the case or
any of the parties is such that the court determines there is doubt that he can act
impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of any party." In addition to
challenges for cause, each party in this case controlled six peremptory challenges, to be
used at their discretion. See K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 22-3412(a)(2)(C). A peremptory
challenge permits a party to strike a prospective juror, without cause, believed to be
partial to the other side. State v. Hill, 290 Kan. 339, 359-60, 228 P.3d 1027 (2010).

Generally, the nature and scope of jury selection is left to the sound discretion of
the district court. State v. Woods, 301 Kan. 852, 870, 348 P.3d 583 (2015). A judicial
action constitutes an abuse of discretion if (1) no reasonable person would take the view
adopted by the district court; (2) the action is based on an error of law; or (3) the action is
based on an error of fact. State v. Marshall, 303 Kan. 438, 445, 362 P.3d 587 (2015).
Even if the district court abuses its discretion in denying a defendant's challenge of a
prospective juror for cause, the failure to excuse a juror for cause does not constitute a
ground for reversal unless the defendant can show that he or she was prejudiced by the
district court's action. State v. Heath, 264 Kan. 557, 587, 957 P.2d 449 (1998).

Thaxton's counsel challenged four prospective jurors who stated they would have
difficulty being fair in a drug case because of personal or family experiences. We will set
forth the relevant testimony of each prospective juror. During the prosecutor's
examination, prospective juror 33 spoke privately with the judge at the bench:

"[Prospective juror 33]: My sister is a recovering drug addict and I have—I
believe that this is going to be a very fair trial. But, sir, my sister stole from family, from
others and I don't believe that it would be in the best interest for me to actually be
involved in this because I would do my best to be as impartial as I could be and to try to
hear everything there, but I believe that it would color my ability to be able to be an
effective and impartial juror. What I would like to ask although is—and I'm more than
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happy to serve on a jury, I have no issue with serving on juries, but it needs to not be a
drug case. I'm not trying to be difficult.
. . . .
"[Prospective juror 33]: I understand. Just me and drug cases would not be a
good mix, but I am more than happy to serve.
"THE COURT: I understand. Let me just make sure one thing.
"[Prospective juror 33]: Yes, sir.
"THE COURT: Obviously this has nothing to do with your sister.
"[Prospective juror 33]: Right.
"THE COURT: And again, I appreciate your honesty. But do you think you
would be able to set aside—and this is difficult—set aside your personal beliefs and
personal life and thoughts and be able to reach a decision based solely on the evidence
that comes from the witness stand?
"[Prospective juror 33]: I could do my best, sir, and I would be happy to do that
if you requested that. I have not heard all the evidence.
"THE COURT: Haven't heard any.
"[Prospective juror 33]: And so I just don't want to get into a situation where I
mean this is raw for me, sir.
"THE COURT: Appreciate it. Appreciate your honesty.
"[Prospective juror 33]: But I am more than happy—if you say, no, I want you to
go further, I'm pretty sure you would be in 10 seconds later going he's off the list.
"THE COURT: Well, we'll—
"[Prospective juror 33]: But I'm willing to stay in, but thought you should know.
"THE COURT: No, that's exactly—
"[Prospective juror 33]: I appreciate it, sir. Thank you.
"THE COURT: I'm going to have you stay though. You stay.
"[Prospective juror 33]: I'll stay.
"THE COURT: Correct."

Also during the prosecutor's examination, prospective juror 15 spoke privately
with the judge at the bench:

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"[Prospective juror 15]: Well, a few years back I had my car broken into and
they stole my cell phone. I made a police report and police had asked me to meet them
near the person's home because the person contacted me stating, well, I found your
phone. And the police said that this person, that's what they did to try to get money from
the person as kind of a reward situation. We went to the location, I knocked on the door,
they knew she was in there, she wouldn't answer the door. Of course they wanted inside.
"THE COURT: Right.
"[Prospective juror 15]: And they never did do anything about it, they could
never catch her.
"THE COURT: Okay.
"[Prospective juror 15]: So it's very frustrating.
"THE COURT: Understandably. Well, and obviously that's nothing to do with
Mr. Thaxton here.
"[Prospective juror 15]: Correct.
"THE COURT: Do you think you'd be able to set aside what happened to you
and your personal what you've lived with over those years and rely just on the evidence
that comes from this witness stand and then I'm going to give you the law to apply to the
evidence?
"[Prospective juror 15]: I would certainly try, but the fact that it was such an
invasion of privacy and he stole her car, which is a horrible invasion of privacy, I would
try, but I'm not sure I could listen."

