TOPEKA—The Supreme Court today upheld the kidnapping and murder convictions of Kimberly Sharp, one of four defendants found guilty for the brutal killing of David Owen, a Topeka man who used unconventional methods to advocate for the homeless.
A police canine search team found Owen's decomposing body in a heavily wooded area on the north bank of the Kansas River near downtown Topeka July 2, 2006. Trial testimony indicated he was tied to a tree, kicked in the head, and left to die approximately two weeks earlier following an encounter at a homeless campsite on the river bank. Owen was known to offer the use of his phone cards and cell phones to homeless persons to call their loved ones. He also tried to force them to return to their families by destroying their camps and taking their equipment and supplies.
Today's decision upheld Sharp's felony murder and kidnapping convictions for her involvement with Charles Hollingsworth and Carl Lee Baker in Owen's death. The charges against the fourth defendant, John Cornell, were reduced by the prosecutor to involuntary manslaughter and kidnapping in exchange for his guilty plea and testimony against the other three defendants. Sharp was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for 20 years for the murder and 61 months' imprisonment for kidnapping.
Justice Lawton R. Nuss, writing for the majority in today's 6-1 decision, said former Shawnee County District Judge Thomas R. Conklin did not err in denying Sharp's motion to suppress her confession, in limiting the defense questioning of Cornell, or in admitting into evidence statements from codefendants Hollingsworth and Baker under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule. The Court also rejected Sharp's contention that she should be granted a new trial as a result of cumulative error.
Justice Nuss wrote in the Court's decision:
"Sharp argues that her confession should have been suppressed because it was involuntary and unreliable. She primarily argues that her confession, including her re-enactment at the crime scene, was exchanged for an 'explicit promise of leniency.' Specifically, Sharp contends that [the police detective] promised her she would not go to jail in connection with Owen's murder and this promise, combined with his assurances that he would help her and her children, as well as her 'particularly vulnerable position,' all worked to overcome her will."
Sharp contended that her "particularly vulnerable position" consisted of being "young, homeless, recently divorced, with two small children."
In rejecting her confession argument, the Court ruled that Judge Conklin's finding–that Sharp was not under coercion or operating under any law enforcement promises–was sufficiently supported by the evidence. It then concluded, based upon all the circumstances, that Sharp had failed to show that the detective had unfairly deprived her of "her free and independent will."
Justice Lee A. Johnson, however, dissented from the majority's determination that all of Sharp's statements were the product of her free and independent will. He said the Court should look at Sharp's interrogation from the "objective view of the defendant, i.e., would a reasonable person have been induced to make a statement by the detective's promises or assurances."
Justice Johnson wrote in his dissent that "anyone in Sharp's situation would have understood that the detective was promising that she was not going to jail 'as long as [she did] not do something dumb and jam [herself]." He added that a promise to take care of her homeless children is just as inducive or coercive as a promise of leniency.
The Supreme Court last December upheld Baker's convictions arising from Owen's murder. Hollingsworth's appeal is pending; Cornell did not appeal his guilty plea.
In the Baker case, the Court rejected his claim that the jury should have been instructed on his contention that he acted under duress, i.e., was forced to participate in the Owen murder under fear for his life. Justice Nuss, who also wrote the decision in Baker's case, said there was insufficient evidence of Baker being forced to help Hollingsworth to warrant an instruction for the jury to consider.
Justice Nuss wrote:
"In sum, even when viewed in the light most favorable to Baker, the evidence is insufficient to justify a rational factfinder finding in accordance with his compulsion defense. Any coercion or duress was not imminent or continuous when Hollingsworth and Owen were outside the camp. Moreover, Baker had reasonable opportunity to escape, or at least withdraw, from the criminal activities, particularly when alone in camp with Greene."
The Baker decision also upheld the admission of postmortem photographs, the prosecutor's use of a sports team analogy to explain the concept of aiding and abetting to the jury, and the defendant's sentence of life without the possibility of parole for 20 years for Owen's murder, plus 233 months for the kidnapping.