During defense counsel's examination, in response to a general question about
whether the panel members could be impartial in a drug trial, prospective juror 10
answered: "Relatives of my wife that are very badly into drugs and it's affecting the
family greatly and has been for years and I would attempt to put that aside, but not gonna
lie, it affects me greatly." Prospective juror 10 ultimately remained on the jury.

Finally, during defense counsel's examination, prospective juror 12 spoke
privately with the judge at the bench:

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"[Prospective juror 12]: My next door neighbor, his . . . former next door
neighbor has been—had been involved with methamphetamines, the production of it, and
got arrested and put in jail for the use of it. It just caused a lot of havoc in our
neighborhood, had to deal with a lot of the police, times the police showing up and
disrupting late at night, couldn't really be out front because we didn't know who was
going to be showing up to do things, strange people in the neighborhood. So I'm just kind
of really—preconceived notion of against it.
"THE COURT: That type of situation?
"[Prospective juror 12]: Yes.
"THE COURT: Well, obviously Mr. Thaxton was not involved with that. Do
you think—and this is a difficult question that I ask—but do you think that you could set
aside your personal belief and rely only on the evidence that comes from the witness
stand here—
"[Prospective juror 12]: Uh-huh.
"THE COURT: —and the law that the court will provide to you to apply to those
facts, do you think you'll be able to set aside any preconceived ideas?
"[Prospective juror 12]: It's really if you have—
"THE COURT: It is tough. I agree.
"[Prospective juror 12]: I think I could keep an open mind to it and everything.
"THE COURT: Okay. That's all we can ask for."

Based on their personal or family experiences, the four prospective jurors each
expressed some doubt about whether they could be impartial in a drug case. Prospective
juror 33 ultimately stated that he would do his best to be fair and was willing to stay on
the jury. Likewise, prospective juror 12 ultimately stated that he could keep an open
mind. Prospective juror 15 ultimately stated: "I would try [to be fair], but I'm not sure I
could listen." Prospective juror 10, who remained on the jury, stated that he would try to
put his family experiences aside but that it "affects me greatly."

Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Thaxton's challenges for
cause presents a close question, especially as to prospective jurors 10 and 15. In the end,
we make no finding on whether the district court abused its discretion because Thaxton
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has failed to show the prejudice required for this court to reverse his convictions. Thaxton
ultimately struck three of the four prospective jurors with his peremptory challenges. To
establish prejudice when the district court refuses to strike a prospective juror for cause,
but the prospective juror is removed by a peremptory challenge, defendants must show
that they would have used the wasted peremptory challenge to strike an objectionable
juror that served on the jury. Heath, 264 Kan. at 588; State v. Matei, No. 110,003, 2015
WL 249680, at *3 (Kan. App. 2015) (unpublished opinion). Thaxton makes no attempt to
establish this level of prejudice, as he points to no other person who served on the jury
that he would have stricken given more peremptory challenges.

Prospective juror 10 remained on the jury, even though Thaxton could have
removed this juror with a peremptory challenge. To establish prejudice when the district
court refuses to strike a prospective juror for cause, and the prospective juror sits on the
jury, defendants must demonstrate that using a peremptory strike on that particular juror
would have forced them to accept other objectionable jurors. State v. Mayberry, 248 Kan.
369, 382, 807 P.2d 86 (1991); Matei, 2015 WL 249680, at *3. Again, Thaxton makes no
attempt to show this level of prejudice. Thaxton could have removed prospective juror 10
with a peremptory challenge, and he fails to demonstrate that using a peremptory strike
on prospective juror 10 would have forced him to accept another objectionable juror.

Thaxton cites Gray v. Mississippi to try to bypass the prejudice requirements
established by Kansas caselaw. In that case, the United States Supreme Court reversed a
death sentence because the district court erroneously excluded a qualified juror from the
panel. In doing so, the Court determined that the traditional harmless error tests did not
apply in a death penalty case and reversal was required due to the error. 481 U.S. at 667-
68. Gray is distinguishable simply because it is a death penalty case. Here, we decline to
reverse Thaxton's convictions based on the district court's potential errors in the jury
selection process because Thaxton has failed to show the required prejudice.

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JURY INSTRUCTIONS

Next, Thaxton claims the district court erred in instructing the jury in a manner
that discouraged it from exercising its power of nullification. Thaxton objects to the
district court's preliminary instruction: "It is my duty to instruct you in the law that
applies to this case, and it is your duty to consider and follow all of the instructions. You
must decide the case by applying these instructions to the facts as you find them." He also
objects to the language in instruction number five: "If you have no reasonable doubt as
to the truth of each of the claims required to be proved by the State, you should find the
defendant guilty."

For jury instruction issues, the progression of analysis and corresponding
standards of review on appeal are:

"'(1) First, the appellate court should consider the reviewability of the issue from
both jurisdiction and preservation viewpoints, exercising an unlimited standard of review;
(2) next, the court should use an unlimited review to determine whether the instruction
was legally appropriate; (3) then, the court should determine whether there was sufficient
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant or the requesting party, that
would have supported the instruction; and (4) finally, if the district court erred, the
appellate court must determine whether the error was harmless, utilizing the test and
degree of certainty set forth in State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert.
denied 565 U.S. 1221 (2012).' [Citation omitted.]" State v. Williams, 303 Kan. 585, 598-
99, 363 P.3d 1101 (2016).

Thaxton failed to object to either instruction at trial. By failing to object, this court
will not reverse Thaxton's convictions unless these instructions were clearly erroneous.
State v. Cameron, 300 Kan. 384, 389, 329 P.3d 1158 (2014).

In Kansas, juries possess the power to decide a case in a manner which is contrary
to the applicable facts and law, i.e., the power of jury nullification. But a defendant is not
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entitled to have the jury instructed on the power of nullification. State v. Naputi, 293 Kan.
55, Syl. ¶ 4, 260 P.3d 86 (2011). Our Supreme Court has held that trial courts are
prohibited from instructing jurors that if they have no reasonable doubt, they must or will
find the defendant guilty. State v. Smith-Parker, 301 Kan. 132, 164, 340 P.3d 485 (2014).

But using the word should is a different story. This court has rejected Thaxton's
argument about the reasonable doubt instruction in several opinions. See State v. Allen,
52 Kan. App. 2d 729, 735, 372 P.3d 432 (2016), rev. denied 306 Kan. 1320 (2017); State
v. Trotter, No. 114,743, 2017 WL 3668908, at *3-5 (Kan. App. 2017) (unpublished
opinion), rev. denied 307 Kan. 993 (2018); State v. Ulmer, No. 114,315, 2016 WL
7428362, at *8-9 (Kan. App. 2016) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 306 Kan. 1330
(2017); State v. Cuellar, No. 112,535, 2016 WL 1614037, at *1-2 (Kan. App. 2016)
(unpublished opinion), rev. denied 306 Kan. 1322 (2017); State v. Hastings, No. 112,222,
2016 WL 852857, at *4-5 (Kan. App. 2016) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 306 Kan.
1324 (2017); State v. Singleton, No. 112,997, 2016 WL 368083, at *4-6 (Kan. App.
2016) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 305 Kan. 1257. We adopt the reasoning of these
decisions and reject Thaxton's argument about instruction number five.

Likewise, the district court's preliminary instruction that the jury must follow the
court's instructions is a correct statement of the law. See K.S.A. 22-3403(3). This
preliminary instruction is found at PIK Crim. 4th 50.040 (2012 Supp.). Our Supreme
Court strongly recommends that trial courts use PIK instructions. See State v. Barber,
302 Kan. 367, 377-78, 353 P.3d 1108 (2015). The district court's preliminary instruction
at Thaxton's trial was not erroneous.

SENTENCING ISSUE

Finally, Thaxton claims the district court violated his constitutional rights when it
increased his sentence based upon his prior criminal history without requiring the State to
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prove the criminal history to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Thaxton acknowledges
that the Kansas Supreme Court has rejected this argument in State v. Ivory, 273 Kan. 44,
46-48, 41 P.3d 781 (2002). The Court of Appeals is duty bound to follow Kansas
Supreme Court precedent absent some indication the Supreme Court is departing from its
previous position. State v. Meyer, 51 Kan. App. 2d 1066, 1072, 360 P.3d 467 (2015).
There is no indication that our Supreme Court is departing from its holding in Ivory.

Affirmed.